Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Oklahoma City, OK
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OK
The read
$399M of CMBS across 27 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 20.5% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($180M, 45% of the book). 4 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Oklahoma City's Distress Rate Runs Hot Against a Slim Book
Oklahoma City carries a compact CMBS book — $399 million across 27 loans — but the distress rate on it is anything but small. As of July 2026, 20.5% of the balance sits in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent, and the filed record has been rising. For a market this size, a single sour credit moves the needle hard, and the headline rate reflects that concentration rather than a broad-based unwind. The median DSCR across the book still reads 1.66, so the strain is uneven rather than systemic.
The calendar is where the weight sits. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $180 million — 45% of the book — comes due. That single vintage dwarfs the near-term slate and frames the refinancing question for this metro well down the road. Nearer maturities are light by comparison, keeping the immediate pressure modest even as the 2029 wall builds.
On the ground, the past year brought four distress events — one store closure and three layoff notices — a thin but non-zero signal against a local unemployment rate of 4.3%, up 1.1 points year over year. Among the metro's banks, four are flagged distressed and nine more sit in early-warning territory. The picture is a small book with a big headline number and a maturity concentration that keeps 2029 firmly in view.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$82M / 20.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$76M
Local Banks (stressed)
4 / 29
Bank Early-Warning
9 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
1
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
27 / $399M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
+1.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Oklahoma City, OK right now?
Oklahoma City presents a mixed distress picture. Store closures are not elevated — the metro ranks 128th of 392 by closure count (0.55 closures per 100,000 jobs, 298th by rate), so retail failure is not the story here. Layoff notices (WARN) cannot be read as a signal: the measurement state is not measurable because 0% of this geography's notices report a headcount, so the low reading is an absence of measurement, not an absence of distress.
The pressure sits on the capital side. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at 8.75% — a share of CRE lent into the metro that is noncurrent — ranking 26th of 393 by count and 84th by rate, with $2,144.0 million over the line (only 19.6% of these dollars require no allocation). Securitized loans in special servicing are also elevated at 20.55% of the securitized balance read here, ranking 28th of 335 by count and 19th by rate, though the figure is a FLOOR measured over 50.0% of special-servicing rows. Both bank and CMBS legs are hot, while store closures are quiet — a disagreement pattern that points to bank stress without a visible tenant cause, likely construction or rate resets rather than vacancy, and securitized distress without retail failure, suggesting an office story. Of six pairs, 1 is both elevated, 0 both quiet, 2 disagree, and 3 are unadjudicated because a side is blind.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
3 closures | 0.55 per 100k jobs | 128 of 392 | 298 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
3 notices | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.14bn | 8.75% | 26 of 393 | 84 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
6 loan records | 20.55% | 28 of 335 | 19 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
0 both quiet
2 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
blind: layoff notices (WARN)
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'layoff notices (WARN) cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 548618, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 753518, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 24513.1, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 399.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36420 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Oklahoma City, OK, and which cannot be read?
In Oklahoma City, OK, the elevated distress signals are concentrated in credit channels. The bank-distressed-CRE reading shows USD2.14bn in distressed lender CRE and USD3.6bn in distressed bank assets, with 19.6% of bank CRE allocated and 6.4% of bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile. The CMBS special-servicing signal is also elevated, with USD82.0mm in special-servicing UPB and a 20.5% share of metro UPB. A forward-looking reading—such as retail store closures or WARN notices over the next year—is unavailable from the given figures, so that signal cannot be read.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $82.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 20.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $24.51bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 6.4%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.14bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $3.60bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 19.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- late
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 6
- Distressed banks
- 6
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 3
credit losses are being worked out; the real-economy signals have already turned or lag
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 6 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
material CRE-credit distress; the ground-level signals are quieter
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36420 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
+1.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.5%4.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 548,618 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 20.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.8% — $63M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+15.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
+16.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+15.0pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Retail: 6 loans, $119M, running 56.8% where the same type runs 2.6% elsewhere — worth 16.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$76M — 19% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 20.5% now (2026-07), +1.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $307M of the metro's $399M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$76M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 41 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.3B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.03× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.3B
After Committed Draws
$1.4B / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.03×
Banks In Footprint
41 / 9 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.5B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $913M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.4B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $576M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
12 of 41
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
16 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 41 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bancfirst OK | 44.8% | 160% total 216%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| The First National Bank And Trust Co., Chickasha, Oklahoma OK | 100.0% | 149% total 213%
