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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Pittsburgh, PA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · PA
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 76 loans. Office is both the largest book ($703M) and the most distressed (32.3% vs 11.1% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 13.9% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($376M). 33 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (471 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Pittsburgh, the Office Book Is Both the Biggest and the Most Troubled
Pittsburgh carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 76 loans, and the strain sits where the money is. Office is the metro's largest book at $703 million and also its most distressed, with a 32.3% distress rate against an 11.1% national mark for the sector — a gap of three to one that leaves little doubt about where the pressure concentrates. By contrast self-storage and hospitality show no filed distress, and the retail book runs below national. The metro-wide distress rate stands at 14.3%, with a median DSCR of 1.52 across the book.
The filed record is moving in one direction. As of July 2026 the distress rate reads 13.9%, up along a rising path rather than a one-quarter blip. Underwriters watching the maturity wall should mark 2031, when the heaviest load lands at $376 million; 2028 and 2029 also carry meaningful balances. None of those cohorts shows distress on the clock yet, so the question is one of refinancing into whatever market greets them.
Away from the bond data, the on-the-ground signal is consistent with the office story: 33 distress events over the past year, spanning store closures and layoff notices that together touched 471 jobs. Among the metro's 17 tracked banks, two are flagged distressed and three sit in early-warning territory — a short list, but one worth watching alongside a CMBS office book already running hot.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$232M / 14.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$347M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
30
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 471 jobs
0.05% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
76 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-1.0pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
221,908
-0.7% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Pittsburgh, PA right now?
Here is your short paragraph of commercial-real-estate commentary for Pittsburgh, PA:
Pittsburgh, PA shows a genuinely split distress picture. The retail and CMBS legs are both elevated: 34 store closures at a rate of 3.43 per 100k jobs ranks 13th of 392 metros by count, while 7 securitized loans in special servicing at 14.42% of balance ranks 24th of 335. The WARN leg is quiet at 3 notices (0.04% rate), and bank CRE sits just under the noncurrent line at 320.7 $mm (0.96% rate). Four of the six leg-pairs disagree. The closures-plus-CMBS agreement reads as property-level distress, while WARN’s silence and the bank tape’s quietness suggest the trouble is concentrated in assets rather than employers or local lenders.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
34 closures | 3.43 per 100k jobs | 13 of 392 | 70 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | 0.04% | 136 of 386 | 210 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$320.7mm | 0.96% | 88 of 393 | 294 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
7 loan records | 14.42% | 24 of 335 | 32 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 990,902 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,207,455 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $33,567.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,609.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Pittsburgh, PA, and which cannot be read?
Pittsburgh, PA is showing elevated distress on two fronts: CMBS special servicing and real-economy closures. Specifically, the CMBS special servicing reading is elevated, with the special-servicing UPB at $232.0mm and a special-servicing share of metro UPB at 14.4%; meanwhile, store closures over the past year are elevated, with 34 closures recorded. On the credit side, the distressed-bank assets reading stands at 0.8 (billion dollars, per the stated figure), and the distressed-lender CRE exposure is $320.7mm, alongside a bank CRE at-risk reading of 8.8% at the 90th percentile. Notably, the overall bank CRE allocation share is 15.9%, and bank CRE volume is $33.57bn. However, the WARN notices figure (1-year count) and the count of CMBS loans in special servicing are not available from the given vetted figures, so those specific readings cannot be read. The convergence signal is 2, confirming that both leading and realized signals are firing together.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $232.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.4%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $33.57bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $320.7mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.80bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 15.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 7
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 34
- WARN notices (past year)
- 3
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-1.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.4%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 990,902 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.7% — $124M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+7.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+7.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+7.6pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 19 loans, $703M, running 32.3% where the same type runs 10.8% elsewhere — worth 9.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$347M — 21% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 13.9% now (2026-07), +5.7pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$347M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 21 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.13× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.7B
After Committed Draws
$1.8B / −35%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.13×
Banks In Footprint
21 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.5B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $955M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.8B,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $552M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 21 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dollar Bank, Federal Savings Bank PA | 70.3% | 168% total 187%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 39.2% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Washington Financial Bank PA | 100.0% | 185% total 204%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 6.2% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Elderton State Bank PA | 100.0% | 138% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.70% |
| Somerset Trust Company PA | 33.2% | 206% total 290%
|
🔒 | 1.51% |
| Apollo Trust Company PA | 100.0% | 103% total 131%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 6.5% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Ssb Bank PA | 100.0% | 185% total 247%
|
🔒 | 1.36% |
| The Farmers National Bank Of Canfield OH | 3.1% | 198% total 285%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| 1st Summit Bank PA | 7.2% | 189% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.65% |
| Infirst Bank PA | 8.6% | 140% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Community Bank PA | 41.2% | 288% total 358%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Marion Center Bank PA | 10.9% | 148% total 278%
|
🔒 | 1.48% |
| Univest Bank And Trust Co. PA | 1.5% | 264% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 1.4% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Brentwood Bank PA | 100.0% | 398% total 441%
|
🔒 | 1.22% |
| Nextier Bank, National Association PA | 91.0% | 315% total 362%
|
🔒 | 2.69% |
| S&t Bank PA | 40.2% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Ameriserv Financial Bank PA | 15.0% | 349% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 5.7% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
Not counted — 23 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · The Huntington National Bank OH · Keybank National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Slovenian Savings And Loan Association Of Canonsburg PA · Cfsbank PA · First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Greene Co PA · Sewickley Savings Bank PA · Westmoreland Federal Savings And Loan Association PA · Commercial Bank And Trust Of Pa PA · West View Savings Bank PA · Farmers Building And Savings Bank PA · Mercer County State Bank PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Bank | $290M | 394% total 671%
|
6.18% | 🔒 |
| Ssb Bank | $85M | 185% total 247%
|
1.36% | 🔒 |
| Elderton State Bank | $157M | 138% total 283%
|
0.70% | 🔒 |
| Nextier Bank, National Association | $1.1B | 315% total 362%
|
2.69% | 🔒 |
| Tristate Capital Bank | $3.4B | 176% total 185%
|
1.50% | 🔒 |
| Brentwood Bank | $452M | 398% total 441%
|
1.22% | 🔒 |
| Washington Financial Bank | $444M | 185% total 204%
|
0.92% | 🔒 |
| Cfsbank | $71M | 48% total 83%
|
0.55% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Pittsburgh, PA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Pittsburgh's banks appear to have ample capacity to absorb its visible maturity wall: 20 maturing loans totaling $347.5mm face $1.76bn of room_after_committed, a wall_to_room of 0.20 (or 0.13 on a before-committed basis), placing the metro 151 of 275 counting from the most strained and well below the median. That said, check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion, since the room figure rests on 21 qualifying banks and is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement of lending, and the wall itself is CMBS-only — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $347.5mm
- … across this many loans
- 20
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.72bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.51bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.76bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.20
- Rank, most strained
- 151
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.13
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 21
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.62bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.20 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
151 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
33 local distress events in the past year (471 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-09-25
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-08-12
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-07-25
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Beaver
2026-07-20
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Fayette
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-04-25
CLOSURE
Monaca
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Tarentum
2026-01-11
CLOSURE
Monroeville
2026-01-02
CLOSURE
Whitehall
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Whitehall Township
2025-12-31
LAYOFF
196 jobs · Westmoreland
What has actually happened on the ground in Pittsburgh, PA recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window, Pittsburgh, PA shows 29 store closures and 3 WARN notices, with 471 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies come in at 3, though this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count: each case is attributed to its filing district and each SEC 8-K to the filer's state, not to where the property sits, and because coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 29
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 471
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.