Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Pittsburgh, PA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · PA
The read
$1.7B of CMBS across 78 loans. Office is both the largest book ($703M) and the most distressed (32.3% vs 11.3% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 13.9% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($377M). 37 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (723 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Pittsburgh, Office Carries the Book — and the Distress
Pittsburgh's CMBS market runs to $1.7 billion across 78 loans, and the strain sits almost entirely in one sector. Office is the metro's largest exposure at $703 million and its most troubled, with a distress rate of 32.3% — nearly three times the 11.3% national office reading. Retail, self-storage and hospitality are quiet by comparison, leaving office to define the credit picture here. Across the full book, the filed distress rate stands at 13.9% as of July 2026, and the direction of that record has been rising.
The maturity calendar keeps the pressure ahead rather than behind. The heaviest load lands in 2031 at $377 million, with another sizable slug due in 2029, and while those later years carry no distress in the filed record today, the 2028 vintage already shows a 15.4% rate. Median DSCR across the book sits at 1.45.
On the ground, the past year brought 37 distress events — 33 store closures and four layoff notices — accounting for 723 jobs. That plays out against a labor market that is still firm: unemployment of 3.7% as of July 2026, down 0.9 points year over year, with office-using employment of 221,908 up 0.8%. The distress in Pittsburgh is concentrated in the office loan book, not the broader economy around it.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$232M / 14.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$376M
Local Banks (stressed)
2 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
33
Layoff Notices (1y)
4 / 723 jobs
0.07% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
78 / $1.7B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.9pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
221,908
+0.8% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Pittsburgh, PA right now?
Here is your short paragraph of commercial-real-estate commentary for Pittsburgh, PA:
Pittsburgh, PA shows a genuinely split distress picture. The retail and CMBS legs are both elevated: 34 store closures at a rate of 3.43 per 100k jobs ranks 13th of 392 metros by count, while 7 securitized loans in special servicing at 14.42% of balance ranks 24th of 335. The WARN leg is quiet at 3 notices (0.04% rate), and bank CRE sits just under the noncurrent line at 320.7 $mm (0.96% rate). Four of the six leg-pairs disagree. The closures-plus-CMBS agreement reads as property-level distress, while WARN’s silence and the bank tape’s quietness suggest the trouble is concentrated in assets rather than employers or local lenders.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
34 closures | 3.43 per 100k jobs | 13 of 392 | 70 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | 0.04% | 136 of 386 | 210 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$320.7mm | 0.96% | 88 of 393 | 294 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
7 loan records | 14.42% | 24 of 335 | 32 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 990902, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1207455, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 33567.6, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1609.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Pittsburgh, PA, and which cannot be read?
Pittsburgh, PA is showing elevated distress on two fronts: CMBS special servicing and real-economy closures. Specifically, the CMBS special servicing reading is elevated, with the special-servicing UPB at $232.0mm and a special-servicing share of metro UPB at 14.4%; meanwhile, store closures over the past year are elevated, with 34 closures recorded. On the credit side, the distressed-bank assets reading stands at 0.8 (billion dollars, per the stated figure), and the distressed-lender CRE exposure is $320.7mm, alongside a bank CRE at-risk reading of 8.8% at the 90th percentile. Notably, the overall bank CRE allocation share is 15.9%, and bank CRE volume is $33.57bn. However, the WARN notices figure (1-year count) and the count of CMBS loans in special servicing are not available from the given vetted figures, so those specific readings cannot be read. The convergence signal is 2, confirming that both leading and realized signals are firing together.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $232.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.4%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $33.57bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $320.7mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.80bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 15.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 7
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 34
- WARN notices (past year)
- 3
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.9pp yr
Last 24 months
3.4%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 990,902 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.6% — $122M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+7.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
+7.4pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+7.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 19 loans, $703M, running 32.3% where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere — worth 9.0pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$376M — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 13.9% now (2026-07), +6.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $1.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$376M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 21 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.8B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.13× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.8B
