Verstavo
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Computational intelligence for CRE

See credit stress early.
Understand it deeply.

Verstavo is a computational intelligence platform built to detect emerging distress in commercial real estate credit — before problems become obvious. Combining comprehensive CMBS and CRE data, deterministic analytics, and natural-language reasoning, it continuously monitors credit conditions, identifies early warning signals, and helps users investigate the risks behind them. From individual loans to the broader market, Verstavo turns credit surveillance into valuable, deeper understanding.

Public CRE disclosure, refined into a distress read you can act on — and audit.

Pulse Public record · current
Stressed CMBS
278
HIGH or CRITICAL
Maturing 90d
$7.2B
318 loans
Bankruptcies 7d
8
-23 vs prior 7d
Layoffs 7d
62
-65 vs prior 7d
Store closures 7d
9
-36 vs prior 7d
On the tape
$271.0B
12,152 loans · Search buildings →
The same readings, taken against the loans you watch. Start a free trial → No credit card required
Headlines Counts & totals · no verdicts
MARKET 8 CRE bankruptcy filings in the last 7 days
MARKET 318 CMBS loans ($7.2B UPB) maturing within 90 days
MARKET Layoff filing: Asama Coldwater Manufacturing Georgia (GA) · 102 jobs
MARKET Recent CRE bankruptcy: Aprica Properties LLC (NY)
MARKET Office carries the most distressed UPB of any property type · $4.9B across 1,887 loans See the sector read →
MARKET 9 states with 3 or more of the 4 distress signals elevated
MARKET $30.8B across 1,439 loans matures in 2027
Every line above is a count or a total, assembled from filings.
Stress Maps 125 metros
Share of each metro's CMBS balance that is 60+ days delinquent or in special servicing. Filed servicer data; bubble size is the metro's CMBS balance.
Every metro has a page. Browse all markets →
Insights Filed data · no forecast
◂ S&L DOTCOM GFC COVID 2% 4% 6% 8% 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
1991-03 – 2026-06 · 36 years · recovering (mid + falling)
U.S. bank noncurrent CRE across three downturns, from the Call Report panel. The phase names where the series sits against its own history.
2.5% 5% 7.5% 2021-10-01 2022-10-01 2023-10-01 2024-10-01 2025-10-01 2026-10-01
2021-07-01 → 2026-10-01 · latest 4.64%
Share of securitized balance reported delinquent, by quarter, as each trust filed it. The axis starts at zero.
$25.0B $50.0B $75.0B 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
Securitized balance reaching final maturity in each year, from the dates the trusts filed. Columns are billions.
Delinquency, year over year, by lender type
Each sector against its own year-ago reading, re-struck over only the lenders that filed in both periods.
CMBS conduit
+22%
2026-09 · 194 trusts
Bank CRE
-7%
2026-06 · 3,596 banks
Fannie Mae multifamily
-5%
2026-07 · whole book
Freddie Mac multifamily
+30%
2026-07 · whole book
Ginnie Mae multifamily
-48%
2026-06 · whole book
CRE CLO — four disclosing managers
+35%
2026-06 · 4 managers
Drawn at 30+ days: CMBS conduit · 90+ days OR nonaccrual: Bank CRE · 60+ days: Fannie Mae multifamily, Freddie Mac multifamily, Ginnie Mae multifamily · nonaccrual: CRE CLO — four disclosing managers
A percentage change in each sector's own delinquency rate, not a rate. Both ends of every comparison are measured over the same lenders, so a month when fewer of them file cannot move the number. The levels are not published here because the six are drawn at different thresholds and would rank the publishers rather than the market.
CRE bankruptcy velocity
65 filings in the last 30 days against a trailing-90d pace of 60 a month (182 in 90 days)
Filings (30d)
65
Filings (90d)
182
Run-rate / mo
60
10 20 30 2026-08-03 2026-08-17 2026-08-31 2026-09-14 2026-09-28 2026-10-12
90d by source · CourtListener: 182
CRE-flagged bankruptcies with a court docket. A news story about a company is not that company's filing and is not counted here.
Layoff pressure on CMBS collateral
590 mass-layoffs and 103,392 jobs in the last 90 days, with 196 more notices (36,593 jobs) already scheduled for the next 60
Layoffs (90d)
590
Jobs lost (90d)
103,392
CMBS MF exposed
2,317
Scheduled (next 60d)
196
36,593 jobs
83 166 250 2026-08-03 2026-08-17 2026-08-31 2026-09-14 2026-09-28 2026-10-12
WARN notices of 50 or more, counted where the layoff happens
WARN mass-layoffs whose workers live in ZIPs with CMBS-financed multifamily collateral, by the Census LODES worker-flow, plus the announced pipeline.
The early-warning signal replayed across the FDIC bank panel from 2001 — scored against what actually happened, not against a forecast. Would we have flagged it? →
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By lender · free

