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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$431M of CMBS across 28 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($86M). 17 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (557 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A small CMBS book, but the street-level record is doing the talking
Santa Rosa-Petaluma carries a modest CMBS footprint — $431 million spread across just 28 loans. The maturity wall is staggered rather than stacked, with the heaviest single-year load landing in 2028 at $86 million; the balance due inside the next 24 months runs to roughly $0.2 billion. Among the small bank set here — three institutions in all — none are flagged distressed, though one sits on early-warning watch.
The more telling signal is on the ground. The metro logged 17 distress events over the past year — 8 store closures and 9 layoff notices — tallying 557 jobs. That is the kind of filed, real-world record that moves ahead of the servicer tape, and it is the headline number here precisely because the CMBS book is too thin to carry the story on its own.
The macro backdrop is steady by comparison. Unemployment reads 4.5% as of August 2026, down 0.3 point year over year, while the office-using base of 29,951 jobs has slipped 1.0% over the same stretch. For a market this size, the watch items are the street-level closures and notices, not the loan book.
Written 2026-10-21
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$163M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
8
Layoff Notices (1y)
9 / 557 jobs
0.31% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
28 / $431M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.5%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
29,951
-1.0% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA right now?
Looking at Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA (CBSA 42220), the distress picture is clear and concentrated on the operating side. Three of the four independent feeds are elevated: store closures stand at 6 over the trailing year (3.35 per 100,000 jobs, rank 70th of 392 by count and 75th by rate), WARN layoff notices total 17 (0.19% of employment, 42nd by count), and bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $968.3mm (17.05% share of lent CRE, 42nd by count, 24th by rate). Distress on the securitized side, however, is not elevated, with 1 special-servicing row at a 2.23% share. The three agreeing pairs—closures/WARN, closures/bank, and WARN/bank—all read hot, pointing to a genuine operating-level deterioration feeding through to lender balance sheets. The three disagreements all involve the CMBS tape, which reads quiet while the other legs run hot; the structural notes indicate this is a retail story playing out on buildings the tape does not hold, with lenders carrying stress on a book the tape cannot see. With 0 quiet pairs and 3 of 6 disagreeing, the consistent message is operational stress in the local economy that has already reached the banking sector, while securitized capital remains insulated from the same pressures.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 3.35 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 75 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
17 notices | 0.19% | 42 of 386 | 122 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$968.3mm | 17.05% | 42 of 393 | 24 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 2.23% | 90 of 335 | 90 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 179,151 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 233,985 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $5,679.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $448.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42220 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.5%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.7%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 179,151 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$163M — 38% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $322M of the metro's $431M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$163M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 6 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$302M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.54× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$302M
After Committed Draws
$259M / −14%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.54×
Banks In Footprint
6 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $193M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $42M
comes out of the room above, leaving $259M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $151M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
Counted — 6 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exchange Bank CA | 91.7% | 225% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Summit State Bank CA | 87.4% | 341% total 509%
|
🔒 | 2.74% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 52.4% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Bank Of Marin CA | 10.5% | 366% total 440%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Tri Counties Bank CA | 0.4% | 315% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 0.4% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
Not counted — 8 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Westamerica Bank CA · Bmo Bank National Association IL · U.s. Bank National Association OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Poppy Bank | $4.6B | 360% total 557%
|
2.15% | 🔒 |
| Summit State Bank | $606M | 341% total 509%
|
2.74% | 🔒 |
| Exchange Bank | $1.1B | 225% total 255%
|
0.59% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
17 local distress events in the past year (557 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2027-01-26
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Petaluma
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
CLOSURE
Sonoma
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Sonoma
2026-09-17
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Santa Rosa
2026-07-22
LAYOFF
51 jobs · Santa Rosa
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
49 jobs · Santa Rosa
2026-03-23
LAYOFF
14 jobs · Kenwood
What has actually happened on the ground in Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground read for Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA is modest but real: 8 store closures and 9 warn notices, with jobs affected at 557 — a figure that is explicitly a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so actual displacement is likely higher. The CRE-side signal is far weaker than it looks: the 61 cre bankruptcies is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is — so it is not a metro-native count and should not be read as Santa Rosa-Petaluma distress; coverage also widened across both court feeds partway through the window, making counts before and after that date non-comparable. Note that closures reflect only APPROVED rows matched ZIP -> CBSA, so the 8 is a filtered count rather than the looser convergence-board tally.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 8
- WARN layoff notices
- 9
- Jobs on those notices
- 557
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 61
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42220 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.