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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Fort Wayne, IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN
The read
$234M of CMBS across 16 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($90M, 39% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 2 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$50M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 1
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
2
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
16 / $234M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.3pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Fort Wayne, IN right now?
There is no single answer for Fort Wayne — the readings conflict, and one can’t be read at all. Bank stress is the only elevated signal: bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line sits at 549.4 $mm as of 2026-03-31, a rank of 58th of 393 metros by count and 50th by rate, at an 11.83% rate. On the tenant side, store closures are quiet (1 closure, 0.5 per 100k jobs) and layoff notices (WARN) are quiet (0 notices, 0.0%). The securitized loans in special servicing reading is unavailable — the leg is blind, so its low numbers are an absence of measurement, not evidence of no distress. With 2 of 6 pairs disagreeing — bank hot against both quiet closure and quiet WARN legs — the story is lender stress without a visible tenant or employment cause, which the pair notes say to read as construction or a rate reset rather than vacancy. The remaining 3 pairs are unadjudicated because the securitized side is blind. Overall: real but narrowly sourced distress, concentrated in the bank book, with no corroborating property-level signal.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
1 closures | 0.5 per 100k jobs | 258 of 392 | 299 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$549.4mm | 11.83% | 58 of 393 | 50 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
1 both quiet
2 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 201,987 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 233,110 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $4,644.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $264.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 23060 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Fort Wayne, IN, and which cannot be read?
For Fort Wayne, IN, the elevated distress signal is bank_distressed_cre, with distressed lender CRE at $549.4mm and bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reaching 17.7%. The CMBS special servicing reading is unavailable: while $0.0mm in CMBS special servicing UPB is reported, the tape shows all 1 loans in special servicing carry no balance, meaning the 0.0% share of metro UPB reflects a data gap rather than an absence of distress. Other readings, such as the 19.4% bank allocation share, are present, but the overall signal is immaterial and not a convergence, with distressed bank assets at 0.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $4.64bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 17.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $549.4mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 19.4%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 1
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 23060 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.4%3.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 201,987 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (16) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$50M — 22% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $234M of the metro's $234M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$50M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 13 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$708M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$708M
After Committed Draws
$420M / −41%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
13 / 0 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $288M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $288M
comes out of the room above, leaving $420M.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 13 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lake City Bank IN | 25.8% | 209% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Star Financial Bank IN | 35.3% | 139% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 5.3% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| The Farmers & Merchants State Bank OH | 11.0% | 231% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Crossroads Bank IN | 18.4% | 104% total 167%
|
🔒 | 4.00% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 2.8% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Greenway Bank OH | 42.0% | 169% total 212%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers And Merchants Bank IN | 67.4% | 230% total 242%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Savings Bank IN | 24.8% | 220% total 360%
|
🔒 | 1.43% |
| Community State Bank IN | 9.7% | 153% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Horizon Bank IN | 1.3% | 235% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Centier Bank IN | 1.1% | 265% total 318%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| The State Bank And Trust Company OH | 2.7% | 225% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · 1st Source Bank IN · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · First Bank Of Berne IN · The Garrett State Bank IN · The Hicksville Bank OH · The Antwerp Exchange Bank Company OH · The Bippus State Bank IN
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Old National Bank IN · Woodforest National Bank TX · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Star Financial Bank | $816M | 139% total 222%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Fort Wayne, IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Fort Wayne looks comfortably able to absorb its visible maturity load: with wall_to_room of 0.12 against $50.3mm maturing_bal across 5 maturing_loans, the metro ranks 191 of 275 (counting from the most strained), and 13 banks_qualifying against 4 banks_excluded_here suggests the room figure is not an exclusion artifact. Room_after_committed of $419.6mm still dwarfs the wall, and with committed_draws of $287.9mm pre-deducted from room_before_committed of $707.5mm, the pre-commitment ratio of wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.07 reinforces that cushion; note the wall is CMBS maturing within 24 months only, so this is an upper bound on what local banks would need to absorb, and any broader whole-maturity-load capacity reading is unavailable here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $50.3mm
- … across this many loans
- 5
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $707.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $287.9mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $419.6mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.12
- Rank, most strained
- 191
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 13
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $233.5mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.12 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
191 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 23060 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
2 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-19
CLOSURE
Fort Wayne
2026-08-03
CLOSURE
Fort Wayne
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-05-13
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Fort Wayne
2024-11-12
LAYOFF
157 jobs · Fort Wayne
2023-11-02
LAYOFF
93 jobs · Bluffton
2022-12-20
LAYOFF
85 jobs · Fort Wayne
2022-04-29
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Fort Wayne
2020-12-18
LAYOFF
154 jobs · Fort Wayne
2020-12-01
LAYOFF
52 jobs · Fort Wayne
2020-07-02
LAYOFF
86 jobs · Fort Wayne
2020-07-02
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Fort Wayne
2020-01-28
LAYOFF
116 jobs · Fort Wayne
2019-08-16
LAYOFF
69 jobs · Fort Wayne
What has actually happened on the ground in Fort Wayne, IN recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, Fort Wayne, IN shows 2 store closures, against 2 cre_bankruptcies, while warn_notices came in at 0 and jobs_affected at 0. Note that the bankruptcy figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count: each case is counted in its filing district and each SEC 8-K or news item in the filer's state, not where the property sits, and coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable. The jobs figure is also a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 2
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 23060 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.