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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Urban Honolulu, HI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · HI
The read
$1.0B of CMBS across 15 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($431M, 42% of the book). 1 on-the-ground distress event in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$381M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 6
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
1
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
15 / $1.0B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
2.9%
+0.7pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
74,052
-0.2% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Urban Honolulu, HI right now?
Urban Honolulu, HI, is showing no signs of CRE distress right now: all four legs read quiet and all 6 of 6 pairs agree. Measured over the trailing 365 days, the metro has seen 2 store closures — 0.56 per 100,000 jobs, ranking 179th of 392 by count and 296th by rate — and 0 layoff notices (WARN), a 0.0% share ranking 313th of 386. On the lender side, 0.0% of the $13,482.4mm in bank CRE allocated to this metro sits over the noncurrent line (0.0% rate, ranked 358th of 393). Securitized loans in special servicing stand at 1 row, or a 3.2% share of the $1,155.0mm balance read, ranking 90th of 335 by count and 83rd by rate. With 0 pairs both elevated, 0 pairs disagreeing, and 6 pairs both quiet, the reading is uniformly calm across storefronts, employers, banks, and the tape.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
2 closures | 0.56 per 100k jobs | 179 of 392 | 296 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$0 | 0% | 358 of 393 | 358 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 3.2% | 90 of 335 | 83 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
6 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 359,329 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 462,562 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $13,482.4 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,155.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46520 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
2.9%
+0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
2.1%3.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 359,329 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$381M — 37% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $984M of the metro's $1.0B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$381M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 8 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$5.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$5.7B
After Committed Draws
$4.2B / −27%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
8 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.6B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.6B
comes out of the room above, leaving $4.2B,
with 1 bank
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $7M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
Counted — 8 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Hawaiian Bank HI | 74.3% | 184% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Bank Of Hawaii HI | 70.0% | 179% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Savings Bank, National Association HI | 81.4% | 177% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Pacific Bank HI | 83.7% | 193% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hawaii National Bank HI | 89.5% | 125% total 199%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Finance Factors, Ltd. HI | 89.0% | 217% total 227%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Commonwealth Business Bank CA | 19.3% | 259% total 453%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 2.1% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
Not counted — 5 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Finance Factors, Ltd. | $202M | 217% total 227%
|
1.29% | 🔒 |
| Hawaii National Bank | $205M | 125% total 199%
|
0.02% | 🔒 |
| American Savings Bank, National Association | $1.8B | 177% total 203%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Hawaiian Bank | $5.3B | 184% total 223%
|
0.07% | 🔒 |
| Central Pacific Bank | $1.9B | 193% total 239%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Hawaii | $4.4B | 179% total 203%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
1 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-24
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-22
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2026-05-19
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-08-10
CLOSURE
Pearl City
2025-01-10
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2025-01-10
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2025-01-10
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2025-01-07
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2025-01-07
CLOSURE
Waipahu
2024-09-30
CLOSURE
Honolulu
2024-09-30
CLOSURE
Honolulu
What has actually happened on the ground in Urban Honolulu, HI recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground record for Urban Honolulu, HI shows 1 store closure and 0 warn_notices, with 0 jobs_affected — though that job figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount count toward the total but contribute zero. CRE-likely bankruptcy filings came to 3, but that is a STATE PROXY count of filings in the states where this metro's collateral sits rather than a metro-native figure, and coverage changes on 2026-09-16 mean counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 1
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46520 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.