Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Raleigh-Cary, NC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NC
The read
$551M of CMBS across 36 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Hospitality is the largest exposure at $123M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($175M, 32% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 9 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (370 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Raleigh's CMBS Book Stays Clean, With the Weight Set for 2029
Raleigh-Cary carries $551M of CMBS across 36 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — nothing in special servicing, nothing 60-plus days delinquent. That 0.0% rate has been flat in the filed record, and the credit around it looks intact: median DSCR sits at 1.91, only four banks touch this market and none register as distressed or on early warning, and metro unemployment is 3.2%, down 0.2 points year over year. Hospitality is the largest single exposure at $123M — a sector running a 6.1% distress rate nationally, but 0.0% here.
The scheduling story is where attention belongs. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $175M — 32% of the entire book — comes due, dwarfing the lighter slugs stacked in 2027, 2028 and 2033. That concentration carries no distress today, but it is the year that will test this market's clean record.
Beneath the loan tape, the ground is not silent. Raleigh logged nine on-the-ground distress events over the past year — seven store closures and two layoff notices totaling 370 jobs. That activity has not surfaced in the servicer-declared numbers, and for now the gap between the filed record and the street runs in the metro's favor.
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$126M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 4
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 370 jobs
0.06% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
36 / $551M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Raleigh-Cary, NC right now?
For Raleigh-Cary, NC, distress is concentrated in exactly one place: the mom-and-pop retail tail. Store closures are elevated at 8 closures (rank 49 of 392 by count, but just 238th by rate at a 1.27 per 100k jobs pace), while WARN layoff notices sit quiet at 2 notices (0.04%). That disagreement—hot on closures, cold on filings—points to failures below the compelled-disclosure floor: small operators no filing regime can see. Lender stress is the other hot reading: bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $764.9 million, elevated purely on size (rank 45 by count, 214th by rate at 2.94%), with the structural caveat that only 2.6% of these dollars are at banks whose exposure needs no deposit allocation. Four of six pairs disagree overall, which is a statement about which mechanisms are running—not a severity signal. CMBS special servicing reads zero for securitized loans, and WARN and the tape agree quiet, so no office or national-capital stress is showing; the story here is a big retail and lender book that is stressed by size, not per unit of itself.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 1.27 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 238 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.04% | 166 of 386 | 210 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$764.9mm | 2.94% | 45 of 393 | 214 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures, bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 629871, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 836062, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 26023.9, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 538.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Raleigh-Cary, NC, and which cannot be read?
Raleigh-Cary, NC shows two elevated distress signals: bank-distressed CRE (with distressed lender CRE at $764.9mm and a bank CRE at-risk share at the 90th percentile of 13.9%) and closures (8 store closures and 2 WARN notices in the past year). Bank CRE allocation is 2.6% of 0 distressed bank assets, while total bank CRE exposure is $26.02bn (a reading that is broadly neutral). On the CMBS side, special servicing is immaterial: $0.0mm UPB represents 0.0% of metro UPB, with 0 loans in special servicing. The convergence reads 2, and the phase is "early" — the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit. Note: a reading for CMBS special servicing is available but shows no stress; no additional distress signals beyond these two are elevated.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $26.02bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 13.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $764.9mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 8
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%3.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 629,871 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.6% — $31M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.4pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-6.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 6 loans, $150M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 3.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$126M — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $438M of the metro's $551M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$126M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 17 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$389M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.32× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$389M
After Committed Draws
$101M / −74%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.32×
Banks In Footprint
17 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $583M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $289M
comes out of the room above, leaving $101M,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $295M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 of 17
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
11 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 17 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 25.9% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Townebank VA | 10.2% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| North State Bank NC | 92.5% | 277% total 498%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Southern Bank And Trust Company NC | 3.3% | 158% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 4.6% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 6.0% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| First Bank NC | 2.8% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First Federal Bank NC | 17.5% | 166% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank NC | 3.1% | 210% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Atlantic Union Bank VA | 0.2% | 264% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Peoples Bank NC | 1.1% | 215% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| First Bank VA | 1.2% | 283% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ks Bank, Inc. NC | 72.2% | 425% total 606%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 27.5% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| Benchmark Community Bank VA | 4.9% | 321% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Providence Bank NC | 3.0% | 419% total 551%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Carter Bank & Trust VA | 1.1% | 395% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
Not counted — 20 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Piedmont Federal Savings Bank NC · Mechanics & Farmers Bank NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Fsnb, National Association OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Pinnacle Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Woodforest National Bank TX · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · United Bank VA · Capital Bank, National Association MD
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $38.8B | 89% total 158%
|
2.09% | 🔒 |
| The Fidelity Bank | $2.1B | 206% total 373%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| North State Bank | $649M | 277% total 498%
|
0.19% | 🔒 |
| Ks Bank, Inc. | $484M | 425% total 606%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Raleigh-Cary, NC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Raleigh-Cary, NC, the $125.6mm CMBS wall maturing within 24 months stands at 1.25 times the room available after committed draws, ranking the metro 47 of 270 from the most strained. That room—$100.6mm—comes from 17 qualifying banks, which is insufficient to cover the full wall before committed draws of $389.4mm are factored in, though the distressed share is 0.0%. Uniquely, this strain is largely an artifact of the 8 excluded banks (nationals, card, and charter institutions) that do not disclose local deposit footprints, meaning the credit is likely less constrained than the ratio implies. Still, the reading is above the median of 0.20, indicating more strain than typical, though the small maturing balance of $125.6mm suggests manageable scale if local banks can absorb the shortfall.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $125.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 11
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $389.4mm
- Committed construction draws
- $583.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $100.6mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.25
- Rank, most strained
- 47
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.32
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 17
- … excluded from the calculation
- 8
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $533.0mm
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.25 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
47 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-5.0%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.9%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
-0.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -8.0% | -0.1% | 95.9% | -0.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.0% | -1.6% | 95.3% | -1.5% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
9 local distress events in the past year (370 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-07-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
70 jobs · Raleigh
2026-06-27
LAYOFF
300 jobs · Cary
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-05-29
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2025-10-01
CLOSURE
Cary
2025-10-01
CLOSURE
Holly Springs
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Cary
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Morrisville
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Morrisville
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Cary
What has actually happened on the ground in Raleigh-Cary, NC recently?
In the Raleigh-Cary, NC metro over a 365-day window, the ground truth shows minimal distress signals: there were 2 CRE-related bankruptcy filings (a state proxy, since filings are attributed by the filer’s state, not property location), 2 WARN notices affecting 370 jobs, and 8 store closures. These figures are all verified and reflect only approved, ZIP-matched events—not the higher convergence board counts—but they indicate no major disruption beyond routine churn.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 8
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 370
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.