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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Omaha, NE-IA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IA, NE
The read
$333M of CMBS across 16 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($128M, 38% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 8 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (79 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$17M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 23
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
6
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 79 jobs
0.02% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
16 / $333M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.0%
-0.1pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
107,207
-4.8% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Omaha, NE-IA right now?
Omaha, NE-IA shows mixed CRE distress signals. Store closures are elevated with 6 closures (rank 70th of 392 by count, 220th by rate), but this is driven by metro size — the rate of 1.41 per 100k jobs sits below the median. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is also elevated at $472.4mm (rank 67th of 393 by count, 212th by rate), yet similarly size-driven with a rate of 2.99% below median. Layoff notices (WARN) are quiet at 0 notices. The securitized loans in special servicing reading is unavailable — the signal cannot be measured here, so its low numbers reflect an absence of measurement, not an absence of distress. The two disagreeing pairs (closures vs. WARN, and WARN vs. bank CRE) suggest small-operator failure below the WARN filing floor, plus lender stress with no employment event behind it.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 1.41 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 220 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$472.4mm | 2.99% | 67 of 393 | 212 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
0 both quiet
2 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures, bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 425,625 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 534,289 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $15,790.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $382.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36540 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Omaha, NE-IA, and which cannot be read?
In Omaha, NE-IA, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE and closures (store closures). Bank-distressed CRE is flagged by distressed lender CRE of $472.4mm (20.6% of bank CRE allocations of $15.79bn) and 22.8% of bank CRE at the 90th percentile. The ground is wobbling with 6 store closures in the past year, though the reading on clarity is obscured: the securitized side cannot be read here because $0.0mm in CMBS special servicing (0.0% of metro UPB) is a gap in the tape — all 2 loans in special servicing carry no balance — not an absence of distress. Additionally, the bank distressed-assets figure of 0.2 billion and 1 distressed bank are provided, but WARN notices (0) and the convergence metric (2) offer limited signal, and the materiality is immaterial.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $15.79bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 22.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $472.4mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.20bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 20.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: not one of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows carries a balance — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 2 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36540 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.0%
-0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.7%3.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 425,625 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (16) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$17M — 5% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $310M of the metro's $333M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$17M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 38 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$806M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.02× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$806M
After Committed Draws
$481M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.02×
Banks In Footprint
38 / 11 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $923M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $325M
comes out of the room above, leaving $481M,
with 15 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $599M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 of 38
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
15 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 38 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security National Bank Of Omaha NE | 84.4% | 238% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Midstates Bank, National Association IA | 59.1% | 117% total 162%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Five Points Bank NE | 27.9% | 170% total 251%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ts Bank IA | 76.5% | 109% total 129%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Arbor Bank NE | 70.4% | 165% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| Pinnacle Bank NE | 31.8% | 282% total 346%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Union Bank And Trust Company NE | 7.7% | 235% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Dayspring Bank NE | 21.6% | 141% total 255%
|
🔒 | 2.05% |
| First State Bank Nebraska NE | 19.3% | 140% total 231%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Availa Bank IA | 16.1% | 195% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Northwest Bank IA | 8.6% | 204% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| First Nebraska Bank NE | 28.5% | 153% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Equitable Bank NE | 22.3% | 184% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Equity Bank KS | 3.0% | 237% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Charter West Bank NE | 14.7% | 138% total 248%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Cornerstone Bank NE | 4.2% | 205% total 286%
