Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Salt Lake City-Murray, UT
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · UT
The read
$683M of CMBS across 40 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 4.0% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($248M, 36% of the book). Office is the largest book ($326M, 8.8% distressed). 6 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (368 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office anchors the book, and the filed record is turning up
Salt Lake City-Murray carries $683M of CMBS across 40 loans, and the distress rate on the filed record has been rising — reaching 4.0% as of July 2026. That is a modest headline number by national standards, but the trend, not the level, is the story here. Underlying credit still reads sound at the median, with a median DSCR of 2.18.
The weight of the book sits in office, the metro's largest sector at $326M and running 8.8% distressed — elevated in absolute terms, though still below the 11.3% national office rate. Retail, by contrast, shows no distress in the filed record against a 2.7% national mark. The maturity calendar concentrates the risk: $248M, or 36% of the book, comes due in 2027, the single heaviest year on the schedule.
Away from the securitized data, the on-the-ground record shows six distress events over the past year — three store closures and three layoff notices totaling 368 jobs. It is a real signal in a metro whose broader labor market remains firm, with unemployment at 3.5% as of July 2026. Desks watching this book should keep the 2027 wall and the office concentration in front of them.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$29M / 4.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$321M
Local Banks (stressed)
6 / 30
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
3
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 368 jobs
0.05% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
40 / $683M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
-0.2pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
216,307
-0.4% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Salt Lake City-Murray, UT right now?
Salt Lake City-Murray, UT is showing a mixed but notable distress picture across the four tracked feeds. The bank CRE leg is clearly elevated, with 18558.4 $mm in noncurrent loans — a 44.98% share of the metro's lent CRE — ranking it 3rd of 393 by count and 4th by rate. Store closures are also elevated (6 closures, ranking 70th of 392 by count), but this is purely a size effect: at 0.86 closures per 100,000 jobs, the metro ranks just 277th by rate, so the reading reflects scale rather than per-unit stress. The other two legs are quiet: WARN layoff notices show only 4 notices (0.05% of employment, rank 113th by count), and securitized CMBS loans in special servicing show 0 rows, a 0.0% rate. Of the six leg pairs, 4 disagree, 1 has both elevated, and 1 has both quiet — with the disagreement typically reflecting structural differences (e.g., store closures hot while WARN is quiet indicates small-operator failures below the filing floor, while bank stress without an employment event suggests lender exposure on a book not tied to local job losses). No blind legs affect this metro's readings.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 0.86 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 277 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
4 notices | 0.05% | 113 of 386 | 203 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$18.56bn | 44.98% | 3 of 393 | 4 of 393 | elevated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 701194, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 717788, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 41259.9, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 709.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41620 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Salt Lake City-Murray, UT, and which cannot be read?
In Salt Lake City-Murray, UT, elevated distress signals include bank-distressed CRE exposure—with "distressed_lender_cre" at $18.56bn and "distressed_bank_assets_bn" at 7.1—and ground-level closures (6 store closures and 4 WARN notices in the past year). A key credit metric, the 90th-percentile bank CRE at-risk share, is 2.8%, while the bank allocation share is 65.9%. However, the CMBS special servicing reading is unavailable as a dollar figure and share—both stated as $0.0mm and 0.0%, respectively—so that channel shows no measurable distress, and no other figures are provided beyond these.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $41.26bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 2.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $18.56bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $7.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 65.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 4
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 4
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41620 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 701,194 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 7.5% — $22M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 14 loans, $326M, running 8.8% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$321M — 47% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 4.0% now (2026-07), +4.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $582M of the metro's $683M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$321M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 8 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$88M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
3.63× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$88M
After Committed Draws
$33M / −63%
Maturing ÷ Room
3.63×
Banks In Footprint
8 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $191M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $56M
comes out of the room above, leaving $33M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $135M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 8
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
