Savannah carries $503M of CMBS across 26 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record, with no loan in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. That reading holds even though the book leans hard into a single sector: Hospitality is the largest exposure at $324M, and against a national hospitality distress rate of 6.1%, Savannah's hotel credit is currently carrying nothing declared. Median DSCR across the metro sits at 1.93.
The maturity picture is back-loaded. The heaviest load lands in 2031 at $199M — 39% of the book — with smaller tranches spread across 2027, 2029 and 2030. Little comes due inside the next two years, and every maturity year in the record prints at 0.0% distress today.
The pressure that exists shows up off the loan tapes rather than on them. Over the past year the metro logged three layoff notices covering 912 jobs, with no store closures filed. Broader labor conditions remain tight, with unemployment at 2.7% as of July 2026, down 0.2 points year over year. Among the three banks tracked here, none is distressed, though one sits on early-warning watch.
Savannah, GA shows no meaningful CRE distress right now. Across the four independent feeds, there are 0 elevated signals out of four, and all 6 of 6 possible pairwise comparisons agree on a quiet reading — with 0 pairs both elevated, 6 pairs both quiet, 0 pairs disagreeing, and 0 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. Store closures are at 0 closures (0.0 per 100,000 jobs); layoff notices (WARN) stand at 3 notices, a 0.42% rate of workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is $129.1 million, or 4.45% of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line; and securitized loans in special servicing are at 0 rows (0.0% of the securitized balance). The only caveat: the bank leg's rate is based on an allocation by branch deposits, since only 13.2% of those dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation — so that reading carries structural uncertainty, though with all other legs silent and no disagreements, the picture is uniformly calm.
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
0 closures | 0 per 100k jobs | 348 of 392 | 348 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | 0.42% | 136 of 386 | 42 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$129.1mm | 4.45% | 147 of 393 | 158 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
In Savannah, GA, the distress-signal readings are either unavailable or immaterial, so no elevated signals are identified. The metric overall is marked by “thin” evidence per the costume test, with convergence at “0” and a phase of “watch,” reflecting “an isolated signal, not a convergence”; materiality is “immaterial” due to “little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals.” Specific figures: bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) stands at “34.7%,” with bank CRE allocation at “13.2%” and lender-level distressed CRE at “$129.1mm”; CMBS special servicing UPB is “$0.0mm” (a “0.0%” share of metro UPB), and distressed bank assets are “0” (with “0” distressed banks). The counts show “3” WARN notices and “0” store closures or CMBS loans in special servicing; the core metric, bank CRE in distress at the P90 threshold, is unavailable because no dollar amount is provided for that measure.
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank GA | 4.2% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Queensborough National Bank & Trust Company GA | 9.6% | 162% total 327%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Carver State Bank GA | 100.0% | 155% total 156%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Banksouth GA | 21.7% | 247% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Great Oaks Bank GA | 42.5% | 248% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia GA | 100.0% | 253% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southeastern Bank GA | 5.9% | 157% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Coastal States Bank SC | 3.6% | 238% total 331%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Colony Bank GA | 3.9% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| The Claxton Bank GA | 11.8% | 230% total 366%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Bank Of Newington GA | 41.7% | 322% total 455%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia | $56M | 253% total 264%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Great Oaks Bank | $159M | 248% total 337%
|
0.07% | 🔒 |
Savannah, GA sits in a tight spot on refinancing capacity: its CMBS wall of $114.9mm maturing across 8 loans within 24 months is 2.29 times the room that 11 qualifying regional and community banks have left after committed draws of $180.5mm — that $50.2mm of remaining room covers only a fraction of the wall, ranking the metro 27 of 270 most strained. Stripping out the committed draws, room before commitments ($166.9mm) would cover the wall at a far more comfortable 0.69 ratio, and with distressed share at 0.0%, the strain looks more like a liquidity timing issue than a credit crisis. Still, the high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event — 4 banks are excluded here because their deposit footprints don't indicate local lending, so if Savannah is served mainly by those nationals, the true capacity may be stronger than this reading suggests. Unavailable: a direct count of how many of Savannah's maturing loans are CMBS-only versus other debt types.
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +0.4% | -1.8% | 95.1% | -2.0% | 2026-07-29 |
In the Savannah, GA metro over the past 365 days, the on-the-ground reading is minimal on the CRE distress side: approved store closures stand at 0 and CRE-likely bankruptcies (state proxy) are 0. However, labor-market stress is visible through 3 WARN notices affecting 912 jobs, though this jobs figure is a floor since notices without a stated headcount contribute zero. No figure for any additional closure or bankruptcy activity is available beyond these counts, so broader distress is not indicated here.