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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Reno, NV
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NV
The read
$847M of CMBS across 36 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $386M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($326M, 39% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 2 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A clean book in Reno, with the weight stacked in 2031
Reno's CMBS book runs to $847M across 36 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record, with nothing in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. Retail is the largest exposure at $386M, and it carries a 0.0% distress rate against a national retail mark of 2.6%. Credit quality underneath looks sturdy: the median DSCR sits at 2.22, comfortable coverage by any desk's standard.
The story here is timing more than stress. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031, where $326M — 39% of the book — comes due, a concentration that dwarfs the smaller slugs spread across 2026, 2028 and 2034. For now the filed record stays benign; the metro's unemployment rate was 3.5% in August 2026, down 0.7 point year over year.
The only crack is on the ground, and it is modest: two store closures over the past year, with no layoff notices filed. That has not translated into servicer-declared distress, and the Reno book remains as clean as any in the coverage set."
Written 2026-10-08
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$203M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
2
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
36 / $847M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.5%
-0.7pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Reno, NV right now?
For Reno, NV (CBSA 39900), the distress picture is mixed but dominated by lender-side pressure rather than visible tenant or employer distress. Of the four vetted feeds, only one leg reads elevated: bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line, at 403.9 $mm (13.41% of the CRE lent into this metro), placing the metro 39th of 393 by rate. Store closures are measured at 0.41 closures per 100,000 jobs (not elevated), layoff notices (WARN) are at 0.0 notices (not elevated), and securitized loans in special servicing are at 0.0 rows (not elevated). The six pairings split three quiet, three disagreeing — with all three disagreements featuring the bank leg hot against a quiet counterpart, which the structural notes read as "bank stress without a visible tenant cause" and "lender stress with no employment event behind it," suggesting construction or a rate reset rather than vacancy. The bank CRE denominator here is $3,011.4 $mm allocated by branch deposits, which the note flags as an allocation the call report cannot fully confirm; CMBS is read on a $773.0 $mm current balance (the trust's slice, not the whole loan). Overall, the metro's distress is concentrated in bank portfolios rather than in the retail, WARN, or securitized channels.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
1 closures | 0.41 per 100k jobs | 258 of 392 | 301 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$403.9mm | 13.41% | 75 of 393 | 39 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 242,175 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 287,827 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $3,011.4 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $773.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Reno, NV, and which cannot be read?
In Reno, NV, the elevated distress signal is bank_distressed_cre, with bank CRE at risk at the 39.2% 90th percentile and distressed lender CRE totaling $403.9mm. However, the reading is thin: bank allocations exact share is 0.0%, and distressed bank assets stand at 0 (in billions), making the materiality "immaterial." Readings are unavailable for CMBS special servicing, as both the UPB ($0.0mm) and share of metro UPB (0.0%) are zero, and there are no CMBS loans in special servicing. Additionally, store closures (1) and WARN notices (0) provide no converged signal, so the phase is "watch" with no full reading.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.01bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 39.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $403.9mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 1
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.5%
-0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 242,175 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 3.4% — $29M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.9pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Retail: 15 loans, $386M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 2.6% elsewhere — worth 1.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$203M — 24% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $708M of the metro's $847M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$203M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 1 regional and local bank that gather deposits here could write roughly
$8M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
25.27× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$8M
After Committed Draws
$7M / −14%
Maturing ÷ Room
25.27×
Banks In Footprint
1 / 0 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1M
comes out of the room above, leaving $7M.
Counted — 1 regional & local CRE lender
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plumas Bank CA | 4.7% | 235% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Eaglemark Savings Bank NV · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · El Dorado Savings Bank, F.s.b. CA · Farm Bureau Bank Fsb NV · Capital Bank And Trust Company CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farm Bureau Bank Fsb | $164M | 92% total 139%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Reno, NV have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Reno's apparent strain is best read as an exclusion artifact rather than evidence of a credit gap: with only 1 bank qualifying against 4 banks excluded here, the metro's 29.33 wall-to-room ratio (and 25.27 before committed draws) reflects a lending footprint this read cannot see, and the platform flags it as explained by exclusion. On the visible figures, the $203.2mm maturing across 12 loans dwarfs the $6.9mm of room after committed draws ($8.0mm before committed draws), so within this narrow footprint the capacity to refinance is not demonstrated — but that reading covers only the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months and cannot be extended to Reno's whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $203.2mm
- … across this many loans
- 12
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $8.0mm
- Committed construction draws
- $1.1mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $6.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 29.33
- Rank, most strained
- 9
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 25.27
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 1
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $846.8mm
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
29.33 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
9 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
exclusion, not scarcity — More banks are excluded here (4) than qualify (1). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39900 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
2 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Reno
2026-02-27
CLOSURE
Reno
2025-07-01
CLOSURE
Dayton
2025-03-31
CLOSURE
Reno
2023-06-05
LAYOFF
Reno
2023-01-25
LAYOFF
250 jobs · Reno
2023-01-05
LAYOFF
104 jobs · Reno
What has actually happened on the ground in Reno, NV recently?
In Reno, NV over the last 365 days, the vetted reading shows 2 store closures, with 0 warn notices, 0 jobs affected, and 0 cre bankruptcies.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 2
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39900 · geo_events · last changed 20 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.