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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Rochester, NY
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NY
The read
$624M of CMBS across 29 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($216M, 35% of the book). Multifamily is the largest book ($202M, 0.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 15.3% as of 2026-07. 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (25 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Rochester's Distress Sits High and Still — a Multifamily Book Holds the Line
Rochester carries $624M of CMBS across 29 loans, and the filed record shows distress parked at 15.3% as of July 2026 — well above where most metros sit, and flat rather than climbing. That is a figure to respect without overreading: the servicer-declared status has not moved, and the median DSCR across the book stands at 1.44.
The ballast here is multifamily. At $202M it is the metro's largest sector book, and it carries a 0.0% distress rate against a 7.9% national mark for the property type — a clean line in a market where the headline number runs hot. The maturity wall is deferred rather than imminent: the heaviest load lands in 2031 at $216M, 35% of the book, with that vintage showing no distress today.
On the ground, the past year brought 10 distress events — eight store closures and two layoff notices totaling 25 jobs — a modest tally against the size of the book. Across the five banks tracked here, none are flagged distressed or on early warning. The picture is a high but settled CMBS distress rate sitting over a multifamily core that is holding.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$94M / 15.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$164M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 5
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
8
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 25 jobs
0.01% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
29 / $624M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
+0.1pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Rochester, NY, and which cannot be read?
In Rochester, NY, the elevated distress signals are CMBS special servicing and store closures. CMBS special servicing covers $94.0mm in UPB, representing 16.3% of metro UPB, while store closures over the past year number 7. Conversely, bank-related distress is absent: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 12.5%, distressed lender CRE is $0.0mm, and the number of distressed banks is 0. The reading for WARN notices (layoffs) in the past year is unavailable, as is any figure for bank CRE allocation share; the 90th percentile measure applies to the at-risk percentage only, and the bank CRE total is $7.59bn with no distressed assets reported.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $94.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 16.3%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $7.59bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 12.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 24.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 5
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40380 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 424,314 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 15.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.8% — $58M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+9.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
+9.2pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+8.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Industrial: 6 loans, $169M, where the same type runs 2.4% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$164M — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 15.3% now (2026-07), +0.8pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $476M of the metro's $624M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$164M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 11 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$773M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.21× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$773M
After Committed Draws
$462M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.21×
Banks In Footprint
11 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $554M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $311M
comes out of the room above, leaving $462M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $243M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 11 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Canandaigua National Bank And Trust Company NY | 99.2% | 241% total 288%
|
🔒 | 1.38% |
| The Lyons National Bank NY | 68.7% | 145% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Genesee Regional Bank NY | 100.0% | 179% total 279%
|
🔒 | 1.14% |
| Wayne Bank PA | 8.7% | 201% total 359%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| Five Star Bank NY | 42.9% | 294% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.87% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 0.4% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Savannah Bank National Association NY | 33.1% | 107% total 136%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 0.5% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| The Upstate National Bank NY | 85.6% | 326% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tompkins Community Bank NY | 11.3% | 323% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Nextier Bank, National Association PA | 2.2% | 315% total 362%
|
🔒 | 2.69% |
Not counted — 8 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Bank Of America, National Association NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Community Bank, National Association NY · Nbt Bank, National Association NY · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Canandaigua National Bank And Trust Company | $1.5B | 241% total 288%
|
1.38% | 🔒 |
| Genesee Regional Bank | $390M | 179% total 279%
|
1.14% | 🔒 |
| Five Star Bank | $2.5B | 294% total 342%
|
0.87% | 🔒 |
| The Lyons National Bank | $476M | 145% total 227%
|
0.72% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Rochester, NY have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For Rochester, NY, the banks captured here appear more than able to absorb the visible maturity load: with maturing_bal of $164.1mm across 6 maturing_loans against room_after_committed of $461.8mm, the wall_to_room reads 0.36 (and 0.21 on room_before_committed of $773.1mm), placing the metro at rank_most_strained of 113 of 275 — above the median but comfortably within local capacity. That said, this room rests on banks_qualifying of 11 while banks_excluded_here of 4 are left out, so the reading covers only the banks whose deposit footprint reveals where they lend, and the CMBS wall is the maturing debt this platform can see rather than the metro's whole maturity load; the distressed share of 15.1% is also worth flagging for context, though no reading on how much of that distress sits in the maturing balance is available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $164.1mm
- … across this many loans
- 6
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $773.1mm
- Committed construction draws
- $554.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $461.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.36
- Rank, most strained
- 113
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.21
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 11
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 15.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $623.6mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.36 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
113 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40380 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (25 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-21
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-29
CLOSURE
Greece
2026-09-23
LAYOFF
Rochster
2026-09-14
CLOSURE
Rochester
2026-08-24
LAYOFF
25 jobs · Richmond
2026-08-12
CLOSURE
Rochester
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Rochester
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Victor
What has actually happened on the ground in Rochester, NY recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window, the on-the-ground picture in Rochester, NY is one of modest but real contraction: 8 store closures and 2 WARN notices, with 25 jobs affected—a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. Broader CRE distress in the states where this metro's collateral sits is captured by 140 CRE-likely filings, though that is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count and is not comparable across the coverage change on 2026-09-16. Any reading on metro-native CRE bankruptcies is unavailable rather than inferred.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 8
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 25
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 140
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40380 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.