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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$1.8B of CMBS across 101 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($517M, 28% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($459M, 0.0% distressed). 49 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,843 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Tampa's CMBS book runs clean, but the maturity wall waits in 2031
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater carries $1.8 billion of CMBS across 101 loans, and by the servicers' own ledger the book is quiet. The heaviest maturity load does not land for years: $517 million, or 28% of the book, comes due in 2031, with that year's paper showing 0.0% distressed on the current record. Nearer-dated maturities are lighter, with $0.4 billion coming due inside 24 months.
Retail is the metro's largest book at $459 million and sits at 0.0% distressed, against a national retail rate of 2.6%. The other sectors tell the same story: multifamily at $0.3 billion and hospitality at $0.3 billion both read 0.0% distressed, well under national marks of 7.9% and 6.2%. Office, at $0.4 billion, is the book to watch given an 11.1% national distress rate, and the local labor backdrop is softer here — office-using employment of 368,144 is down 1.6% year over year, with metro unemployment at 4.7% as of August 2026, up 0.4 point from a year earlier.
The on-the-ground record, by contrast, has been active. The past year brought 49 distress events — store closures and layoff notices — touching 1,843 jobs. That is the kind of ground-level signal that runs ahead of the filed loan tape, and for now the two are not yet pointing the same direction.
Written 2026-10-25
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$390M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 11
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
36
Layoff Notices (1y)
13 / 1,843 jobs
0.14% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
101 / $1.8B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.7%
+0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
368,144
-1.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL right now?
All four distress signals are running elevated in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL right now, with 0 of 6 indicator pairs quiet and 0 of 6 disagreeing. Store closures are elevated, ranked 16th of 392 by count and 146th by rate (2.25 per 100k jobs); WARN layoff notices are elevated, ranked 22nd of 386 by count and 137th by rate (0.16% of employment); bank CRE over the noncurrent line is elevated, ranked 34th of 393 by count and 110th by rate (6.91% of the $21,004.0mm allocated to this metro); and securitized loans in special servicing are elevated, ranked 5th of 335 by count and 102nd by rate (0.54% of the $1,837.0mm current balance, though that rate is a floor measured over 2.9% of special-servicing rows). The unanimous agreement across all six pairs — closures with WARN, closures with bank, closures with CMBS, WARN with bank, WARN with CMBS, and bank with CMBS — points to broad-based stress across both the tenant and lender sides, not a single-sector story.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
29 closures | 2.25 per 100k jobs | 16 of 392 | 146 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
43 notices | 0.16% | 22 of 386 | 137 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.45bn | 6.91% | 34 of 393 | 110 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
35 loan records | 0.54% | 5 of 335 | 102 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 1,287,665 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,619,264 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $21,004.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,837.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.7%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%5.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,287,665 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$390M — 21% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.1B of the metro's $1.8B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$390M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 24 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.25× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.6B
After Committed Draws
$1.2B / −25%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.25×
Banks In Footprint
24 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $517M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $390M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.2B,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $128M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
9 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 24 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of Tampa FL | 96.0% | 156% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 3.1% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 9.5% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Bayfirst National Bank FL | 80.6% | 115% total 229%
|
🔒 | 3.43% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 2.0% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 4.1% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Climate First Bank FL | 79.2% | 261% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 8.4% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 15.9% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 4.7% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 1.0% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| First National Bank Of Pasco FL | 100.0% | 224% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Brannen Bank FL | 14.4% | 140% total 202%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Amerant Bank, National Association FL | 1.6% | 218% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Citizens Bank And Trust FL | 7.0% | 164% total 313%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Stearns Bank National Association MN | 1.1% | 148% total 215%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| Bankflorida FL | 49.8% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 5.5% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Bank Of Central Florida FL | 10.1% | 290% total 426%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Gulf Atlantic Bank FL | 5.8% | 231% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Flagship Bank FL | 100.0% | 419% total 548%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 52.2% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| American Pride Bank GA | 10.8% | 431% total 502%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Inb, National Association IL | 4.2% | 349% total 468%
|
🔒 | 1.48% |
Not counted — 34 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Td Bank, National Association DE · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Tcm Bank, National Association FL · The Huntington National Bank OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Beal Bank Usa NV · Trustco Bank NY · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Bank Ozk AR · First Horizon Bank TN · Centennial Bank AR · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Metro City Bank GA · United Community Bank SC · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Renasant Bank MS · Encore Bank AR · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ · Servisfirst Bank AL
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bayfirst National Bank | $257M | 115% total 229%
|
3.43% | 🔒 |
| Bankflorida | $259M | 281% total 437%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Flagship Bank | $485M | 419% total 548%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Raymond James Bank | $4.0B | 103% total 103%
|
1.49% | 🔒 |
| Central Bank | $210M | 398% total 588%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Tampa | $1.1B | 156% total 309%
|
0.03% | 🔒 |
| Climate First Bank | $673M | 261% total 347%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Waterfall Bank | $289M | 441% total 515%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-1.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.2%
Occupancy
96.0%
Rent Growth
-1.1%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | +0.6% | -0.9% | 95.5% | -1.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.0% | -0.9% | 95.8% | -0.3% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | -3.6% | -1.7% | 96.6% | -1.7% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
49 local distress events in the past year (1,843 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-09-18
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-19
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Brandon
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
Saint Petersburg
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
St. Petersburg
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Clearwater
What has actually happened on the ground in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL metro recorded 36 store closures and 13 warn notices, with 1,843 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the bankruptcy side, the metro-native reading is unavailable; the only figure is a state proxy, so 53 should be read as CRE-likely filings across the states this metro's collateral sits in, not a Tampa-specific count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 36
- WARN layoff notices
- 13
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,843
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 53
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.