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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · DE, MD, NJ, PA
The read
$6.7B of CMBS across 266 loans. Office is the largest book ($2.1B) but runs below its national distress rate (6.8% vs 11.1%); the elevated risk is in Multifamily (9.8%). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($1.6B). Distress is flat in the filed record — 4.8% as of 2026-07. 129 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (8,191 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the book, but multifamily is where the strain shows
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington runs $6.7 billion of CMBS across 266 loans, and the headline read is calmer than the sector mix suggests. Office is the largest book at $2.1 billion, yet it carries a distress rate of 6.8% — well under the 11.1% national office mark. The elevated risk sits elsewhere: multifamily, at $1.2 billion, posts a 9.8% distress rate, above its own 7.9% national benchmark. For a metro whose reputation is written in office square footage, the sharper read is on the residential book.
In the filed record, distress is flat at 4.8% as of July 2026, against a median DSCR of 1.61. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028, with $1.6 billion coming due that year — a concentration worth marking even as near-term distress holds steady. By comparison, $1.7 billion matures inside the next 24 months.
On the ground, the past year brought 129 distress events — 84 store closures and 45 layoff notices touching 8,191 jobs — set against a metro unemployment rate of 4.4% in August 2026. The signals are mixed rather than one-directional: a contained CMBS distress rate and a below-national office book on one side, a maturity wall in 2028 and an above-national multifamily rate on the other.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$326M / 4.8%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.7B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 40
Bank Early-Warning
6 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
84
Layoff Notices (1y)
45 / 8,191 jobs
0.32% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
266 / $6.7B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.4%
-1.0pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD right now?
In Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, distress is broad and elevated across all four independent feeds, with all 6 pairs reading hot and 0 disagreeing or quiet, and 4 of 4 signals elevated. Store closures sit at 74 closures (2.92 per 100k jobs, 5th of 392 by count vs. 91st by rate), while WARN layoff notices total 44 (0.25% of employment, 21st by count, 94th by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line reaches $4,864.5mm, or 6.71% of the metro's lent CRE (12th by count, 111th by rate), and securitized loans in special servicing total 93 rows, or 4.56% of the securitized balance read (2nd by count, 74th by rate; the bank figure is an allocation by branch deposits, and the CMBS value is a floor measured over 19.4% of special-servicing rows — not a precise ceiling on stress).
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
74 closures | 2.92 per 100k jobs | 5 of 392 | 91 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
44 notices | 0.25% | 21 of 386 | 94 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$4.86bn | 6.71% | 12 of 393 | 111 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
93 loan records | 4.56% | 2 of 335 | 74 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 2,537,841 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 3,213,768 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $72,457.5 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $6,838.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, and which cannot be read?
In Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, closures, and WARN notices. On the credit side, bank distressed CRE exposure stands at $4.86bn (with a 90th-percentile at-risk share of 13.1% of $72.46bn bank CRE), and CMBS special servicing UPB is $312.0mm (a 4.6% share of metro UPB). Real-economy signals are also firing: 74 one-year store closures and 44 WARN notices. Notably, the CMBS dollar figure is a floor, as measured over 19.4% of the metro's 93 special-servicing rows; the rest carry no balance. The reading on distressed bank assets is 0 (with 0 distressed banks), and the bank allocation share is 4.7%. The convergence score is 4, indicating multiple signals aligning. Not readable from the provided data: any non-bank lender CRE distress detail beyond the stated figures, or a distinct measure for bank CRE at risk beyond the p90 percentile—no alternative percentiles are available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $312.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $72.46bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 13.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $4.86bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 4.7%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 93
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 74
- WARN notices (past year)
- 44
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 19.4% of this metro's 93 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.4%
-1.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.7%5.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,537,841 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.8% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.8% — $131M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 5 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-1.3pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 75 loans, $2.1B, running 6.8% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 1.4pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.7B — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 4.8% now (2026-07), -0.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.8B of the metro's $6.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.7B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 41 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4.8B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.36× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$4.8B
After Committed Draws
$2.4B / −49%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.36×
Banks In Footprint
41 / 16 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $3.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2.3B
comes out of the room above, leaving $2.4B,
with 20 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.4B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 41
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 41 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb DE | 90.7% | 225% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 31.1% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Firstrust Savings Bank PA | 95.3% | 245% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Penn Community Bank PA | 96.9% | 229% total 278%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Univest Bank And Trust Co. PA | 87.7% | 264% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Parke Bank NJ | 75.4% | 254% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Ambler Savings Bank PA | 83.5% | 113% total 174%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Phoenixville Federal Bank And Trust PA | 100.0% | 176% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Newfield National Bank NJ | 57.8% | 174% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Asian Bank PA | 100.0% | 251% total 337%
|
🔒 | 1.22% |
