Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OR, WA
The read
$1.5B of CMBS across 64 loans. Retail is the largest book ($551M) but runs below its national distress rate (0.0% vs 2.7%); the elevated risk is in Hospitality (16.2%, 2.7× national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 4.0% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($401M, 26% of the book). 48 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,663 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail Holds the Line in Portland — the Trouble Is in the Hotels
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro carries $1.5 billion of CMBS across 64 loans, and the headline story is a book that reads calmer than its parts. Retail is the largest sector at $551 million, yet it runs at a 0.0% distress rate — below the 2.7% national mark for the sector. The pressure sits instead in hospitality, where the metro's 16.2% distress rate runs 2.7 times the national figure. Multifamily, at a $0.2 billion book, also carries elevated distress at 10.5% against a 7.6% national rate.
Overall distress stands at 4.0% as of July 2026, and the filed record has been rising. The maturity wall is the number to watch: the heaviest load lands in 2029, at $401 million — 26% of the book — carrying a 6.1% distress rate. The nearer 2027 slug is smaller at $0.2 billion but already prints a 24.2% distress rate, while the 2031 and 2035 vintages sit clean at 0.0%. Median DSCR across the metro holds at 1.98.
On the ground, the past year brought 48 distress events — 18 store closures and 30 layoff notices touching 3,663 jobs. Metro unemployment was 4.9% in July 2026, down 0.3 points year over year. The signal here is a book anchored by a healthy retail base, with the risk concentrated in hospitality and in the loans coming due over the next several years.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$61M / 4.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$271M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 4
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
18
Layoff Notices (1y)
30 / 3,663 jobs
0.34% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
64 / $1.5B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
-0.3pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA, and which cannot be read?
In Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE, closures, and warn, with bank distressed lender CRE at $1.38bn (including 0.4 in distressed bank assets) and 48.3% of bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile. However, the CMBS side cannot be read: although special servicing shows $37.0mm (a 2.5% share of metro UPB), the reading is unavailable as a reliable measure because the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of this metro’s 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a floor, and the credit side remains unreadable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $37.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $12.79bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 48.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.38bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 3.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 15
- WARN notices (past year)
- 46
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 2 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.9%5.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,064,206 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.9% — $13M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
-0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-0.6pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 11 loans, $227M, running 16.2% where the same type runs 6.0% elsewhere — worth 1.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$271M — 18% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 4.0% now (2026-07), +1.7pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $907M of the metro's $1.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$271M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 13 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$389M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.70× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$389M
After Committed Draws
$232M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.70×
Banks In Footprint
13 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $305M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $156M
comes out of the room above, leaving $232M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $149M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 13 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Mcminnville OR | 100.0% | 125% total 191%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northwest Bank ID | 33.2% | 177% total 224%
|
🔒 | 5.26% |
| Banner Bank WA | 5.1% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Washington Trust Bank WA | 4.6% | 216% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Citizens Bank OR | 12.6% | 111% total 175%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Beneficial State Bank CA | 22.7% | 285% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.44% |
| Bank Of The Pacific WA | 4.5% | 190% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heritage Bank WA | 14.5% | 295% total 432%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Clackamas County Bank OR | 100.0% | 316% total 354%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pacific West Bank OR | 100.0% | 348% total 506%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| Riverview Bank WA | 85.9% | 344% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.08% |
| Summit Bank OR | 15.7% | 323% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Oregon Pacific Banking Company Dba Oregon Pacific Bank OR | 1.5% | 335% total 451%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Keybank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Columbia Bank OR · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · First Interstate Bank MT · Wafd Bank WA · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pacific West Bank | $189M | 348% total 506%
|
4.13% | 🔒 |
| Riverview Bank | $756M | 344% total 440%
|
1.08% | 🔒 |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Mcminnville | $165M | 125% total 191%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Clackamas County Bank | $127M | 316% total 354%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
48 local distress events in the past year (3,663 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-11-18
CLOSURE
Vancouver
2026-11-18
CLOSURE
Vancouver
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Vancouver
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
60 jobs · Tualatin
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
11 jobs · Tualatin
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Portland
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Hillsboro
2026-08-07
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-08-04
LAYOFF
129 jobs · Tigard
2026-08-03
CLOSURE
Portland
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
129 jobs · Tigard
2026-07-30
LAYOFF
387 jobs · Portland
2026-07-29
CLOSURE
McMinnville
2026-07-29
LAYOFF
375 jobs · Portland
What has actually happened on the ground in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA recently?
In the Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA metro, the recent 365-day ground truth shows 0 CRE-likely bankruptcies (a state-proxy measure, not metro-native), 30 WARN notices affecting 3,663 jobs (a floor, given some notices don’t state headcounts), and 15 approved store closures tied to the metro via ZIP matching.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 15
- WARN layoff notices
- 30
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,663
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38900 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
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Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.