Savannah carries $463 million of CMBS across 26 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record. Hospitality is the dominant exposure at $284 million, and against a national hospitality distress rate of 6.2%, the metro's hotel book shows nothing in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. Median debt service coverage sits at 1.78, and the servicer ledger has given no ground.
The maturity calendar is where the attention belongs. The heaviest load lands in 2031, with $159 million — 34% of the book — coming due in a single year, well beyond the near-term refinancing window. Smaller tranches are spread across 2027, 2029 and 2030, none currently distressed.
Away from the loan tapes, the local labor picture is firm: unemployment of 2.9% as of August 2026, down 0.3 point year over year. The on-the-ground record shows a single distress event in the past year, a layoff notice affecting 120 jobs, and no store closures. For a book this concentrated in hotels, the filed record is quiet.
Savannah, GA shows no meaningful CRE distress right now. Across the four independent feeds, there are 0 elevated signals out of four, and all 6 of 6 possible pairwise comparisons agree on a quiet reading — with 0 pairs both elevated, 6 pairs both quiet, 0 pairs disagreeing, and 0 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. Store closures are at 0 closures (0.0 per 100,000 jobs); layoff notices (WARN) stand at 3 notices, a 0.42% rate of workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is $129.1 million, or 4.45% of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line; and securitized loans in special servicing are at 0 rows (0.0% of the securitized balance). The only caveat: the bank leg's rate is based on an allocation by branch deposits, since only 13.2% of those dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation — so that reading carries structural uncertainty, though with all other legs silent and no disagreements, the picture is uniformly calm.
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
0 closures | 0 per 100k jobs | 348 of 392 | 348 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | 0.42% | 136 of 386 | 42 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$129.1mm | 4.45% | 147 of 393 | 158 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
In Savannah, GA, the distress-signal readings are either unavailable or immaterial, so no elevated signals are identified. The metric overall is marked by “thin” evidence per the costume test, with convergence at “0” and a phase of “watch,” reflecting “an isolated signal, not a convergence”; materiality is “immaterial” due to “little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals.” Specific figures: bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) stands at “34.7%,” with bank CRE allocation at “13.2%” and lender-level distressed CRE at “$129.1mm”; CMBS special servicing UPB is “$0.0mm” (a “0.0%” share of metro UPB), and distressed bank assets are “0” (with “0” distressed banks). The counts show “3” WARN notices and “0” store closures or CMBS loans in special servicing; the core metric, bank CRE in distress at the P90 threshold, is unavailable because no dollar amount is provided for that measure.
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank GA | 4.3% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Queensborough National Bank & Trust Company GA | 9.5% | 162% total 327%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Carver State Bank GA | 100.0% | 155% total 156%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Banksouth GA | 16.4% | 247% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Great Oaks Bank GA | 49.1% | 248% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia GA | 100.0% | 253% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southeastern Bank GA | 6.4% | 157% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Coastal States Bank SC | 4.2% | 238% total 331%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Colony Bank GA | 4.4% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| The Claxton Bank GA | 9.7% | 230% total 366%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Bank Of Newington GA | 46.0% | 322% total 455%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia | $56M | 253% total 264%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Great Oaks Bank | $159M | 248% total 337%
|
0.07% | 🔒 |
Savannah, GA screens as one of the more strained metros for bank-side refinancing capacity: its wall-to-room ratio is 2.28 against a median of 0.24, ranking 35 of 275 counting from the most strained. The CMBS wall is modest in absolute terms — maturing_bal of $114.7mm across 8 maturing loans, with cmbs_upb of $462.7mm and a distressed_share of 0.0% — but the local bank room available to absorb it is thin: room_before_committed of $166.0mm falls to room_after_committed of $50.3mm once committed_draws of $182.4mm are deducted, leaving wall_to_room_before_committed_draws at 0.69. That said, this reading rests on only 11 banks_qualifying with 5 banks_excluded_here, so the apparent strain may partly reflect banks whose deposit footprint does not reveal where they lend rather than an actual capacity shortfall; note also that the maturing balance covers CMBS only, making every ratio an upper bound on what local banks would need to absorb.
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +0.4% | -1.8% | 95.1% | -2.0% | 2026-07-29 |
Over the past 365 days, the on-the-ground reading for Savannah, GA shows 0 store closures, alongside 1 WARN notice covering 120 jobs affected—though that jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute nothing to it. On the bankruptcy side, 80 CRE-likely filings are recorded, but this is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so it counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count.