Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$8.2B of CMBS across 216 loans. Office is the largest book ($4.9B) but runs below its national distress rate (10.1% vs 11.3%); the elevated risk is in Multifamily (33.3%, 4.4× national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($2.2B, 27% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 11.4% as of 2026-07. 231 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (13,932 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In San Francisco, the office fear is misplaced — the strain is in multifamily
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont carries $8.2 billion of CMBS across 216 loans, and the instinct is to point at office. That instinct is wrong here. Office is far and away the largest book at $4.9 billion, but its distress rate runs at 10.1% — below the 11.3% national mark for the sector. The pressure sits instead in multifamily, where 33.3% of the $0.9 billion book is distressed, some 4.4 times the 7.6% national rate. It is a smaller book, but the concentration of trouble is unmistakable.
The maturity wall is stacked toward the back end. The heaviest load lands in 2029, when $2.2 billion — 27% of the book — comes due, carrying an 11.0% distress rate. Nearer terms are lighter and cleaner: $1.0 billion in 2028 at 3.6% and another $1.0 billion in 2030 at 3.4%. Overall distress in the filed record is flat, reading 11.4% as of July 2026, against a median DSCR of 2.0 across the metro.
On the ground, the record shows 231 distress events over the past year — 77 store closures and 154 layoff notices totaling 13,932 jobs. Office-using employment is down 4.6% year over year even as the metro's unemployment rate, at 4.4%, has come off four-tenths of a point. The through-line for desks underwriting here: the office book is behaving better than the national tape, the multifamily book is not, and the 2029 stack is where the real weight sits.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$915M / 11.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.3B
Local Banks (stressed)
2 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
7 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
77
Layoff Notices (1y)
154 / 13,932 jobs
0.67% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
216 / $8.2B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.4%
-0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
694,628
-4.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA right now?
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA is showing broad-based distress across all four independent feeds, with all 6 of 6 paired readings agreeing on elevation and none quiet or disagreeing. Store closures stand at 61 closures (2.93 per 100,000 jobs), ranking 7th by count and 89th by rate of 392 metros. WARN layoff notices total 237 (0.62% of employment), ranking 2nd by count and 19th by rate of 386 metros. Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $9,832.9 million (20.94% of allocated CRE), ranking 8th by count and 15th by rate of 393 metros. Securitized loans in special servicing number 19 rows at $8,308.0 million (11.47% of the securitized balance read), ranking 9th by count and 46th by rate of 335 metros. Every pair agrees hot, including the bank-tape pair where disagreement elsewhere often signals book differences—here both are elevated, indicating stress is present on both balance-sheet and trust paper simultaneously.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
61 closures | 2.93 per 100k jobs | 7 of 392 | 89 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
237 notices | 0.62% | 2 of 386 | 19 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$9.83bn | 20.94% | 8 of 393 | 15 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
19 loan records | 11.47% | 9 of 335 | 46 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2082908, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2345350, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 46950.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 8308.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, and which cannot be read?
In San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, elevated distress signals include bank distressed CRE (with 14.1% of bank CRE at the 90th percentile, equating to $2.10bn in distressed bank assets), CMBS special servicing (11.5% of metro UPB, or $953.0mm), and both closures (61 store closures) and WARN notices (237) in the real economy. The figure for bank CRE allocation as a share of total bank assets (5.0%) is not among the elevated signals, and the reading for the level of bank CRE itself ($46.95bn) is not provided as a distress signal—only the at-risk share is available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $953.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 11.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $46.95bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 14.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $9.83bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $2.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 5.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 19
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 61
- WARN notices (past year)
- 237
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.4%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.6%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,082,908 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 11.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 8.6% — $213M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+2.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+2.7pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+1.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 29 loans, $886M, running 33.3% where the same type runs 7.0% elsewhere — worth 2.8pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.3B — 16% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 11.4% now (2026-07), +0.2pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $5.5B of the metro's $8.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.3B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 32 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.2B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.05× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.2B
After Committed Draws
$942M / −22%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.05×
Banks In Footprint
32 / 17 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $733M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $267M
comes out of the room above, leaving $942M,
with 18 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $466M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 32 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fremont Bank CA | 91.9% | 217% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 4.4% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Usa, National Association NY | 21.0% | 154% total 183%
|
🔒 | 11.70% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank Of Central California CA | 10.1% | 164% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| California Pacific Bank CA | 100.0% | 117% total 159%
