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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Savannah, GA

The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · GA
The read
$503M of CMBS across 26 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($199M, 39% of the book). Nothing in this book is distressed today; Hospitality is the largest exposure at $324M. Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 3 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (912 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Savannah's CMBS Book Runs Clean, With the Weight Sitting in Hospitality and 2031

Savannah carries $503M of CMBS across 26 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record, with no loan in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. That reading holds even though the book leans hard into a single sector: Hospitality is the largest exposure at $324M, and against a national hospitality distress rate of 6.1%, Savannah's hotel credit is currently carrying nothing declared. Median DSCR across the metro sits at 1.93.

The maturity picture is back-loaded. The heaviest load lands in 2031 at $199M — 39% of the book — with smaller tranches spread across 2027, 2029 and 2030. Little comes due inside the next two years, and every maturity year in the record prints at 0.0% distress today.

The pressure that exists shows up off the loan tapes rather than on them. Over the past year the metro logged three layoff notices covering 912 jobs, with no store closures filed. Broader labor conditions remain tight, with unemployment at 2.7% as of July 2026, down 0.2 points year over year. Among the three banks tracked here, none is distressed, though one sits on early-warning watch.

CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0% in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$115M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
0
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 912 jobs 0.53% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
26 / $503M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
2.7% -0.2pp yr

How much CRE distress is there in Savannah, GA right now?

Savannah, GA shows no meaningful CRE distress right now. Across the four independent feeds, there are 0 elevated signals out of four, and all 6 of 6 possible pairwise comparisons agree on a quiet reading — with 0 pairs both elevated, 6 pairs both quiet, 0 pairs disagreeing, and 0 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. Store closures are at 0 closures (0.0 per 100,000 jobs); layoff notices (WARN) stand at 3 notices, a 0.42% rate of workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is $129.1 million, or 4.45% of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line; and securitized loans in special servicing are at 0 rows (0.0% of the securitized balance). The only caveat: the bank leg's rate is based on an allocation by branch deposits, since only 13.2% of those dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation — so that reading carries structural uncertainty, though with all other legs silent and no disagreements, the picture is uniformly calm.

The figures behind this answer
SignalLevel Rate Rank by count Rank by rate Reading
store closures
store closures per 100,000 jobs
0 closures 0 per 100k jobs 348 of 392 348 of 392 quiet
trailing 365 days to today
layoff notices (WARN)
workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment
3 notices 0.42% 136 of 386 42 of 386 quiet
trailing 365 days to today
bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line
$129.1mm 4.45% 147 of 393 158 of 393 quiet
allocated
2026-03-31
securitized loans in special servicing
share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing
0 loan records 0% 220 of 335 220 of 335 quiet
2026-07-29
6 pairs compared 0 both elevated 6 both quiet 0 disagreeing 0 unreadable — a side is blind 0 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 171922, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 215025, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 2899.4, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 513.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Which distress signals are elevated in Savannah, GA, and which cannot be read?

In Savannah, GA, the distress-signal readings are either unavailable or immaterial, so no elevated signals are identified. The metric overall is marked by “thin” evidence per the costume test, with convergence at “0” and a phase of “watch,” reflecting “an isolated signal, not a convergence”; materiality is “immaterial” due to “little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals.” Specific figures: bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) stands at “34.7%,” with bank CRE allocation at “13.2%” and lender-level distressed CRE at “$129.1mm”; CMBS special servicing UPB is “$0.0mm” (a “0.0%” share of metro UPB), and distressed bank assets are “0” (with “0” distressed banks). The counts show “3” WARN notices and “0” store closures or CMBS loans in special servicing; the core metric, bank CRE in distress at the P90 threshold, is unavailable because no dollar amount is provided for that measure.

