Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$1.7B of CMBS across 92 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 2.4% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($480M, 28% of the book). Hospitality is the largest book ($511M, 0.0% distressed). 54 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (4,336 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Hospitality carries the book, but the filed record is turning
Orlando runs $1.7 billion of CMBS across 92 loans, and the distress rate in the filed record sits at 2.4% as of July 2026 — modest on its face, but rising. That is the number to watch here: a book that has held up is now moving in one direction, off a low base, with a median DSCR of 1.52 still providing cushion.
Hospitality is the largest concentration at $511 million, and none of it is distressed today — a striking contrast with the 6.1% national rate for the sector. Office, at roughly $0.4 billion, carries a 2.6% distress rate against an 11.3% national mark, and retail's 2.4% runs just inside the 2.7% national figure. Industrial and multifamily books show no distress on the page. The heaviest refinancing test lands in 2028, when $480 million — 28% of the book — comes due; that vintage is 2.0% distressed for now.
The on-the-ground record adds texture the loan tape doesn't capture: 54 distress events over the past year — 28 store closures and 26 layoff notices — touching 4,336 jobs. With unemployment at 4.7% and office-using employment essentially flat, the metro's credit picture is one of low headline distress against a filed record that has started to climb.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$43M / 2.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$474M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 8
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
28
Layoff Notices (1y)
26 / 4,336 jobs
0.34% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
92 / $1.7B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
+0.6pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
318,144
+0.1% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL right now?
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL shows clear signs of commercial real estate distress, with three of four monitored signals elevated. Store closures are running at 1.81 per 100,000 jobs (ranked 22nd by count), and layoff notices are at 0.29% of metro employment (ranked 20th by count). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at 8.33% of the CRE lent into the metro, with $964.5mm over the line. Securitized loans in special servicing is the quiet leg at 2.49% of the securitized balance read here, with 4 rows in special servicing — a reading that's unavailable for any of the other legs' denominators.
Of the six pairwise comparisons, three agree on elevation (closures+WARN, closures+bank, WARN+bank) and three disagree. The disagreements point to specific structural stories: closures are hot while the securitized tape is quiet, reading as "retail is failing on buildings this tape does not hold"; WARN is hot while the tape is quiet, reading as "employers are cutting and the securitized book has not moved"; and bank CRE is hot while the tape is quiet, reading as "the lenders here are stressed on a book the tape cannot see." The common thread across all three disagreements is the quiet CMBS leg — the securitized book simply is not showing the same stress as the other feeds. The tape holds only its own non-pari-passu slice, and its silence is a fact about that book, not evidence the metro is free of distress. The metro's distress is concentrated in the bank-and-employment channels, while the securitized channel has not yet moved.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
23 closures | 1.81 per 100k jobs | 22 of 392 | 190 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
45 notices | 0.29% | 20 of 386 | 76 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$964.5mm | 8.33% | 43 of 393 | 89 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | 2.49% | 42 of 335 | 87 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1269572, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1471906, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 11573.9, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1726.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL, and which cannot be read?
In Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL, the distinct distress signals that are elevated are bank_distressed_cre, closures, and warn — that is, distressed bank exposure and recorded closures/layoffs. Before I cite any figures, note: one of the elevated signals (bank_distressed_cre) is directly visible in the data, while the other two (closures, warn) are named but their underlying figures are not given to me; I can only state that they are listed as elevated. What I can read quantitatively: the bank-level distressed-CRE reading shows distressed_lender_cre of $964.5mm, and the bank’s CRE exposure is elevated at the 90th percentile (28.8% of bank CRE at risk), with 2.5% of bank assets allocated to CRE (total $11.57bn). Also, distressed bank assets are 0.2 (in billions). On the CMBS side, special servicing is 2.5% of metro UPB ($43.0mm), with 4 CMBS loans in special servicing. What cannot be read from the provided figures: the store-closure count (23) and WARN-notice count (45) are listed as elevated but the actual figures are not among the STATED numbers I can quote; their readings are unavailable. The “convergence” indicator is 3, and the phase is early. No other figures are available for those two signals.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $43.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $11.57bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 28.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $964.5mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.20bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 23
- WARN notices (past year)
- 45
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
+0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,269,572 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 2.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.1% — $63M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 5 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 11 loans, $370M, running 2.6% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$474M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 2.4% now (2026-07), +1.9pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $1.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$474M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 22 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$751M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.63× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$751M
After Committed Draws
$370M / −51%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.63×
Banks In Footprint
22 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $631M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $381M
comes out of the room above, leaving $370M,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $250M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 22 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 14.0% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 45.3% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Axiom Bank, National Association FL | 76.3% | 171% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Southern Bank FL | 80.0% | 224% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Banco Do Brasil Americas FL | 7.0% | 108% total 119%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| City National Bank Of Florida FL | 3.1% | 258% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Climate First Bank FL | 34.6% | 261% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 0.6% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 10.1% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 1.3% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 2.4% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 18.8% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 0.6% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| One Florida Bank FL | 96.6% | 298% total 433%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Bankflorida FL | 29.6% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Surety Bank FL | 5.2% | 121% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Mainstreet Community Bank Of Florida FL | 27.2% | 292% total 529%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| First Southern Bank AL | 0.8% | 171% total 243%
|
🔒 | 2.46% |
| Sunrise Bank FL | 48.3% | 387% total 582%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 21.5% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Amerasia Bank NY | 10.6% | 354% total 406%
|
🔒 | 1.90% |
| Ocean Bank FL | 0.4% | 528% total 621%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
Not counted — 24 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Td Bank, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Trustco Bank NY · The First National Bank Of Mount Dora FL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Helm Bank Usa FL · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Synchrony Bank UT
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ · Servisfirst Bank AL
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Commerce Bank & Trust FL · First Colony Bank Of Florida FL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commerce Bank & Trust | $76M | 163% total 368%
|
5.39% | 🔒 |
| United Southern Bank | $262M | 224% total 279%
|
0.18% | 🔒 |
| Cogent Bank | $724M | 162% total 276%
|
0.32% | 🔒 |
| One Florida Bank | $955M | 298% total 433%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
| Sunrise Bank | $343M | 387% total 582%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Axiom Bank, National Association | $166M | 171% total 188%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Colony Bank Of Florida | $156M | 239% total 485%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The First National Bank Of Mount Dora | $54M | 74% total 124%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL, the banks lending here appear stretched relative to the CMBS maturity wall. With 22 qualifying banks, the maturing balance is $473.7mm across 22 loans, while the room after committed draws is $370.0mm — putting the wall-to-room ratio at 1.28, which is ABOVE the median of 0.20 and ranks 45 of 270 counting from the most strained. Notably, only 9 banks were excluded here, and the reading isn’t explained by an exclusion artifact, so this strain looks genuine. Still, room is a deposit-footprint proxy, and the wall is CMBS-only, so the ratio is an upper bound on local absorption — but at this level, refinancing capacity looks tight unless committed draws unwind.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $473.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 22
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $751.1mm
- Committed construction draws
- $630.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $370.0mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.28
- Rank, most strained
- 45
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.63
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 22
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 2.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.73bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.28 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
45 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+1.5%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.4%
Occupancy
96.1%
Rent Growth
-0.7%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | +3.1% | -0.4% | 96.2% | -0.8% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | +1.3% | -0.1% | 95.5% | -0.1% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | +0.1% | -0.7% | 96.7% | -1.1% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
54 local distress events in the past year (4,336 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Altamonte Springs
2026-09-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
180 jobs · Winter Park
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Orlando
2026-08-02
CLOSURE
Orlando
2026-07-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
21 jobs · ORLANDO
2026-06-08
LAYOFF
12 jobs · SAINT CLOUD
2026-06-08
LAYOFF
25 jobs · CLERMONT
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Winter Park
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Sanford
2026-05-29
LAYOFF
74 jobs · MAITLAND
2026-05-24
CLOSURE
Winter Park
2026-05-24
CLOSURE
Sanford
2026-05-09
CLOSURE
Orlando
What has actually happened on the ground in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL recently?
In the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL metro over the past 365 days, the ground truth shows 26 WARN notices affecting 4,336 jobs and 24 store closures, alongside 4 CRE-likely bankruptcies (state-proxy count, not metro-native). These numbers reflect only approved, ZIP-matched events; pending filings are excluded, and the jobs figure is a floor since notices without headcounts contribute zero.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 24
- WARN layoff notices
- 26
- Jobs on those notices
- 4,336
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.