|
🔒 | 3.91% |
| Rolling Hills Bank & Trust IA | 12.2% | 154% total 190%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Rvr Bank NE | 28.5% | 236% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Foundation One Bank NE | 100.0% | 265% total 328%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Exchange Bank NE | 9.1% | 262% total 295%
|
🔒 | 3.69% |
| Hershey Bank NE | 16.6% | 102% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Lincoln Fsb Of Nebraska NE | 14.2% | 225% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Commercial State Bank NE | 29.0% | 229% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| West Gate Bank NE | 8.0% | 266% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| F&m Bank NE | 8.2% | 180% total 212%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Henderson State Bank NE | 1.8% | 119% total 152%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Western National Bank NE | 3.2% | 171% total 210%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Dundee Bank NE | 100.0% | 495% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Westroads Bank, Inc. NE | 100.0% | 395% total 460%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Enterprise Bank NE | 100.0% | 448% total 524%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Access Bank NE | 100.0% | 306% total 414%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| I3 Bank NE | 95.2% | 305% total 416%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Core Bank NE | 94.4% | 375% total 446%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Premier Bank National Association NE | 82.7% | 350% total 439%
|
🔒 | 1.51% |
| Horizon Bank NE | 34.5% | 385% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Riverstone Bank NE | 14.7% | 368% total 474%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Cornhusker Bank NE | 3.0% | 413% total 508%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Bankers Trust Company IA | 2.2% | 360% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
Not counted — 29 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Washington County Bank NE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Glenwood State Bank IA · Firstbank Of Nebraska NE · Malvern Bank IA · Citizens State Bank NE · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Community Bank IA · Wahoo State Bank NE · Jones Bank NE · United Bank Of Iowa IA · First Northeast Bank Of Nebraska NE · Farmers Trust & Savings Bank IA · Farmers And Merchants Bank NE · Westside State Bank IA · The Shelby County State Bank IA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Associated Bank, National Association WI · First Interstate Bank MT · Umb Bank, National Association MO · First Savings Bank SD · Great Southern Bank MO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Republic Bank | $101M | 305% total 474%
|
6.29% | 🔒 |
| First National Bank Of Omaha | $6.0B | 111% total 148%
|
0.70% | 🔒 |
| Washington County Bank | $87M | 83% total 95%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| Midstates Bank, National Association | $134M | 117% total 162%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Ts Bank | $63M | 109% total 129%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Westroads Bank, Inc. | $208M | 395% total 460%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Security National Bank Of Omaha | $700M | 238% total 327%
|
1.96% | 🔒 |
| Glenwood State Bank | $56M | 92% total 126%
|
1.74% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Omaha, NE-IA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Omaha, NE-IA shows ample bank capacity against its visible maturity load: just 2 maturing loans totaling $17.4mm face $481.0mm of room after committed draws ($805.6mm before), a wall_to_room of 0.04 (0.02 wall_to_room_before_committed_draws) that ranks 250 of 275 counting from the most strained, with 38 banks_qualifying against 9 banks_excluded_here and a distressed_share of 0.0%; note the wall is $332.8mm of cmbs_upb maturing within 24 months, so this reading covers only the debt the platform can see, and room is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement of lending capacity.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $17.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 2
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $805.6mm
- Committed construction draws
- $923.1mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $481.0mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.04
- Rank, most strained
- 250
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.02
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 38
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $332.8mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.04 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
250 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36540 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
8 local distress events in the past year (79 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-30
LAYOFF
79 jobs · Missouri Valley
2026-08-18
LAYOFF
Omaha
2026-07-02
CLOSURE
Omaha
2026-01-24
CLOSURE
Omaha
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Council Bluffs
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Bellevue
2025-12-23
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-10-31
CLOSURE
Omaha
2025-10-28
CLOSURE
Omaha
2025-10-13
CLOSURE
Omaha
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Council Bluffs
2024-11-01
CLOSURE
Council Bluffs
2024-11-01
CLOSURE
Omaha
2024-11-01
CLOSURE
Council Bluffs
2024-11-01
CLOSURE
Omaha
What has actually happened on the ground in Omaha, NE-IA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Omaha, NE-IA metro recorded 6 store closures and 2 warn notices, with 79 jobs affected. These figures are paired with 1 cre bankruptcies, but that reading is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count, and the jobs figure should be treated as a floor since notices stating no headcount contribute zero.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 6
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 79
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36540 · geo_events · last changed 18 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.