Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Fayetteville, NC

Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is, about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is falling are not telling you the same thing.

Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 92,650 jobs in the metro). QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose. Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means “suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”

Realized distress is RISING — 1.2% now (2026-07), +1.2pp over the year.

Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.

Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.

$57M of CMBS matures here within two years. The 3 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly $47M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is 1.21× that room. The median metro sits at 0.12×.

The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs — every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks have $37M of construction committed and not yet advanced, of which $19M comes out of the room above, leaving $28M, with 1 bank whose entire remaining room is spoken for. A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net across balance sheets — so $17M of what has been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws. SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land: 2 more cross it once their own commitments fund.

Counted — 3 regional & local CRE lenders

Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here

These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.

no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender

Truist Bank NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fsnb, National Association OK

national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends

First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local bank sector could absorb if it were the only door. Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held (SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share. Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 — the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show. Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded — 313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.