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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · AZ
The read
$4.3B of CMBS across 207 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $1.3B. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($1.0B). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 90 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (6,969 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Phoenix's CMBS book is clean — but the ground is already moving
Across $4.3 billion of CMBS spread over 207 loans, Phoenix carries nothing in distress: 0.0% as of July 2026, and flat in the filed record. Retail is the largest exposure at $1.3 billion, with Office close behind at $1.2 billion, Hospitality at $0.6 billion and Self-Storage at $0.5 billion. Every sector reads at 0.0% here against national rates of 2.6% for retail, 6.2% for hospitality, and 11.1% for office — the kind of gap that defines this market right now. Median DSCR sits at 2.13.
The pressure is forward, not present. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028, when $1.0 billion comes due, followed by $0.7 billion in 2031, $0.6 billion in 2029 and $0.5 billion in 2032. Over the next 24 months, $1.2 billion reaches its maturity date. For now that book clears clean, but it is a schedule worth watching as it approaches.
The securitized record and the street tell different stories. Over the past year Phoenix logged 90 on-the-ground distress events — 28 store closures and 62 layoff notices totaling 6,969 jobs. Unemployment stands at 4.9%, up 0.6 points year over year, and office-using employment of 541,202 is down 1.1%. None of that has reached the filed distress numbers, but it is the live signal beneath a book that still reads flat.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.2B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 10
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
28
Layoff Notices (1y)
62 / 6,969 jobs
0.33% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
207 / $4.3B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
+0.6pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
541,202
-1.1% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ right now?
Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ shows broadly agreed-upon elevated distress signals across all four measured legs: 27 store closures (elevated by size, not rate, with a rate of 1.27 closures per 100,000 jobs, ranking 18th by count but 238th by rate out of 392 metros) and 49 layoff notices (a floor, with a rate of 0.26% of employed persons, ranking 17th by count and 90th by rate out of 386 metros). Bank CRE distress shows $3,411.3mm over the noncurrent line — a rate of 11.33% — ranking 17th by count and 54th by rate out of 393 metros. Securitized loans in special servicing are flagged as elevated by count (16 rows) but the reading is unavailable: the leg is blind, its rate cannot be measured, and any low numbers there are an absence of measurement, not evidence of quiet. All six pairs agree on elevated status — both store closures and WARN, closures and bank CRE, closures and tape, WARN and bank, WARN and tape, and bank with tape — with zero quiet or disagreeing pairs. Note the store-closures signal here is driven by metro size, not per-unit stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
27 closures | 1.27 per 100k jobs | 18 of 392 | 238 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
49 notices | 0.26% | 17 of 386 | 90 of 386 | elevated
floor trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$3.41bn | 11.33% | 17 of 393 | 54 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
16 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
elevation could not be checked — securitized loans in special servicing are elevated on the count and have no rate ranking to be judged against. That is NOT the same as having checked and found nothing.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 2,119,780 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 2,536,406 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $30,116.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $4,299.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38060 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ, and which cannot be read?
In Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE (with 1.6% of bank CRE allocated and 9.8% at risk at the 90th percentile), CMBS special servicing (where 0.0% of metro UPB is in special servicing), and real-economy signals (27 store closures and 49 WARN notices). Notably, the 0.0% CMBS special-servicing figure is a data gap—not an absence of distress—as all 16 loans in special servicing carry no balance on the tape; the true securitized reading is unavailable. Bank CRE at risk is also pegged at 9.8% with $30.12bn in bank CRE, though the distressed lender CRE figure is 0.5 billion and the current materiality is "immaterial." Overall, the reading shows 4 convergence and a "peak" phase.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $30.12bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 9.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $3.41bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.50bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 1.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 16
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 27
- WARN notices (past year)
- 49
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 16 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38060 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
+0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,119,780 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.5% — $237M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 5 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.5pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-5.6pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 42 loans, $1.2B, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 3.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.2B — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.8B of the metro's $4.3B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.2B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 21 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$630M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.86× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$630M
After Committed Draws