| Customers Bank PA | 1.9% | 179% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Franklin Bank NJ | 91.0% | 136% total 211%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Century Savings Bank NJ | 33.6% | 131% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Ephrata National Bank PA | 9.4% | 104% total 170%
|
🔒 | 0.93% |
| Haddon Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 192% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Quaint Oak Bank PA | 77.2% | 232% total 503%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Iron Workers Savings Bank PA | 100.0% | 145% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wayne Bank PA | 8.7% | 201% total 359%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| The First National Bank Of Elmer NJ | 85.6% | 237% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Citizens & Northern Bank PA | 17.1% | 262% total 366%
|
🔒 | 2.56% |
| Harleysville Bank PA | 89.0% | 284% total 291%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Bird-In-Hand PA | 1.9% | 115% total 226%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Harford Bank MD | 8.3% | 235% total 419%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 1.1% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 3.9% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Sharon Bank PA | 100.0% | 361% total 435%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Resource Bank PA | 100.0% | 454% total 620%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Meridian Bank PA | 99.2% | 306% total 448%
|
🔒 | 4.33% |
| Qnb Bank PA | 84.9% | 332% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Artisans' Bank DE | 67.8% | 302% total 400%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Hyperion Bank PA | 54.7% | 348% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| The Bank Of Princeton NJ | 38.9% | 382% total 509%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 29.9% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| First Bank NJ | 28.3% | 339% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First Citizens Community Bank PA | 24.6% | 320% total 401%
|
🔒 | 1.98% |
| Columbia Bank NJ | 12.0% | 350% total 405%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| S&t Bank PA | 11.0% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Tompkins Community Bank NY | 6.3% | 323% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| First Commerce Bank NJ | 4.6% | 459% total 634%
|
🔒 | 0.41% |
| Oceanfirst Bank, National Association NJ | 3.5% | 384% total 456%
|
🔒 | 0.95% |
| Provident Bank NJ | 0.7% | 422% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
Not counted — 38 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Capital One, National Association VA · Td Bank, National Association DE · Barclays Bank Delaware DE · Td Bank Usa, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Comenity Bank DE · Truist Bank NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Sei Private Trust Company PA · Hatboro Federal Savings, Fa PA · Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware DE · First National Bank And Trust Company Of Newtown PA · United Savings Bank PA · Bny Mellon Trust Of Delaware DE · The Haverford Trust Company PA · Stifel Trust Company Delaware, National Association DE · Applied Bank DE · Beal Bank Usa NV · The National Bank Of Malvern PA · The Pennsville National Bank NJ · The Northern Trust Company IL · Monroe Savings Bank NJ · Abacus Federal Savings Bank NY · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Cross River Bank NJ · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Woori America Bank NY · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Company VA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meridian Bank | $1.1B | 306% total 448%
|
4.33% | 🔒 |
| Santander Bank, N.a. | $17.1B | 117% total 124%
|
3.20% | 🔒 |
| The First National Bank Of Elmer | $196M | 237% total 440%
|
1.30% | 🔒 |
| Quaint Oak Bank | $370M | 232% total 503%
|
1.10% | 🔒 |
| Artisans' Bank | $326M | 302% total 400%
|
0.40% | 🔒 |
| Sharon Bank | $72M | 361% total 435%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Franklin Bank | $77M | 136% total 211%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The National Bank Of Malvern | $51M | 97% total 138%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, the visible maturity load looks manageable against qualifying bank capacity: $1.70bn of CMBS maturing across 64 loans against $4.78bn of room before committed construction draws and $2.44bn after, a wall-to-room reading of 0.70 (0.36 before committed draws), which ranks 70 of 275 counting from the most strained and sits above the median. That said, the reading is partial by construction — it covers CMBS maturing within 24 months only, room is a deposit-footprint proxy for lending capacity, and 6 banks are excluded here against 41 qualifying, so any local supply of credit outside that footprint is invisible rather than absent.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.70bn
- … across this many loans
- 64
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $4.78bn
- Committed construction draws
- $3.78bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $2.44bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.70
- Rank, most strained
- 70
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.36
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 41
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.8%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $6.74bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.70 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
70 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-27Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+4.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+4.4%
Occupancy
97.0%
Rent Growth
+4.4%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UDR | +4.5% | +4.4% | 97.0% | +4.4% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
129 local distress events in the past year (8,191 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-15
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 61 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-11-17
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 374 jobs · Swedesboro
2026-12-06
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 18 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-10-19
CLOSURE
Maple Shade
2026-10-16
CLOSURE
Philadelphia
2026-10-16
LAYOFF
48 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-10-14
LAYOFF
Philadelphia
2026-10-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
CLOSURE
New Hope
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-03
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Chester
2026-10-02
LAYOFF
500 jobs · North Wales
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
80 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-10-01
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
What has actually happened on the ground in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD recently?
Over the recent 365-day window, the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD metro has logged 82 store closures, 45 WARN notices, and 8,191 jobs affected, alongside 101 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings — though that last figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count, and the jobs figure is a floor since notices stating no headcount contribute zero.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 82
- WARN layoff notices
- 45
- Jobs on those notices
- 8,191
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 101
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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