Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Tulsa, OK
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OK
The read
$308M of CMBS across 18 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($133M, 43% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 11.5% as of 2026-07. 6 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
$36M / 11.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$51M
Local Banks (stressed)
4 / 25
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
18 / $308M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.6%
+1.3pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Tulsa, OK right now?
In Tulsa, OK, commercial real estate distress is mixed, with bank stress elevated but tenant and securitized signals quiet. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at 16.83% (ranked 28th of 393 metros by count and 26th by rate), while store closures are not elevated at 0.76 per 100,000 jobs (ranked 128th by count and 286th by rate). Securitized loans in special servicing are flat at 11.65% (ranked 90th of 335 by count and 45th by rate). Layoff notices (WARN) are unmeasurable—not a quiet signal—so their reading is unavailable. The two disagreeing pairs point to bank stress without a visible tenant cause (likely construction or rate resets, not vacancy) and lenders carrying stress on a book the securitized tape cannot see, with no pairs both elevated and one pair agreeing quiet.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
3 closures | 0.76 per 100k jobs | 128 of 392 | 286 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.11bn | 16.83% | 28 of 393 | 26 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 11.65% | 90 of 335 | 45 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
1 both quiet
2 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
blind: layoff notices (WARN)
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'layoff notices (WARN) cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 397112, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 513636, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 12543.7, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 309.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Tulsa, OK, and which cannot be read?
In Tulsa, OK, the elevated distress signal is bank distressed CRE exposure, with distressed lender CRE at $2.11bn and distressed bank assets at 7.8 (billion), alongside a bank CRE at-risk reading of 26.0% at the 90th percentile and bank CRE allocations at 28.8%. However, the CMBS reading is limited: special servicing UPB is $36.0mm, representing 11.7% of metro UPB, but the number of CMBS loans in special servicing is only 1. The real-economy signals are quieter—store closures in the past year total 3 and WARN notices total 2—while the convergence indicator is 1. Distress signals that cannot be read include any specific bank CRE dollar figure beyond the $2.11bn distressed lender CRE (total bank CRE is $12.54bn, but the at-risk share is not directly given as a dollar amount), and no further breakdown of the $36.0mm CMBS UPB into individual loan-level detail is available from the provided figures.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $36.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 11.7%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $12.54bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 26.0%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.11bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $7.80bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 28.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- late
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 4
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
credit losses are being worked out; the real-economy signals have already turned or lag
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
material CRE-credit distress; the ground-level signals are quieter
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.6%
+1.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.6%4.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 397,112 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (18) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$51M — 16% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 11.5% now (2026-07), -0.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $239M of the metro's $308M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$51M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 33 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.03× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.9B
After Committed Draws
$1.0B / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.03×
Banks In Footprint
33 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.2B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $832M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.0B,
with 16 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $376M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
7 of 33
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
17 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 33 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bancfirst OK | 17.0% | 160% total 216%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Arvest Bank AR | 12.7% | 213% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| First Bank Of Owasso OK | 100.0% | 108% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 3.2% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Gateway First Bank OK | 68.7% | 214% total 229%
|
🔒 | 3.37% |
| International Bank Of Commerce OK | 29.2% | 127% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Vast Bank, National Association OK | 100.0% | 163% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mabrey Bank OK | 84.1% | 240% total 402%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| The First National Bank And Trust Company Of Broken Arrow OK | 100.0% | 193% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Armstrong Bank OK | 14.0% | 204% total 272%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Patrons Bank, National Association OK | 84.7% | 194% total 264%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Bank Of Commerce OK | 46.5% | 117% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Pryority Bank OK | 73.2% | 248% total 354%