Every bank on the tape, as the regulator reads it

One page per bank on the Call Report tape above its $100mn asset floor — its commercial real estate concentration against the regulator’s own lines, and the public CRE tape cut to the metros where its branches are. The same sections for a one-branch bank and for the largest.

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By building · free

Every building on the CMBS tape, and who holds the debt

One page per commercial building with a securitized loan reported against it — every trust holding a piece, the balance each one reports, the maturity, the servicer and the named tenants, exactly as each trust filed them, with the disagreements between them printed rather than resolved. A building is the grain, not the loan, so one financed in four trusts appears once. A building financed privately by a bank, an agency or an insurer was never filed and is not on this tape.

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Verstavo School of CRE

A public course on how this market actually works — from reading a securitized loan tape to running a workout, written by the people building the platform.

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The cross-section

One collateral, three channels

The same building can sit on a bank’s balance sheet, inside a CMBS trust, or in a CRE CLO — each disclosing a different amount about it. The stress doesn’t leave when a loan changes hands; it moves.

See the cross‑section →
The long view

Where are we in the cycle?

U.S. bank noncurrent CRE back to 1991, across three downturns — so today’s reading has something real to be measured against.

Read the clock →
By property type

Where the distress actually is

The all‑property blend reads calm because it averages office’s downturn into the healthy types. Split it apart and the story changes — office vertical, multifamily quietly re‑rated, retail and storage fine.

See the breakdown →
National Pulse Public · the current edition
Verstavo National Pulse
Week of September 28, 2026
State of the cycle: a static core grinding while the floating-rate frontier turns up — the wall is stepping closer.
The Frontier Stops Blinking, and the Near Wall Steps Up
The fixed-rate core cooled a hair this week, but the floating-rate frontier confirmed its turn — and $4.23 billion of maturities just pulled into the 90-day window.

The core did the small, honest thing this week: it eased. Across 12,176 CMBS loans and $262.79 billion of balance, $15.94 billion — 537 loans, 6.1% — sits in special servicing or 60-plus days late. The rate ticked down a tenth, distressed dollars fell $360 million, and bank noncurrent CRE slipped to 1.16%. But read past the headline: the distressed loan count still rose by 19, and 75 loans worth $2.08 billion newly crossed the line against just 24 cures. A static pool that cools on dollars while it thickens on count is not healing. It is churning the same names.

The edition continues, with its sector and geography tables. Read the full edition →
Ask the data

Investigate by asking questions,
not by assembling analyses manually.

A plain-language question on every page and in every entity drawer, answered off the tape with the metric it used named beside it — and scoped to what you are looking at, so a question the surface cannot answer gets a refusal that says why rather than a number that looks like one.

The reasoning runs over the public record. Your loans, balances and borrowers are never sent to a language model.

How the answers are built →
And then there's your own book

You underwrote it once, at closing.
We re-underwrite it every quarter.

Import your loans and the underwrite keeps running — against today's rates, today's market, and the actual door each loan has to exit through. Not a score that sits there: a take-out test that names which constraint binds and the shortfall in dollars, re-run on every new tape.

Deterministic by design — your loans, balances and borrowers are never sent to a language model.

How the re-underwrite works →