The figures behind this answer
CMBS in special servicing
$0.0mm
… as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
0.0%
Bank CRE lent into this metro
$2.90bn
… at risk at the 90th percentile
34.7%
CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
$129.1mm
Assets at those lenders
$0.00bn
… share needing no branch-deposit allocation
13.2%
Legs agreeing
0
Phase
watch
CMBS loans in special servicing
0
Distressed banks
0
Store closures (past year)
0
WARN notices (past year)
3
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing. This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent; office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two. That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
2.7% -0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.4%3.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is, about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Retail trade
23,028 jobs · +0.4% yr
Industrial
17,382 jobs · 0.0% yr
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 171,922 jobs in the metro). QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose. Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means “suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.8% — $29M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Hospitality
0.0% metro · 6.1% US · $324M
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
-6.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 10 loans, $324M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.1% elsewhere — worth 3.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$115M — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
2027
$88M · 5 loans · 0.0%
2028
$27M · 3 loans · 0.0%
2029
$54M · 6 loans · 0.0%
2030
$92M · 3 loans · 0.0%
2031
$199M · 7 loans · 0.0%
2032
$20M · 1 loan · 0.0%
2034
$22M · 1 loan · 0.0%
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $443M of the metro's $503M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Downtown Savannah / Historic District
$360M · 0.0%
Pooler / Garden City
$53M · 0.0%
Port Wentworth / Bloomingdale
$30M · 0.0%
Thunderbolt / Islands (Wilmington & Skidaway)
$29M · 0.0%
Southside Savannah
$23M · 0.0%
Midtown Savannah
$5M · 0.0%
Richmond Hill / Pembroke
$3M · 0.0%
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$115M of CMBS matures here within two years. The 11 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly $167M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is 0.69× that room. The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$167M
After Committed Draws
$50M / −70%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.69×
Banks In Footprint
11 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs — every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks have $180M of construction committed and not yet advanced, of which $117M comes out of the room above, leaving $50M, with 6 banks whose entire remaining room is spoken for. A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net across balance sheets — so $64M of what has been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws. SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land: 1 of 11 is past it on drawn balances alone, and 8 more cross it once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 11 regional & local CRE lenders
BankDeposit shareCRE / Capital*Room contributedNoncurrent CRE
Ameris Bank GA 4.2% 263%
total 319%
🔒 0.12%
Queensborough National Bank & Trust Company GA 9.6% 162%
total 327%
🔒 0.37%
Carver State Bank GA 100.0% 155%
total 156%
🔒 0.00%
Banksouth GA 21.7% 247%
total 303%
🔒 0.54%
Great Oaks Bank GA 42.5% 248%
total 337%
🔒 0.07%
First Bank Of Coastal Georgia GA 100.0% 253%
total 264%
🔒 0.00%
Southeastern Bank GA 5.9% 157%
total 223%
🔒 0.08%
Coastal States Bank SC 3.6% 238%
total 331%
🔒 1.53%
Colony Bank GA 3.9% 278%
total 392%
🔒 0.49%
The Claxton Bank GA 11.8% 230%
total 366%
🔒 3.03%
Bank Of Newington GA 41.7% 322%
total 455%
🔒 0.68%
Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
United Community Bank SC · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Bank Ozk AR · Renasant Bank MS
* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local bank sector could absorb if it were the only door. Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held (SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share. Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 — the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show. Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded — 313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
BankTotal CRECRE / Capital*Noncurrent CREEarly Warning
First Bank Of Coastal Georgia $56M 253%
total 264%
0.00% 🔒
Great Oaks Bank $159M 248%
total 337%
0.07% 🔒
* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.

Do the banks lending in Savannah, GA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?

Savannah, GA sits in a tight spot on refinancing capacity: its CMBS wall of $114.9mm maturing across 8 loans within 24 months is 2.29 times the room that 11 qualifying regional and community banks have left after committed draws of $180.5mm — that $50.2mm of remaining room covers only a fraction of the wall, ranking the metro 27 of 270 most strained. Stripping out the committed draws, room before commitments ($166.9mm) would cover the wall at a far more comfortable 0.69 ratio, and with distressed share at 0.0%, the strain looks more like a liquidity timing issue than a credit crisis. Still, the high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event — 4 banks are excluded here because their deposit footprints don't indicate local lending, so if Savannah is served mainly by those nationals, the true capacity may be stronger than this reading suggests. Unavailable: a direct count of how many of Savannah's maturing loans are CMBS-only versus other debt types.

The figures behind this answer
CMBS maturing in the window
$114.9mm
… across this many loans
8
Local bank room, before committed draws
$166.9mm
Committed construction draws
$180.5mm
Local bank room, after those draws
$50.2mm
Wall-to-room ratio
2.29
Rank, most strained
27
… out of this many metros ranked
270
… before committed draws
0.69
Population ranked against
CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
Qualifying local banks
11
… excluded from the calculation
4
Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
0.0%
Total CMBS balance here
$503.0mm
Capacity band
tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of 0.20 across the ranked metros.
2.29 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
27 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026 · Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.4%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.8%
Occupancy
95.1%
Rent Growth
-2.0%
REITSS NOISS RevenueOccupancyRentAs Of
MAA +0.4% -1.8% 95.1% -2.0% 2026-07-29
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
3 local distress events in the past year (912 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-01-31
LAYOFF
SDH Services EAST,LLC
120 jobs · Savannah
2025-10-20
LAYOFF
International Paper
101 jobs · Savannah
2025-10-20
LAYOFF
International Paper Savannah Mill
691 jobs · Savannah
2025-08-15
LAYOFF
Target Corporation
62 jobs · Savannah
2024-12-31
LAYOFF
Americold Logistics LLC
58 jobs · Pooler
2024-08-19
LAYOFF
Interfor
93 jobs · Bloomingdale
2024-07-01
LAYOFF
Southside Communities Fire Protection, Inc.
112 jobs · Garden City
2024-02-29
LAYOFF
William Barnet & Son, LLC
68 jobs · Savannah
2024-02-11
LAYOFF
Caesarstone Technologies USA, Inc.
129 jobs · Richmond Hill
2023-10-14
LAYOFF
Service Management Systems
155 jobs · Savannah
2023-08-18
LAYOFF
Progressus Therapy, LLC
241 jobs · Savannah
2023-03-18
LAYOFF
OA Logistics
345 jobs · Port Wentworth

What has actually happened on the ground in Savannah, GA recently?

In the Savannah, GA metro over the past 365 days, the on-the-ground reading is minimal on the CRE distress side: approved store closures stand at 0 and CRE-likely bankruptcies (state proxy) are 0. However, labor-market stress is visible through 3 WARN notices affecting 912 jobs, though this jobs figure is a floor since notices without a stated headcount contribute zero. No figure for any additional closure or bankruptcy activity is available beyond these counts, so broader distress is not indicated here.

The figures behind this answer
Store closures
0
WARN layoff notices
3
Jobs on those notices
912
CRE-related bankruptcies
0
Window, in days
365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view. “No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress. Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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