Start free trial
No credit card required
Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Peoria, IL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IL
The read
$97M of CMBS across 11 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($33M, 34% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 3 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$30M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
3 / 13
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
3
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
11 / $97M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.0%
-0.9pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Peoria, IL right now?
Peoria, IL is showing a mild but highly specific distress profile — not broad-based trouble, but a lender-side stress signal without an evident tenant or employment cause behind it. The bank CRE leg reads elevated, with $368.9mm of bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line as of 2026-03-31, a rate of 9.62% that ranks 72nd of 393 metros. That bank signal stands alone: store closures over the trailing 365 days sit at 2.04 per 100k jobs (rank 163rd of 392), and WARN layoff notices register zero (0.0% of employment), both quiet. The disagreement between bank stress and the quiet tenant/employment legs suggests the pressure is coming from construction or a rate reset rather than vacancy — no visible retail or workforce breakage is driving it. The securitized-loans-in-special-servicing reading is unavailable: the denominator cannot be measured here, with 0% of special-servicing rows carrying a balance, so that leg is blind and should not be read as evidence of distress or calm — it's an absence of measurement, not a quiet number. Overall, one of six signal pairs is both quiet, two disagree, and three are unadjudicated because a side is blind, so the honest takeaway is lender stress without a visible operating tail, and no confirmable signal from securitized capital.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
3 closures | 2.04 per 100k jobs | 128 of 392 | 163 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$368.9mm | 9.62% | 82 of 393 | 72 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
1 both quiet
2 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 146,821 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 166,699 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $3,833.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $93.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Peoria, IL, and which cannot be read?
For Peoria, IL, the elevated distress signal is in bank-distressed CRE, with 10.9% of bank CRE allocated and 6.5% at risk in the 90th percentile, alongside $368.9mm in distressed lender CRE and 1.4 billion in distressed bank assets. The CMBS special servicing reading is unavailable because, although 1 loan is in special servicing, its $0.0mm balance reflects a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress; consequently, the 0.0% share is not a true measure. No other signals are currently readable, and the overall phase is "watch" with no convergence.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.83bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 6.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $368.9mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 10.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 4
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.0%
-0.9pp yr
Last 24 months
3.8%5.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 146,821 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (11) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$30M — 31% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $97M of the metro's $97M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$30M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 14 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$410M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$410M
After Committed Draws
$186M / −55%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
14 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $244M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $224M
comes out of the room above, leaving $186M,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $20M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 14 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Morton Community Bank IL | 75.4% | 247% total 313%
|
🔒 | 0.69% |
| Goodfield State Bank IL | 100.0% | 154% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.95% |
| Heartland Bank And Trust Company IL | 11.2% | 262% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Bank Of Pontiac IL | 13.9% | 166% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Cbi Bank & Trust IA | 4.8% | 144% total 230%
|
🔒 | 1.70% |
| Princeville State Bank IL | 100.0% | 179% total 271%
|
🔒 | 14.82% |
| Midamerica National Bank IL | 13.1% | 202% total 293%
|
🔒 | 6.41% |
| Fortress Bank IL | 26.2% | 264% total 308%
|
🔒 | 1.97% |
| Bank Of Farmington IL | 17.2% | 166% total 233%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Ipava State Bank IL | 16.7% | 132% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Mid Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 1.8% | 271% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Midwest Bank IL | 1.9% | 183% total 190%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 7.5% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Inb, National Association IL | 6.2% | 349% total 468%
|
🔒 | 1.48% |
Not counted — 16 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Commerce Bank MO · Better Banks IL · State Bank Of Toulon IL · The First National Bank Of Lacon IL · The First National Bank In Tremont IL · Regions Bank AL · Flanagan State Bank IL · First Security Bank IL · The Havana National Bank IL · Community Partners Savings Bank IL · Peoples National Bank Of Kewanee IL · First State Bank Of Forrest IL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midamerica National Bank | $192M | 202% total 293%
|
6.41% | 🔒 |
| Fortress Bank | $263M | 264% total 308%
|
1.97% | 🔒 |
| Goodfield State Bank | $67M | 154% total 223%
|
0.95% | 🔒 |
| Morton Community Bank | $1.9B | 247% total 313%
|
0.69% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Farmington | $63M | 166% total 233%
|
0.48% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Peoria, IL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Peoria, IL looks comfortably able to absorb its visible CMBS maturity wall: 2 maturing loans totaling $29.7mm come due against $185.8mm of room after committed draws at banks qualifying here, with 2 banks excluded here, giving a wall-to-room ratio of 0.16 (0.07 before committed draws) — well below the median metro — and a distressed share of 0.0%, ranking 167 of 275 counting from the most strained; the usual caveats apply, since room is a deposit-footprint proxy and the $29.7mm wall covers only the $96.5mm of CMBS UPB this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $29.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 2
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $409.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $244.2mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $185.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.16
- Rank, most strained
- 167
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 14
- … excluded from the calculation
- 2
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $96.5mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.16 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
167 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37900 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
3 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-08-24
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-08-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-08-10
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-08-01
CLOSURE
Peoria
2026-07-31
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Peoria
2025-12-20
CLOSURE
Peoria
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Peoria
2025-08-02
CLOSURE
Peoria
2025-01-23
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Peoria
2025-01-15
CLOSURE
Washington
What has actually happened on the ground in Peoria, IL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the vetted reading for Peoria, IL shows 3 store closures, 0 warn notices and 15 cre bankruptcies, with jobs affected at 0 — though note that affected_employees is nullable, so that figure is a floor rather than a full accounting. The 15 cre bankruptcies figure should be read carefully: it is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 15
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37900 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.