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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$8.2B of CMBS across 214 loans. Office is the largest book ($5.0B) but runs below its national distress rate (10.0% vs 11.1%); the elevated risk is in Mixed-Use (9.3%, 1.7× national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($2.2B, 27% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 11.4% as of 2026-07. 226 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (15,778 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the weight, but the sharp edge is in Mixed-Use
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont holds $8.2 billion of CMBS across 214 loans, and office is the dominant book at $5.0 billion. That concentration looks worse than it reads: office here runs at a 10.0% distress rate, below its 11.1% national mark. The elevated risk sits elsewhere. Mixed-Use, a smaller $0.7 billion book, is distressed at 9.3% — 1.7 times the national rate of 5.4%. Industrial and Retail, by contrast, show no filed distress at all.
The maturity wall is back-loaded. The heaviest load lands in 2029, with $2.2 billion — 27% of the book — coming due at an 11.0% distress rate. The nearer years are lighter: $1.0 billion matures in 2028 at 3.6%, and $1.4 billion comes due inside the next 24 months. Across the metro, median DSCR stands at 2.0.
Distress is flat in the filed record, at 11.4% as of July 2026. On the ground, the past year brought 226 distress events — 77 store closures and 149 layoff notices totaling 15,778 jobs. Office-using employment, at 694,628 jobs, is down 4.6% year over year, even as metro unemployment sits at 4.6%, off 0.3 points from a year earlier.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$915M / 11.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.4B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
7 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
77
Layoff Notices (1y)
149 / 15,778 jobs
0.76% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
214 / $8.2B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.6%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
694,628
-4.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA right now?
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA is showing broad-based distress across all four independent feeds, with all 6 of 6 paired readings agreeing on elevation and none quiet or disagreeing. Store closures stand at 61 closures (2.93 per 100,000 jobs), ranking 7th by count and 89th by rate of 392 metros. WARN layoff notices total 237 (0.62% of employment), ranking 2nd by count and 19th by rate of 386 metros. Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $9,832.9 million (20.94% of allocated CRE), ranking 8th by count and 15th by rate of 393 metros. Securitized loans in special servicing number 19 rows at $8,308.0 million (11.47% of the securitized balance read), ranking 9th by count and 46th by rate of 335 metros. Every pair agrees hot, including the bank-tape pair where disagreement elsewhere often signals book differences—here both are elevated, indicating stress is present on both balance-sheet and trust paper simultaneously.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
61 closures | 2.93 per 100k jobs | 7 of 392 | 89 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
237 notices | 0.62% | 2 of 386 | 19 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$9.83bn | 20.94% | 8 of 393 | 15 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
19 loan records | 11.47% | 9 of 335 | 46 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 2,082,908 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 2,345,350 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $46,950.5 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $8,308.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, and which cannot be read?
In San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, elevated distress signals include bank distressed CRE (with 14.1% of bank CRE at the 90th percentile, equating to $2.10bn in distressed bank assets), CMBS special servicing (11.5% of metro UPB, or $953.0mm), and both closures (61 store closures) and WARN notices (237) in the real economy. The figure for bank CRE allocation as a share of total bank assets (5.0%) is not among the elevated signals, and the reading for the level of bank CRE itself ($46.95bn) is not provided as a distress signal—only the at-risk share is available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $953.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 11.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $46.95bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 14.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $9.83bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $2.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 5.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 19
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 61
- WARN notices (past year)
- 237
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.6%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.6%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,082,908 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 11.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 8.5% — $215M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 5 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+2.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+2.9pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+1.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 30 loans, $895M, where the same type runs 7.3% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.4B — 17% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 11.4% now (2026-07), +0.2pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $5.5B of the metro's $8.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.4B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 35 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.4B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.98× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.4B
After Committed Draws
$1.1B / −24%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.98×
Banks In Footprint
35 / 17 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $854M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $345M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.1B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $509M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 35 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fremont Bank CA | 91.2% | 217% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 6.1% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Usa, National Association NY | 24.8% | 154% total 183%
|
🔒 | 11.70% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank Of Central California CA | 9.3% | 164% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| California Pacific Bank CA | 100.0% | 117% total 159%
|