|
🔒 | 19.25% |
| First Bank MO | 6.2% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Amalgamated Bank NY | 5.1% | 235% total 239%
|
🔒 | 4.15% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 9.1% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Exchange Bank CA | 6.9% | 225% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Beneficial State Bank CA | 50.6% | 285% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.44% |
| Summit Bank CA | 100.0% | 270% total 325%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| State Bank Of India (California) CA | 18.2% | 276% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| Bac Community Bank CA | 28.7% | 276% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ctbc Bank Corp. (Usa) CA | 0.9% | 214% total 252%
|
🔒 | 2.90% |
| Gbc International Bank CA | 15.4% | 269% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Beacon Business Bank, National Association CA | 100.0% | 371% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of San Rafael CA | 100.0% | 454% total 455%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of The Orient CA | 99.6% | 378% total 580%
|
🔒 | 2.35% |
| Metropolitan Bank CA | 87.3% | 340% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Marin CA | 63.3% | 366% total 440%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 35.1% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| United Business Bank CA | 31.0% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 26.9% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 25.8% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Commercial Bank Of California CA | 23.2% | 470% total 592%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Tri Counties Bank CA | 14.2% | 315% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Liberty Bank, National Association CA | 14.1% | 480% total 519%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Summit State Bank CA | 12.7% | 341% total 509%
|
🔒 | 2.74% |
| Five Star Bank CA | 11.7% | 536% total 640%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 7.4% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| Preferred Bank CA | 5.0% | 357% total 380%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 3.0% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
Not counted — 34 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Bank Of America California, National Association CA · Bmo Bank National Association IL · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Westamerica Bank CA · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Bank Of Stockton CA · Monet Bank TX · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Happen Bank, National Association UT · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
East West Bank CA · City National Bank CA · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Cathay Bank CA · Columbia Bank OR · Cibc Bank Usa IL · Bank Of Guam GU · Wafd Bank WA · Hanmi Bank CA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Pacific Coast Bankers' Bank CA · Bank Of San Francisco CA · Gateway Bank, F.s.b. CA · Mission National Bank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial State Bank | $913M | 285% total 395%
|
3.44% | 🔒 |
| California Pacific Bank | $69M | 117% total 159%
|
19.25% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of The Orient | $802M | 378% total 580%
|
2.35% | 🔒 |
| Summit Bank | $151M | 270% total 325%
|
1.94% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of San Francisco | $284M | 235% total 300%
|
0.08% | 🔒 |
| Metropolitan Bank | $127M | 340% total 421%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Mission National Bank | $149M | 378% total 429%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Business Bank, National Association | $97M | 371% total 492%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA has 32 qualifying banks and 15 excluded here, with a maturing CMBS wall of $1.28bn across 66 loans against local bank room of $942.4mm after committed draws — a wall-to-room ratio of 1.35, versus a median of 0.20. That ranks the metro 44 of 270, counting from the most strained, so its banks appear stretched to refinance the full maturing load; however, the distressed share reads 11.3%, and this wall is CMBS-only, so the true capacity picture is an upper bound on local absorption rather than a complete view.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.28bn
- … across this many loans
- 66
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.21bn
- Committed construction draws
- $732.6mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $942.4mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.35
- Rank, most strained
- 44
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.05
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 32
- … excluded from the calculation
- 15
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 11.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $8.12bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.35 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
44 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+7.6%
Same-Store Revenue
+5.9%
Occupancy
97.2%
Rent Growth
+5.8%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +4.6% | 96.6% | +4.3% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | +8.7% | +6.5% | 97.7% | +5.6% | 2026-04-28 |
| ESS | — | +4.4% | 96.8% | — | 2026-07-30 |
| UDR | +6.5% | +8.0% | 97.8% | +7.6% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
231 local distress events in the past year (13,932 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
San Francisco
2026-11-03
CLOSURE
Brentwood
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Oakland
2026-09-16
CLOSURE
Redwood City
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
San Francisco
2026-09-09
LAYOFF
64 jobs · Martinez
2026-09-03
LAYOFF
93 jobs · San Francisco
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
San Ramon
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Livermore
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Dublin
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Dublin
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Hayward
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Hayward
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
58 jobs · South San Francisco
2026-08-28
CLOSURE
Berkeley
What has actually happened on the ground in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA recently?
In the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA metro over the past 365 days, the ground-level readings show 154 WARN notices affecting 13,882 jobs (a floor, as notices without a stated headcount contribute 0), alongside 63 approved store closures—a metro-native count via ZIP matching. Additionally, there have been 3 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings, though this is a state proxy (based on the filer’s state, not property location), so a metro-native bankruptcy reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 63
- WARN layoff notices
- 154
- Jobs on those notices
- 13,882
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.