|
🔒 | 2.05% |
| International Bank Of Commerce OK | 47.3% | 127% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Arvest Bank AR | 6.4% | 213% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 2.1% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| F&m Bank OK | 78.9% | 169% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Armstrong Bank OK | 27.6% | 204% total 272%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Bank 7 OK | 48.6% | 252% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Intrust Bank, National Association KS | 6.0% | 189% total 251%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| First National Bank Of Oklahoma OK | 56.2% | 236% total 392%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Liberty National Bank OK | 28.9% | 214% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| All America Bank OK | 65.6% | 225% total 303%
|
🔒 | 6.81% |
| Gateway First Bank OK | 13.6% | 214% total 229%
|
🔒 | 3.37% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 8.4% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| Great Plains National Bank OK | 24.6% | 243% total 333%
|
🔒 | 2.30% |
| Fnb Community Bank OK | 100.0% | 257% total 324%
|
🔒 | 3.85% |
| Sooner State Bank OK | 91.3% | 242% total 297%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Mcclain Bank OK | 100.0% | 223% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Vision Bank OK | 19.6% | 201% total 232%
|
🔒 | 2.81% |
| First Bank & Trust Co. OK | 16.8% | 224% total 276%
|
🔒 | 7.09% |
| Ynb OK | 100.0% | 243% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Great Nations Bank OK | 100.0% | 196% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Liberty Bank OK | 96.1% | 288% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Frazer Bank OK | 15.2% | 166% total 235%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mabrey Bank OK | 6.1% | 240% total 402%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| The City National Bank And Trust Company Of Lawton, Oklahoma OK | 14.2% | 273% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank And Trust Company Of Ardmore OK | 2.2% | 161% total 245%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Farmers Bank OK | 26.4% | 253% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Commerce OK | 10.3% | 265% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.41% |
| Prism Bank OK | 100.0% | 299% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Shamrock Bank, N.a. OK | 1.5% | 227% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| The Bank Of The West OK | 2.3% | 297% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Enterprise Bank OK | 100.0% | 339% total 468%
|
🔒 | 9.21% |
| Valliance Bank OK | 81.0% | 380% total 534%
|
🔒 | 0.86% |
| Kirkpatrick Bank OK | 70.7% | 384% total 449%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Fidelity Bank OK | 66.8% | 308% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Legacy Bank OK | 46.9% | 300% total 381%
|
🔒 | 4.63% |
| Sovereign Bank OK | 31.5% | 389% total 478%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Interbank OK | 17.7% | 451% total 470%
|
🔒 | 2.57% |
| Regent Bank OK | 15.4% | 300% total 425%
|
🔒 | 3.16% |
| Fidelity Bank, National Association KS | 7.9% | 323% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
Not counted — 25 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Rcb Bank OK · The First Bank Of Okarche OK · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Commerce Bank MO · The Payne County Bank OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Midfirst Bank OK · Bokf, National Association OK · Busey Bank IL · Umb Bank, National Association MO · The Central Trust Bank MO · Simmons Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Watermark Bank OK · Chickasaw Community Bank OK · First Security Bank And Trust Company OK · The Citizens Bank Of Edmond OK · Stride Bank, National Association OK · First Bethany Bank & Trust OK · Valor Bank OK · Corebank OK · Quail Creek Bank OK · Frontier State Bank OK · The Bankers Bank OK
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Enterprise Bank | $97M | 339% total 468%
|
9.21% | 🔒 |
| All America Bank | $211M | 225% total 303%
|
6.81% | 🔒 |
| Frontier State Bank | $325M | 416% total 468%
|
5.94% | 🔒 |
| Fnb Community Bank | $184M | 257% total 324%
|
3.85% | 🔒 |
| Midfirst Bank | $9.3B | 161% total 226%
|
1.34% | 🔒 |
| International Bank Of Commerce | $461M | 127% total 173%
|
0.83% | 🔒 |
| Bank 7 | $834M | 252% total 301%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Mcclain Bank | $86M | 223% total 309%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Oklahoma City, OK have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Oklahoma City, OK shows clear capacity in its lending environment to refinance maturing CRE debt. The metro’s maturing balance is $75.6mm, against a bank room of $1.38bn after committed draws, producing a wall to room of 0.05 — well below the median reading. This slack band ranking places Oklahoma City at 218 of 270 of metros ranked, counting from the most strained, indicating the strain is modest. Qualifying banks number 41, with 17 banks excluded here, and the room reflects what regional and community banks could still write under the SR 06-26 concentration line. While the committed draws of $1.49bn reduce the available room from $2.29bn to $1.38bn, the maturing wall remains small relative to that buffer, suggesting the banks have ample headroom to absorb the $75.6mm maturing obligation. The distressed share of 20.5% adds some caution, but the overall proxy for lending footprint supports refinancing capacity.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $75.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 5
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.29bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.49bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.38bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.05
- Rank, most strained
- 218
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.03
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 41
- … excluded from the calculation
- 17
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 20.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $398.9mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.05 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
218 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36420 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
4 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2026-04-01
CLOSURE
Guthrie
2025-12-03
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2025-10-01
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2023-04-04
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2023-02-23
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2022-07-07
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2021-05-13
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2021-02-08
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2020-08-27
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2020-08-17
LAYOFF
Norman
2020-07-07
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
2020-06-26
LAYOFF
Oklahoma City
What has actually happened on the ground in Oklahoma City, OK recently?
In Oklahoma City, OK, over the past 365 days, on-the-ground commercial real estate activity has been limited, with no CRE-likely bankruptcy filings and 0 jobs affected. There were 3 store closures and 3 WARN notices, but the reading for jobs affected is a floor, as notices with no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36420 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.