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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NC, VA
The read
$1.5B of CMBS across 65 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 8.6% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($427M, 29% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($333M, 0.0% distressed). 12 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (293 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
The Record Is Turning in Hampton Roads, With 2028 the Year to Watch
Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk carries $1.5 billion of CMBS across 65 loans, and the filed record has turned the wrong way: distress sits at 8.6% as of July 2026 and is rising. That reading comes against a book whose fundamentals still look sound on paper, with a median DSCR of 1.85 and a metro unemployment rate of 3.7% as of August 2026, flat year over year. The distress here is declared, not forecast — loans the servicer has moved into special servicing or that have run 60-plus days past due.
The maturity calendar concentrates the attention on 2028, when $427 million comes due — 29% of the entire book and the heaviest single year in the schedule. Retail is the largest sector exposure at $333 million, and for now it is carrying none of the distress, showing a 0.0% rate against a 2.5% national retail mark. That is the notable split in this metro: the biggest book is the clean one, while the pressure in the filed record is building elsewhere.
On the ground, the past year brought 12 distress events — nine store closures and three layoff notices totaling 293 jobs. It is a modest tally for a book this size, but it is the real-economy counterpart to a servicer record that is moving in one direction. With only two banks of note in the local footprint and none flagged, the credit story here runs through the CMBS pipe, and 2028 is where it crests.
Written 2026-10-26
CMBS Distressed UPB
$135M / 9.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$477M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
9
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 293 jobs
0.05% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
65 / $1.5B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
0.0pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC right now?
Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC shows a mixed distress picture, with 3 of 6 signal pairs reading elevated on both sides and 3 pairs disagreeing. Store closures are elevated with 8 closures (rank 49th of 392 by count but 230th by rate at 1.34 per 100k jobs), reflecting size-driven pressure rather than per-capita stress, while bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at 568.2 ($mm) — a 5.94% rate (126th of 393). Securitized loans in special servicing are elevated at 7 rows, an 8.42% rate (54th of 335), the strongest rate showing. Layoff notices, however, read quiet at 3 notices (0.04% of employment, 210th by rate), and the disagreements between WARN and the property-level legs suggest the buildings are in trouble while employers aren't — a signature of lender stress with no employment event behind it. The closures leg is elevated on count only, so any narrative leaning on it should acknowledge this metro's size, not its per-unit strain.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 1.34 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 230 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | 0.04% | 136 of 386 | 210 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$568.2mm | 5.94% | 53 of 393 | 126 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
7 loan records | 8.42% | 24 of 335 | 54 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 599,036 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 833,711 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $9,566.5 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,603.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47260 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC, and which cannot be read?
In Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, and closures. Bank distressed CRE sits at $568.2mm (with bank CRE allocations at 0.0% of total bank CRE of $9.57bn), while CMBS special servicing UPB is $135.0mm, equal to 8.4% of metro UPB. Closures are rising with 8 store closures and 3 WARN notices in the past year. However, the bank CRE at-risk (90th percentile) reading is 2.7%, and the convergence score is 3 — indicating early-phase deterioration ("the leading edge"). Notably, the reading on distressed bank assets is unavailable, as the figure is 0 (no distressed banks), and the bank allocation exact share is 0.0%, so those specific figures cannot be meaningfully interpreted as elevated; only the listed signals are confirmed.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $135.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 8.4%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $9.57bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 2.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $568.2mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 7
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 8
- WARN notices (past year)
- 3
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47260 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%4.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 599,036 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 9.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.1% — $59M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+3.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
+4.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+3.1pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 7 loans, $214M, running 41.0% where the same type runs 11.0% elsewhere — worth 4.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$477M — 32% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 8.6% now (2026-07), +3.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $947M of the metro's $1.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$477M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 10 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.3B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.38× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.3B
After Committed Draws
$232M / −81%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.38×
Banks In Footprint
10 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.6B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.0B
comes out of the room above, leaving $232M,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $546M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 10 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Townebank VA | 59.4% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Southern Bank And Trust Company NC | 16.6% | 158% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Chesapeake Bank VA | 57.6% | 226% total 282%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Atlantic Union Bank VA | 4.7% | 264% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Dollar Bank, Federal Savings Bank PA | 3.7% | 168% total 187%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 1.0% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Primis Bank VA | 7.7% | 188% total 317%
|
🔒 | 3.31% |
| Citizens And Farmers Bank VA | 8.8% | 267% total 304%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Blue Ridge Bank, National Association VA | 4.6% | 255% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 6.8% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · The Bank Of Southside Virginia VA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Woodforest National Bank TX · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Servisfirst Bank AL · Amg National Trust Bank CO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Townebank | $9.0B | 249% total 345%
|
0.19% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC ranks 39 of 275 counting from the most strained, with a wall-to-room ratio of 2.05 against a median of 0.24 — banks here appear strained relative to the typical metro, though that ratio is an upper bound built on a CMBS-only maturity wall. The visible wall is $476.8mm across 18 maturing loans against room after committed draws of $232.3mm, falling from room before committed draws of $1.25bn once $1.57bn in committed construction draws is deducted; with banks_qualifying at 10 and banks_excluded_here at 6, that 2.05 is not explained by exclusion here, so the reading is not merely an artifact of invisible national or charter banks. Distressed share of 9.0% and CMBS UPB of $1.50bn round out the picture; any non-CMBS maturity load is unavailable in this reading.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $476.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 18
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.25bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.57bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $232.3mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.05
- Rank, most strained
- 39
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.38
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 10
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 9.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.50bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
2.05 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
39 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47260 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
12 local distress events in the past year (293 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Chesapeake
2026-09-28
LAYOFF
51 jobs · Virginia Beach
2026-09-21
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-01
LAYOFF
168 jobs · Norfolk
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Williamsburg
2026-05-29
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Williamsburg
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Williamsburg
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-02-17
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Virginia Beach
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
Virginia Beach
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
Williamsburg
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Hampton
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Virginia Beach
What has actually happened on the ground in Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC metro has recorded 9 store closures and 3 WARN notices, with 293 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies read 1, though this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 9
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 293
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47260 · geo_events · last changed 11 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.