🔒 | 19.25% |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 14.1% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Bank MO | 6.1% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Gateway Bank, F.s.b. CA | 100.0% | 190% total 204%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Amalgamated Bank NY | 5.1% | 235% total 239%
|
🔒 | 4.15% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 9.8% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Exchange Bank CA | 7.0% | 225% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Beneficial State Bank CA | 49.4% | 285% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.44% |
| Summit Bank CA | 100.0% | 270% total 325%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| Ctbc Bank Corp. (Usa) CA | 1.9% | 214% total 252%
|
🔒 | 2.90% |
| State Bank Of India (California) CA | 20.1% | 276% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| Bac Community Bank CA | 29.6% | 276% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Gbc International Bank CA | 12.4% | 269% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Beacon Business Bank, National Association CA | 100.0% | 371% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of San Rafael CA | 100.0% | 454% total 455%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of The Orient CA | 96.4% | 378% total 580%
|
🔒 | 2.35% |
| Metropolitan Bank CA | 86.5% | 340% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Marin CA | 64.8% | 366% total 440%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 38.1% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| United Business Bank CA | 33.3% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 22.4% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 22.1% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Commercial Bank Of California CA | 19.6% | 470% total 592%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Liberty Bank, National Association CA | 17.2% | 480% total 519%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tri Counties Bank CA | 15.8% | 315% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Five Star Bank CA | 15.1% | 536% total 640%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Summit State Bank CA | 12.6% | 341% total 509%
|
🔒 | 2.74% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 6.4% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| Preferred Bank CA | 5.4% | 357% total 380%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 3.3% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 0.0% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 34 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Bank Of America California, National Association CA · Bmo Bank National Association IL · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Westamerica Bank CA · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Bank Of Stockton CA · Monet Bank TX · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Happen Bank, National Association UT · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
East West Bank CA · City National Bank CA · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Cathay Bank CA · Columbia Bank OR · Bank Of Guam GU · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Hanmi Bank CA · Wafd Bank WA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial State Bank | $913M | 285% total 395%
|
3.44% | 🔒 |
| California Pacific Bank | $69M | 117% total 159%
|
19.25% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of The Orient | $802M | 378% total 580%
|
2.35% | 🔒 |
| Summit Bank | $151M | 270% total 325%
|
1.94% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of San Francisco | $284M | 235% total 300%
|
0.08% | 🔒 |
| Metropolitan Bank | $127M | 340% total 421%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Mission National Bank | $149M | 378% total 429%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Business Bank, National Association | $97M | 371% total 492%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA ranks 51 of 275 on strain, and its CMBS wall of $1.41bn against regional and community bank room is a wall_to_room of 1.29 — above the median of 0.24 — leaving room_after_committed of $1.09bn (room_before_committed of $1.44bn, wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.98) across 67 maturing_loans, so local bank capacity does not appear to cover the visible maturity load; note that 35 banks_qualifying versus 14 banks_excluded_here means some of this strain may reflect excluded lenders rather than true incapacity, and the $8.23bn cmbs_upb and 11.1% distressed_share frame the broader market this sits within.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.41bn
- … across this many loans
- 67
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.44bn
- Committed construction draws
- $853.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.09bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.29
- Rank, most strained
- 51
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.98
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 35
- … excluded from the calculation
- 14
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 11.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $8.23bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.29 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
51 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+7.6%
Same-Store Revenue
+5.9%
Occupancy
97.2%
Rent Growth
+5.8%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +4.6% | 96.6% | +4.3% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | +8.7% | +6.5% | 97.7% | +5.6% | 2026-04-28 |
| ESS | — | +4.4% | 96.8% | — | 2026-07-30 |
| UDR | +6.5% | +8.0% | 97.8% | +7.6% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
226 local distress events in the past year (15,778 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-03
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Brentwood
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · San Francisco
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Richmond
2026-10-15
CLOSURE
San Francisco
2026-10-15
CLOSURE
San Francisco
2026-10-15
CLOSURE
Berkeley
2026-10-15
LAYOFF
190 jobs · San Francisco
2026-10-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
Livermore
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
Livermore
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
What has actually happened on the ground in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA metro recorded 77 store closures and 149 WARN notices, with 15,778 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor given that notices stating no headcount contribute zero. The CRE bankruptcy reading of 61 is a state proxy, counting CRE-likely filings in the states where this metro's collateral sits rather than a metro-native count, and coverage widened across both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so pre- and post-date counts are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 77
- WARN layoff notices
- 149
- Jobs on those notices
- 15,778
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 61
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41860 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.