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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$1.2B of CMBS across 69 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($472M, 38% of the book). Distress is easing in the filed record — 5.8% as of 2026-07. 17 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,317 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
San Antonio's record is cooling, with the real test still three years out
San Antonio-New Braunfels carries $1.2B of CMBS across 69 loans, a mid-sized book whose weight sits well down the road. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, where $472M — 38% of the book — comes due, dwarfing the nearer-term slate. Only about $0.2B matures inside the next 24 months, so the refinancing question here is a 2029 story, not an immediate one. Underwriting backs that up: the median DSCR across the book stands at 1.68.
In the filed record, distress is easing — 5.8% as of July 2026, and the trend is falling. The servicer-declared status is the point: multifamily and self-storage both read clean on the distress line, with multifamily in particular running far below the 7.9% national rate for the sector. Of the ten banks with local exposure, none are flagged distressed, though three sit on the early-warning list.
The harder signal is on the ground. The metro logged 17 distress events over the past year — 10 store closures and 7 layoff notices — totaling 1,317 jobs. That real-economy churn runs against the cooling filed record, and bears watching as the 2029 wall approaches. Unemployment, at 4.5% as of August 2026, is up 0.2 points year over year.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$249M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 10
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
10
Layoff Notices (1y)
7 / 1,317 jobs
0.14% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
69 / $1.2B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.5%
+0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX right now?
For San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX, three of the four distress signals are elevated, and none of the four are quiet. Store closures are running hot, but only because the metro is large: 8 closures clear the count threshold while ranking 277th of 392 by closures per 100,000 jobs. WARN notices are also elevated, at 8 notices (0.13% of employment). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at $1,102.9mm, or 7.66% of the book allocated to this metro. The securitized tape is quiet, with 2 special-servicing rows at 5.73% of balance. Three pairs disagree: closures hot against a quiet tape reads as retail failing on buildings the tape doesn’t hold; WARN hot against the quiet tape reads as employers cutting while the securitized book hasn’t moved; and bank hot against the tape quiet reads as lenders stressed on a book the tape can’t see. The three agreeing pairs all sit hot, so this is a metro where size, not rate, carries the closures signal.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 0.86 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 277 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
8 notices | 0.13% | 67 of 386 | 150 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.10bn | 7.66% | 41 of 393 | 101 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 5.73% | 66 of 335 | 65 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 933,122 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,285,786 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $14,407.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,222.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.5%
+0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 933,122 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$249M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 5.8% now (2026-07), -1.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $809M of the metro's $1.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$249M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 36 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.05× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$4.9B
After Committed Draws
$3.3B / −33%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.05×
Banks In Footprint
36 / 9 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $2.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.6B
comes out of the room above, leaving $3.3B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $468M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
9 of 36
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 36 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frost Bank TX | 31.1% | 123% total 208%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Broadway National Bank TX | 78.7% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 7.2% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| International Bank Of Commerce TX | 16.2% | 215% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.90% |
| Texas Capital Bank TX | 2.6% | 105% total 130%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Jefferson Bank TX | 99.0% | 251% total 352%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| First Commercial Bank, National Association TX | 95.2% | 163% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| Txn Bank TX | 79.4% | 180% total 220%
|
🔒 | 1.55% |
| Castroville State Bank TX | 100.0% | 133% total 170%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southtrust Bank, N.a. TX | 32.5% | 145% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 3.9% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Texas Community Bank TX | 7.9% | 194% total 272%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 6.5% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| Third Coast Bank TX | 3.6% | 236% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 0.3% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 3.0% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Security State Bank & Trust TX | 17.6% | 266% total 346%
|
🔒 | 3.45% |
| Rio Bank TX | 15.2% | 242% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Lone Star National Bank TX | 2.8% | 207% total 276%
|
🔒 | 1.31% |
| Susser Bank TX | 5.5% | 243% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Security State Bank TX | 31.7% | 278% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 1.8% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Falcon International Bank TX | 9.5% | 285% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Moody National Bank TX | 3.4% | 278% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.18% |
| Ozona Bank TX | 1.5% | 174% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank And Trust, S.s.b. TX | 0.7% | 112% total 166%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Texas Regional Bank TX | 4.0% | 295% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Schertz Bank & Trust TX | 94.2% | 345% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Sonora TX | 24.5% | 327% total 439%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Liberty Capital Bank TX | 23.8% | 372% total 439%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Vantage Bank Texas TX | 15.1% | 314% total 424%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| Texas Champion Bank TX | 14.2% | 373% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Sage Capital Bank, TX | 9.6% | 329% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 2.6% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Pinnacle Bank TX | 2.3% | 352% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| First Lockhart Bank TX | 0.1% | 365% total 510%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
Not counted — 26 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Citibank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Falls City National Bank TX · Farm Bureau Bank Fsb NV · Truist Bank NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Marion State Bank TX · The Lytle State Bank Of Lytle, Texas TX · Amarillo National Bank TX · First State Bank Of Uvalde TX · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Trusttexas Bank, Ssb TX · Transpecos Banks, Ssb TX
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Bokf, National Association OK · Midfirst Bank OK · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Bank Ozk AR · Woodforest National Bank TX · Centennial Bank AR · Encore Bank AR · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Simmons Bank AR
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Txn Bank | $146M | 180% total 220%
|
1.55% | 🔒 |
| Frost Bank | $10.7B | 123% total 208%
|
0.74% | 🔒 |
| Schertz Bank & Trust | $537M | 345% total 467%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Vantage Bank Texas | $2.2B | 314% total 424%
|
1.04% | 🔒 |
| Jefferson Bank | $980M | 251% total 352%
|
1.04% | 🔒 |
| First Commercial Bank, National Association | $166M | 163% total 273%
|
0.67% | 🔒 |
| Broadway National Bank | $1.6B | 176% total 244%
|
0.03% | 🔒 |
| Castroville State Bank | $52M | 133% total 170%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-7.2%
Same-Store Revenue
-3.3%
Occupancy
94.4%
Rent Growth
-2.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -7.2% | -3.3% | 94.4% | -2.5% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
17 local distress events in the past year (1,317 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
LAYOFF
San Antonio
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-09-15
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-08-27
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
New Braunfels
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
New Braunfels
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
San Antonio
What has actually happened on the ground in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX metro logged 10 store closures and 7 WARN notices, with 1,317 jobs affected — though that figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. The CRE bankruptcy reading for this metro is not a native count: the state-proxy figure of 154 reflects CRE-likely filings in the states where this metro's collateral sits (each court case counted once, a case attributed to its filing district and an SEC 8-K to the filer's state), and coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 10
- WARN layoff notices
- 7
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,317
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 154
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.