Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$3.7B of CMBS across 191 loans. Retail is the largest book ($1.2B) but runs below its national distress rate (0.4% vs 2.7%); the elevated risk is in Multifamily (12.8%, 1.7× national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($770M). Distress is flat in the filed record — 1.2% as of 2026-07. 106 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (7,681 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail Carries the Book, but Multifamily Is Where the Risk Sits
The Inland Empire's securitized ledger runs to $3.7B across 191 loans, and by the servicer's own count it is quiet: distress stands at 1.2% as of July 2026 and has held flat in the filed record. Retail is the largest book at $1.2B, yet it carries a distress rate of just 0.4% against a 2.7% national mark — a sector that elsewhere drags is here running well inside the national line. Industrial, self-storage, hospitality and office all sit at zero distress on the tape, and the median DSCR across the book is a comfortable 2.06.
The elevated risk is narrower and clear: multifamily, at 12.8%, runs 1.7× the national rate — the one sector out of step with an otherwise clean page. That is the line desks should watch, not the headline number. On the calendar, the heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 at $770M, with a further $1.1B coming due inside 24 months; none of it carries distress on the current tape.
Off the securitized page, the on-the-ground record is more active than the loan tape suggests: 106 distress events over the past year — 40 store closures and 66 layoff notices touching 7,681 jobs. Unemployment sits at 5.7%, down 0.4 point year over year, while office-using employment has slipped 2.4%. For now the filed distress and the ground-level signal are telling different stories, and the servicer's record is the one holding flat.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$44M / 1.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.1B
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 6
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
40
Layoff Notices (1y)
66 / 7,681 jobs
0.54% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
191 / $3.7B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.7%
-0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
191,627
-2.4% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA right now?
In Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, distress is elevated across all four independent feeds, with 4 of 4 signals elevated and all 6 pairs of cross-checks in agreement—0 pairs both quiet and 0 disagreeing, with 0 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. Store closures sit at 36 closures on 1,411,086 metro jobs, ranking 12th of 392 by count and 114th by rate at 2.55 per 100,000 jobs; WARN layoff notices hit 94 on 2,075,553 employed, ranking 8th of 386 by count and 48th by rate at 0.39%; bank CRE over the noncurrent line is $2,417.2 million of $12,174.5 million lent, ranking 24th of 393 by count and 17th by rate at 19.85%; securitized loans in special servicing number 8 rows on $3,713.0 million, ranking 22nd of 335 by count and 98th by rate at 1.19%. The bank leg's rate carries a caveat that only 12.1% of its dollars sit at banks lending in one metro, with the rest split by branch deposits the call report cannot confirm. No blind legs are present in this metro.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
36 closures | 2.55 per 100k jobs | 12 of 392 | 114 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
94 notices | 0.39% | 8 of 386 | 48 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.42bn | 19.85% | 24 of 393 | 17 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
8 loan records | 1.19% | 22 of 335 | 98 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1411086, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2075553, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 12174.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 3713.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, and which cannot be read?
In Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, several distress signals are elevated: bank distressed CRE exposure is at 12.1% of bank CRE, with 7.9% of bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile; CMBS special servicing covers $44.0mm in UPB, representing 1.2% of metro UPB; and real-economy pressures include 36 store closures and 94 WARN notices over the past year. The distressed lender CRE total is $2.42bn. However, the reading on distressed bank assets is unavailable, as the stated figure is 0 — no distressed banks are identified, so the dollar amount of distressed bank assets cannot be inferred from the given data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $44.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 1.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $12.17bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 7.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.42bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 12.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 8
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 36
- WARN notices (past year)
- 94
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.7%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
4.6%6.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,411,086 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 1.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.2% — $110M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.7pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 26 loans, $435M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.1B — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 1.2% now (2026-07), -0.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $2.2B of the metro's $3.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.1B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 17 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$276M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
3.89× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$276M
After Committed Draws
$88M / −68%
Maturing ÷ Room
3.89×
Banks In Footprint
17 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $377M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $189M
comes out of the room above, leaving $88M,
with 9 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $189M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 17 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 26.7% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Chino Commercial Bank, N.a. CA | 100.0% | 213% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| First Bank MO | 4.9% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Banner Bank WA | 3.8% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Banc Of California CA | 5.0% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| American Continental Bank CA | 14.1% | 196% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 2.2% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.1% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| First Pacific Bank CA | 2.8% | 243% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Balboa Thrift And Loan Association CA | 2.3% | 235% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hcn Bank CA | 100.0% | 611% total 655%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Provident Savings Bank, F.s.b. CA | 100.0% | 354% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Golden State Bank CA | 19.5% | 420% total 612%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| C3bank, National Association CA | 6.8% | 361% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 5.2% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 2.9% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Genesis Bank CA | 1.7% | 442% total 532%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
Not counted — 16 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Icon Business Bank CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
City National Bank CA · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · East West Bank CA · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Legacy Bank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chino Commercial Bank, N.a. | $213M | 213% total 363%
|
0.55% | 🔒 |
| Provident Savings Bank, F.s.b. | $465M | 354% total 362%
|
0.10% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association | $9.1B | 281% total 406%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| Hcn Bank | $767M | 611% total 655%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA stands as one of the more strained metros in the country, ranking 12th of 270 for strain. The area's maturing CMBS wall of $1.07bn is 12.22 times the available regional and community bank room after committed draws, leaving just $87.9mm in capacity to refinance its 63 maturing loans against a backdrop of $3.67bn in total CMBS UPB. While banks qualifying here number 17, the tight band signals a meaningful gap, suggesting local lenders face considerable pressure to absorb the maturing debt before the concentration line.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.07bn
- … across this many loans
- 63
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $276.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $377.1mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $87.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 12.22
- Rank, most strained
- 12
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 3.89
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 17
- … excluded from the calculation
- 7
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 1.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $3.67bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
12.22 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
12 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
106 local distress events in the past year (7,681 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Ontario
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Ontario
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
49 jobs · San Bernardino
2026-08-26
CLOSURE
Riverside
2026-08-24
LAYOFF
37 jobs · San Bernardino
2026-08-14
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
Palm Springs
2026-08-11
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Palm Springs
2026-08-05
LAYOFF
18 jobs · Ontario
2026-07-31
LAYOFF
12 jobs · Chino
2026-07-31
LAYOFF
Redlands
2026-07-29
LAYOFF
62 jobs · Palm Springs
2026-07-28
LAYOFF
54 jobs · Victorville
2026-07-24
CLOSURE
Temecula
2026-07-16
LAYOFF
94 jobs · Redlands
What has actually happened on the ground in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA recently?
In the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA metro over the past 365 days, commercial-real-estate distress has surfaced as 3 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings (a state-proxy count, not metro-native), 66 WARN layoff notices affecting 7,858 jobs (a floor, as notices without stated headcounts contribute 0), and 36 approved store closures. The reading for metro-native bankruptcies is unavailable, as the bankruptcy figure reflects filings by the state where the metro’s collateral sits, not property-level locations.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 36
- WARN layoff notices
- 66
- Jobs on those notices
- 7,858
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.