3 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 8 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quill Bank UT | 7.8% | 136% total 277%
|
🔒 | 4.71% |
| Bank Of Utah UT | 13.7% | 270% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| D. L. Evans Bank ID | 1.6% | 130% total 245%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Brighton Bank UT | 100.0% | 272% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| First Utah Bank UT | 98.4% | 290% total 539%
|
🔒 | 7.07% |
| Northwest Bank ID | 2.6% | 177% total 224%
|
🔒 | 5.26% |
| Cache Valley Bank UT | 2.9% | 292% total 449%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Sunwest Bank UT | 5.8% | 327% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
Not counted — 42 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association UT · Goldman Sachs Bank Usa NY · American Express National Bank UT · Ally Bank UT · Synchrony Bank UT · Ubs Bank Usa, National Association UT · Sofi Bank, National Association UT · Sallie Mae Bank UT · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Comenity Capital Bank UT · Bmw Bank Of North America UT · Merrick Bank UT · Square Financial Services, Inc. UT · Wex Bank UT · Celtic Bank UT · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Webbank UT · Medallion Bank UT · Nelnet Bank UT · Keybank National Association OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Thrivent Bank UT · First Electronic Bank UT · Finwise Bank UT · The Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. UT · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Varo Bank, National Association UT · Milestone Bank UT · Continental Bank UT · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First American Trust, Fsb CA · Regions Bank AL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Glacier Bank MT · Midfirst Bank OK · Banterra Bank IL · Columbia Bank OR · Wafd Bank WA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Optum Bank, Inc. UT · Home Savings Bank UT · Fortis Bank CO · Stride Bank, National Association OK
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Utah Bank | $463M | 290% total 539%
|
7.07% | 🔒 |
| Celtic Bank | $2.0B | 11% total 214%
|
4.51% | 🔒 |
| Finwise Bank | $259M | 44% total 162%
|
9.61% | 🔒 |
| Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association | $9.5B | 22% total 22%
|
5.23% | 🔒 |
| Sunwest Bank | $2.2B | 327% total 467%
|
0.49% | 🔒 |
| Zions Bancorporation, N.a. | $23.7B | 152% total 239%
|
0.33% | 🔒 |
| Ubs Bank Usa, National Association | $1.6B | 14% total 16%
|
0.32% | 🔒 |
| Brighton Bank | $171M | 272% total 462%
|
0.30% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Salt Lake City-Murray, UT have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Salt Lake City-Murray, UT, the capacity for banks to refinance its maturing CMBS is tight, with a wall-to-room ratio of 9.77 against $320.6mm in maturing loans, though this is partly an artifact of bank exclusion. Only 8 banks qualify here versus 10 excluded, meaning the strain is driven by visibility limits rather than scarce credit—after accounting for committed draws, room stands at $32.8mm, far below the maturing balance.
More banks are excluded here (10) than qualify (8). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce. The wall_to_room of 9.77 is above the median of 0.20, but the presence of 4.2% distressed share among 15 maturing loans suggests some pressure, even if the exclusion of national and card banks skews the reading. A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event, so the capacity to refinance appears constrained only among the regional/community banks this data captures, not necessarily the broader lending market.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $320.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 15
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $88.3mm
- Committed construction draws
- $190.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $32.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 9.77
- Rank, most strained
- 14
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 3.63
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 8
- … excluded from the calculation
- 10
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $683.4mm
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
9.77 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
14 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
{'fork': 'exclusion, not scarcity', 'note': "More banks are excluded here (10) than qualify (8). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce."}
True
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41620 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
6 local distress events in the past year (368 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-05-03
CLOSURE
Salt Lake City
2026-02-15
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Salt Lake City
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Tooele
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Salt Lake City
2025-11-18
LAYOFF
205 jobs · Salt Lake City
2025-09-21
LAYOFF
63 jobs · Salt Lake City
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Sandy
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Sandy
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Murray
2025-06-20
LAYOFF
54 jobs · Salt Lake City
2025-05-23
CLOSURE
Salt Lake City
2025-04-18
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Salt Lake City
2025-03-29
CLOSURE
Riverton
2024-11-25
LAYOFF
186 jobs · Salt Lake City
2024-11-22
LAYOFF
12 jobs · Salt Lake City
What has actually happened on the ground in Salt Lake City-Murray, UT recently?
In the past 365 days, Salt Lake City-Murray, UT has seen 3 WARN notices affecting 368 jobs, with 6 store closures reported. The CRE bankruptcies reading is 0, but this is a state proxy — not a metro-native count — so a true metro-level bankruptcies figure is unavailable from these figures.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 6
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 368
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41620 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.