After Committed Draws
$1.8B / −35%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.13×
Banks In Footprint
21 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.5B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $970M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.8B,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $554M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 21 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dollar Bank, Federal Savings Bank PA | 71.4% | 168% total 187%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 39.5% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 7.4% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Washington Financial Bank PA | 100.0% | 185% total 204%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Elderton State Bank PA | 100.0% | 138% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.70% |
| Somerset Trust Company PA | 32.0% | 206% total 290%
|
🔒 | 1.51% |
| Apollo Trust Company PA | 100.0% | 103% total 131%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 6.7% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Ssb Bank PA | 100.0% | 185% total 247%
|
🔒 | 1.36% |
| The Farmers National Bank Of Canfield OH | 3.9% | 198% total 285%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| 1st Summit Bank PA | 7.1% | 189% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.65% |
| Infirst Bank PA | 9.3% | 140% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Community Bank PA | 40.2% | 288% total 358%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Marion Center Bank PA | 11.0% | 148% total 278%
|
🔒 | 1.48% |
| Univest Bank And Trust Co. PA | 1.2% | 264% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 0.9% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Brentwood Bank PA | 100.0% | 398% total 441%
|
🔒 | 1.22% |
| Nextier Bank, National Association PA | 92.5% | 315% total 362%
|
🔒 | 2.69% |
| S&t Bank PA | 40.0% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Ameriserv Financial Bank PA | 12.1% | 349% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 6.2% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
Not counted — 24 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · The Huntington National Bank OH · Keybank National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Slovenian Savings And Loan Association Of Canonsburg PA · Cfsbank PA · First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Greene Co PA · Sewickley Savings Bank PA · Westmoreland Federal Savings And Loan Association PA · Commercial Bank And Trust Of Pa PA · West View Savings Bank PA · Farmers Building And Savings Bank PA · Monet Bank TX · Mercer County State Bank PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Tristate Capital Bank PA · Enterprise Bank PA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Bank | $290M | 394% total 671%
|
6.18% | 🔒 |
| Ssb Bank | $85M | 185% total 247%
|
1.36% | 🔒 |
| Elderton State Bank | $157M | 138% total 283%
|
0.70% | 🔒 |
| Nextier Bank, National Association | $1.1B | 315% total 362%
|
2.69% | 🔒 |
| Tristate Capital Bank | $3.4B | 176% total 185%
|
1.50% | 🔒 |
| Brentwood Bank | $452M | 398% total 441%
|
1.22% | 🔒 |
| Washington Financial Bank | $444M | 185% total 204%
|
0.92% | 🔒 |
| Cfsbank | $71M | 48% total 83%
|
0.55% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Pittsburgh, PA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Pittsburgh, PA's maturity wall sits at $375.7mm across 20 maturing loans, versus regional/community bank room of $1.82bn after committed draws, putting the wall-to-room ratio at 0.21 — above the median of 0.20 but in the "slack" band, indicating banks do have the capacity to absorb it. The metro ranks 135 of 270, counting from the most strained, and the 14.1% distressed share of CMBS is modest; note that 21 banks qualify and 6 are excluded here, though the exclusion artifact does not explain the reading. Since room after committed draws is $1.82bn — over four times the wall — refinancing capacity appears sufficient, and even the before-committed room of $2.79bn underscores ample headroom.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $375.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 20
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.79bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.52bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.82bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.21
- Rank, most strained
- 135
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.13
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 21
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.64bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.21 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
135 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
37 local distress events in the past year (723 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-08-12
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-07-25
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Beaver
2026-07-20
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Fayette
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Pittsburgh
2026-04-25
CLOSURE
Monaca
2026-04-25
CLOSURE
Monaca
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Tarentum
2026-01-11
CLOSURE
Monroeville
2026-01-11
CLOSURE
Monroeville
2026-01-02
CLOSURE
Whitehall
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Whitehall Township
2025-12-31
LAYOFF
196 jobs · Westmoreland
What has actually happened on the ground in Pittsburgh, PA recently?
Over the past 365 days, Pittsburgh, PA has recorded 34 store closures and 4 WARN notices, affecting 723 jobs, with 0 CRE bankruptcy filings over the window.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 34
- WARN layoff notices
- 4
- Jobs on those notices
- 723
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38300 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.