$445M / −29%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.86×
Banks In Footprint
21 / 6 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $396M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $185M
comes out of the room above, leaving $445M,
with 12 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $211M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 21
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 21 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western State Bank ND | 52.7% | 162% total 211%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Ks Statebank KS | 29.4% | 136% total 283%
|
🔒 | 1.92% |
| Bell Bank ND | 17.5% | 270% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Stearns Bank National Association MN | 4.1% | 148% total 215%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| First International Bank & Trust ND | 13.1% | 273% total 374%
|
🔒 | 1.81% |
| Goldwater Bank, N.a. AZ | 84.0% | 265% total 290%
|
🔒 | 5.41% |
| Trustbank IL | 18.8% | 160% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Bnc National Bank AZ | 11.8% | 213% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 3.6% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Alerus Financial, National Association ND | 6.0% | 260% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 2.5% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Tradition Capital Bank MN | 8.7% | 291% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Unison Bank ND | 12.4% | 284% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Colorado CO | 1.0% | 292% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First Western Bank & Trust ND | 0.3% | 243% total 378%
|
🔒 | 2.64% |
| Southwest Heritage Bank AZ | 41.1% | 311% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.28% |
| First Fidelity Bank OK | 27.9% | 308% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Bankers Trust Company IA | 7.1% | 360% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Parkway Bank And Trust Company IL | 5.5% | 433% total 452%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| First Western Trust Bank CO | 4.5% | 312% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sunwest Bank UT | 4.0% | 327% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
Not counted — 33 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Beal Bank Usa NV · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · First American Trust, Fsb CA · Commerce Bank MO · Usaa Federal Savings Bank AZ · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Western Alliance Bank AZ · Midfirst Bank OK · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Umb Bank, National Association MO · Bokf, National Association OK · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Busey Bank IL · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Banterra Bank IL · Glacier Bank MT · Columbia Bank OR · Wafd Bank WA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Gateway Commercial Bank AZ · Zenith Bank & Trust AZ · Scottsdale Community Bank AZ · Integro Bank AZ · Gainey Business Bank AZ
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldwater Bank, N.a. | $174M | 265% total 290%
|
5.41% | 🔒 |
| Western Alliance Bank | $15.8B | 161% total 178%
|
2.46% | 🔒 |
| Gateway Commercial Bank | $98M | 154% total 337%
|
0.98% | 🔒 |
| Southwest Heritage Bank | $560M | 311% total 428%
|
0.28% | 🔒 |
| Bnc National Bank | $430M | 213% total 319%
|
0.04% | 🔒 |
| Integro Bank | $115M | 211% total 590%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ screens as strained on bank-refinancing capacity: its wall-to-room ratio of 2.64 ranks 28 of 275 (counting from the most strained), with $1.17bn of CMBS maturing across 61 loans against $444.7mm of remaining room after committed draws ($629.6mm before committed draws of $395.8mm). That said, the ratio must be read with its size and composition: the metro carries $4.28bn in CMBS UPB and a 0.0% distressed share, and 21 banks qualify here against 19 excluded, so the tightness reflects the concentration line and the regional/community footprint proxy rather than evident credit stress.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.17bn
- … across this many loans
- 61
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $629.6mm
- Committed construction draws
- $395.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $444.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.64
- Rank, most strained
- 28
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 1.86
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 21
- … excluded from the calculation
- 19
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $4.28bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
2.64 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
28 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38060 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-1.9%
Same-Store Revenue
0.0%
Occupancy
95.7%
Rent Growth
-1.4%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -1.5% | -0.2% | 95.9% | -1.5% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.4% | +0.2% | 95.4% | -1.2% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
90 local distress events in the past year (6,969 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-21
LAYOFF
Phoenix
2026-10-20
CLOSURE
Phoenix
2026-10-09
CLOSURE
Phoenix
2026-10-05
LAYOFF
108 jobs · Phoenix
2026-10-02
CLOSURE
Phoenix
2026-09-30
LAYOFF
107 jobs · Tempe
2026-09-28
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-09-23
CLOSURE
Tempe
2026-09-21
LAYOFF
Phoenix
2026-09-20
CLOSURE
Phoenix
2026-09-15
LAYOFF
120 jobs · Tempe
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Phoenix
2026-09-08
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Tempe
2026-09-03
LAYOFF
Scottsdale
2026-09-03
LAYOFF
98 jobs · Scottsdale
What has actually happened on the ground in Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ reading shows 28 store closures and 62 WARN notices affecting 6,969 jobs — the latter a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. The commercial-real-estate bankruptcy figure of 9 is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, and because coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 28
- WARN layoff notices
- 62
- Jobs on those notices
- 6,969
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 9
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 38060 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.