Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Rochester, NY
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NY
The read
$575M of CMBS across 28 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 15.3% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($177M, 31% of the book). 7 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Rochester's Record Turns, and 2028 Is Where the Strain Sits
Rochester carries $575M of CMBS across 28 loans, and the filed record has been rising: distress stood at 15.3% as of July 2026. That is a share of the book the servicer has already declared delinquent or moved into special servicing, not a projection — and the direction is up. Against that, the median DSCR of 1.44 says the broad book is still covering, so the pressure is concentrated rather than systemic.
The maturity wall tells the story of timing versus stress. The heaviest load lands in 2031, at $177M, or 31% of the book — but that vintage carries no filed distress today. The nearer-term problem sits in 2028, where nearly half the maturing paper, 46.6%, is already distressed. It is a smaller stack than 2031, but it is the tranche where the trouble is live now.
On the ground, the metro logged 7 store closures over the past year and no layoff notices, a retail-tilted signal rather than an employment shock. Unemployment held at 4.2% in July 2026, up 0.2 points year over year. The local banks tracked here show no distress and no early-warning flags, leaving the CMBS book as the place to watch.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$94M / 16.4%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$164M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 5
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
28 / $575M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
+0.2pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Rochester, NY, and which cannot be read?
In Rochester, NY, the elevated distress signals are CMBS special servicing and store closures. CMBS special servicing covers $94.0mm in UPB, representing 16.3% of metro UPB, while store closures over the past year number 7. Conversely, bank-related distress is absent: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 12.5%, distressed lender CRE is $0.0mm, and the number of distressed banks is 0. The reading for WARN notices (layoffs) in the past year is unavailable, as is any figure for bank CRE allocation share; the 90th percentile measure applies to the at-risk percentage only, and the bank CRE total is $7.59bn with no distressed assets reported.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $94.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 16.3%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $7.59bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 12.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 24.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 5
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40380 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
+0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 424,314 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 16.4% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.8% — $61M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+10.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+10.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+10.1pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Industrial: 6 loans, $169M, running 43.3% where the same type runs 2.3% elsewhere — worth 12.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$164M — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 15.3% now (2026-07), +1.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $437M of the metro's $575M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$164M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 12 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$868M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.19× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$868M
After Committed Draws
$524M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.19×
Banks In Footprint
12 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $506M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $344M
comes out of the room above, leaving $524M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $162M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 12 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Canandaigua National Bank And Trust Company NY | 100.0% | 241% total 288%
|
🔒 | 1.38% |
| The Lyons National Bank NY | 70.8% | 145% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Genesee Regional Bank NY | 100.0% | 179% total 279%
|
🔒 | 1.14% |
| Community Bank, National Association NY | 6.2% | 201% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Wayne Bank PA | 10.3% | 201% total 359%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 0.5% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Savannah Bank National Association NY | 32.9% | 107% total 136%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Five Star Bank NY | 24.6% | 294% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.87% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 0.2% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| The Upstate National Bank NY | 83.1% | 326% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tompkins Community Bank NY | 11.2% | 323% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Nextier Bank, National Association PA | 1.3% | 315% total 362%
|
🔒 | 2.69% |
Not counted — 7 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Bank Of America, National Association NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Nbt Bank, National Association NY · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Canandaigua National Bank And Trust Company | $1.5B | 241% total 288%
|
1.38% | 🔒 |
| Genesee Regional Bank | $390M | 179% total 279%
|
1.14% | 🔒 |
| Five Star Bank | $2.5B | 294% total 342%
|
0.87% | 🔒 |
| The Lyons National Bank | $476M | 145% total 227%
|
0.72% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
7 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-12
CLOSURE
Rochester
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Rochester
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Victor
2026-02-17
CLOSURE
Newark
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Rochester
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Rochester
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Canandaigua
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Rochester
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Greece
2025-06-30
CLOSURE
Rochester
2025-06-01
CLOSURE
Geneseo
2025-06-01
CLOSURE
Henrietta
2024-12-11
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Rochester
What has actually happened on the ground in Rochester, NY recently?
In the past 365 days, Rochester, NY has recorded 7 store closures, while the reading for CRE bankruptcies is 0, with 0 jobs affected and 0 WARN notices filed during the same window. However, the available data does not break down these events by specific property locations or provide a metro-native count for bankruptcies, given the state-proxy methodology, so a fully granular, on-the-ground picture remains partially unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40380 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
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Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.