|
🔒 | 3.09% |
| First National Bank Of Oklahoma OK | 28.1% | 236% total 392%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Avb Bank OK | 100.0% | 273% total 411%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Bank 7 OK | 11.4% | 252% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Equity Bank KS | 2.8% | 237% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Firstar Bank OK | 21.5% | 253% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Maplemark Bank OK | 11.2% | 222% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ssb Bank OK | 29.2% | 119% total 149%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Spiritbank OK | 100.0% | 288% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Grand Bank OK | 87.5% | 289% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 1.0% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| All Capital Bank OK | 17.5% | 227% total 247%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The City National Bank And Trust Company Of Lawton, Oklahoma OK | 10.1% | 273% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank, National Association OK | 1.0% | 247% total 332%
|
🔒 | 2.04% |
| Oklahoma Capital Bank OK | 100.0% | 486% total 610%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Oklahoma Bank OK | 97.0% | 476% total 640%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Regent Bank OK | 68.1% | 300% total 425%
|
🔒 | 3.16% |
| Blue Sky Bank OK | 50.8% | 349% total 490%
|
🔒 | 3.42% |
| Legacy Bank & Trust Company MO | 9.5% | 483% total 521%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| Fidelity Bank, National Association KS | 2.0% | 323% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| First Fidelity Bank OK | 1.4% | 308% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
Not counted — 25 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Rcb Bank OK · American Heritage Bank OK · Commerce Bank MO · The Exchange Bank OK · American Exchange Bank OK · First Bank & Trust Company OK · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First Bank OK · Tib National Association TX
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Bokf, National Association OK · Midfirst Bank OK · Busey Bank IL · The Central Trust Bank MO · Umb Bank, National Association MO · Simmons Bank AR · Great Southern Bank MO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
American Bank And Trust Company OK · Security Bank OK · Triad Bank, National Association OK · Fnb Coweta OK · Stride Bank, National Association OK · Community Bank OK · Chickasaw Community Bank OK
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regent Bank | $1.0B | 300% total 425%
|
3.16% | 🔒 |
| American Bank And Trust Company | $71M | 111% total 140%
|
3.55% | 🔒 |
| Blue Sky Bank | $585M | 349% total 490%
|
3.42% | 🔒 |
| Gateway First Bank | $666M | 214% total 229%
|
3.37% | 🔒 |
| Spiritbank | $354M | 288% total 379%
|
0.74% | 🔒 |
| First Bank Of Owasso | $408M | 108% total 377%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| American Heritage Bank | $199M | 96% total 133%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Security Bank | $463M | 240% total 388%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Tulsa, OK have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Tulsa, OK’s refinance picture for maturing CMBS debt looks manageable, with local banks appearing to have ample capacity. The metro has $50.8mm in maturing CMBS across 4 loans, against regional and community bank lending room of $1.03bn after deducting committed construction draws — and $1.86bn before those draws. This yields a wall-to-room ratio of 0.05 (or 0.03 before committed draws), well below the median 0.20 among ranked metros, placing Tulsa 225th of 270 from the most strained reading — i.e., relatively slack. Only 33 banks in the metro qualify for this capacity measure (14 are excluded for non-local deposit footprints, though that exclusion does not distort this reading). The distressed share stands at 11.5%, but the sizeable room cushion suggests refinancing capacity is not a constraint here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $50.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 4
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.86bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.21bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.03bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.05
- Rank, most strained
- 225
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.03
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 33
- … excluded from the calculation
- 14
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 11.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $308.5mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.05 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
225 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46140 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
6 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Tulsa
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Tulsa
2026-03-13
LAYOFF
TULSA
2026-01-18
CLOSURE
Tulsa
2026-01-18
CLOSURE
Tulsa
2026-01-15
LAYOFF
Owasso
2024-10-22
LAYOFF
Sapulpa
2024-10-22
LAYOFF
Sapulpa
2024-08-01
CLOSURE
Tulsa
2024-07-30
LAYOFF
Barnsdall
2023-06-12
LAYOFF
Tulsa
2022-07-01
LAYOFF
Tulsa
2020-10-20
LAYOFF
Broken Arrow
2020-05-15
LAYOFF
Tulsa
2020-05-04
LAYOFF
Tulsa
What has actually happened on the ground in Tulsa, OK recently?
On the ground in Tulsa, OK, recent readings are largely quiet: CRE bankruptcies stand at 0 and jobs affected at 0. However, there have been 3 store closures and 2 WARN notices over the past 365 days. The jobs figure is a floor, as notices without a stated headcount contribute 0, and the bankruptcy count is a state proxy, not metro-native.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46140 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.