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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OR, WA
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 66 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($458M, 28% of the book). 47 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,416 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
The securitized book reads calm; the pink slips tell another story
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 66 loans, and on the page it reads quietly: distress sits at 5.3%, roughly $0.1 billion of the book, with just three banks in view and none of them flagged — one carries an early-warning signal. The maturity wall is deferred rather than near. Only about $0.3 billion comes due inside 24 months; the heaviest load lands in 2031, where $458 million — 28% of the book — matures carrying no distress today. Another $0.4 billion sits in 2029 and $0.3 billion in 2035.
The real-economy ledger is less serene. The past year brought 47 on-the-ground distress events — 18 store closures and 29 layoff notices — totaling 3,416 jobs. That is the kind of strain a securitized distress rate can lag, and it is worth watching against a book skewed toward consumer- and labor-sensitive collateral: retail is the metro's largest exposure at $0.6 billion, against a national retail distress rate of 2.6%, with multifamily and hospitality each at $0.2 billion, where the national marks run higher at 7.9% and 6.2%.
The labor backdrop is steady for now — unemployment was 4.9% as of August 2026, down 0.4 point year over year. The split to hold onto here: a CMBS book that looks benign on reported distress, a maturity profile that front-loads nothing and parks its bulk in 2031, and a filed record of closures and layoffs that runs ahead of either.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$86M / 5.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$304M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
18
Layoff Notices (1y)
29 / 3,416 jobs
0.32% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
66 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
-0.4pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA, and which cannot be read?
In Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE, closures, and warn, with bank distressed lender CRE at $1.38bn (including 0.4 in distressed bank assets) and 48.3% of bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile. However, the CMBS side cannot be read: although special servicing shows $37.0mm (a 2.5% share of metro UPB), the reading is unavailable as a reliable measure because the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of this metro’s 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a floor, and the credit side remains unreadable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $37.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $12.79bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 48.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.38bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 3.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 15
- WARN notices (past year)
- 46
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 2 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.9%5.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,064,206 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.8% — $7M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+0.5pp
… and loan size held fixed
+0.4pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
+0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 11 loans, $226M, where the same type runs 6.2% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$304M — 19% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.0B of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$304M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 14 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$394M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.77× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$394M
After Committed Draws
$237M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.77×
Banks In Footprint
14 / 6 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $308M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $157M
comes out of the room above, leaving $237M,
with 9 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $151M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 14 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Mcminnville OR | 100.0% | 125% total 191%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northwest Bank ID | 34.5% | 177% total 224%
|
🔒 | 5.26% |
| Banner Bank WA | 5.1% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Washington Trust Bank WA | 4.5% | 216% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Citizens Bank OR | 12.6% | 111% total 175%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Bank Of The Pacific WA | 6.1% | 190% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Beneficial State Bank CA | 22.3% | 285% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.44% |
| Heritage Bank WA | 13.2% | 295% total 432%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Clackamas County Bank OR | 100.0% | 316% total 354%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pacific West Bank OR | 100.0% | 348% total 506%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| Riverview Bank WA | 86.3% | 344% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.08% |
| Summit Bank OR | 19.0% | 323% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Oregon Pacific Banking Company Dba Oregon Pacific Bank OR | 2.1% | 335% total 451%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 1.1% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
Not counted — 11 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Keybank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Riverview Bank | $756M | 344% total 440%
|
1.08% | 🔒 |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Mcminnville | $165M | 125% total 191%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Clackamas County Bank | $127M | 316% total 354%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro carries $304.0mm of CMBS maturing within 24 months across 17 maturing_loans against $236.5mm of room_after_committed at the qualifying banks, a wall_to_room of 1.29 — above the median and ranking 52 of 275 counting from the most strained. The strain eases substantially on a pre-draw basis, with room_before_committed of $393.8mm and wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.77, but that cushion is largely spoken for by $308.1mm of committed_draws; note also that the wall covers only the $1.63bn cmbs_upb maturing share, that room is a deposit-footprint proxy, and that 14 banks_qualifying sit alongside 4 banks_excluded_here, so the read is directional rather than a measurement of total refinancing capacity.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $304.0mm
- … across this many loans
- 17
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $393.8mm
- Committed construction draws
- $308.1mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $236.5mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.29
- Rank, most strained
- 52
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.77
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 14
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.63bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.29 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
52 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38900 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
47 local distress events in the past year (3,416 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-18
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Vancouver
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Portland
2026-10-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-21
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-20
LAYOFF
13 jobs · Portland
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-10-01
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-09-23
LAYOFF
80 jobs · Portland
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Vancouver
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
60 jobs · Tualatin
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
11 jobs · Tualatin
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Portland
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Hillsboro
2026-08-07
CLOSURE
Portland
What has actually happened on the ground in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground reading for Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA shows 29 WARN notices, 18 store closures, and 3,416 jobs affected — the last being a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies register 1, though this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count. No metro-native CRE bankruptcy reading is available.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 18
- WARN layoff notices
- 29
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,416
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38900 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.