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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$427M of CMBS across 20 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2035 ($155M, 36% of the book). 11 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (443 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$28M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 1
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
4 / 443 jobs
0.14% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
20 / $427M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
+0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
56,514
+1.5% yr
How much CRE distress is there in North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL right now?
For North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL, CRE distress is mixed: bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at $434.0 million, a 7.29% share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line (ranked 71st of 393 metros by count, 105th by rate), while store closures are quiet at 5 closures, or 1.64 per 100,000 jobs (83rd of 392 by count, 206th by rate), and layoff notices (WARN) are quiet at 7 notices, or 0.12% of employment (74th of 386, 156th by rate). Securitized loans in special servicing sit at a floor of 4 rows, or 2.52% of the securitized balance read here (42nd of 335 by count, 86th by rate) — a floor because only 25.0% of the special-servicing rows here carry a balance. Of the six pairs, 0 are both elevated, 3 are both quiet, and 3 disagree — with bank stress showing no visible tenant or employment cause.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 1.64 per 100k jobs | 83 of 392 | 206 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
7 notices | 0.12% | 74 of 386 | 156 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$434.0mm | 7.29% | 71 of 393 | 105 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | 2.52% | 42 of 335 | 86 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 305,301 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 388,640 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $5,950.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $437.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35840 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL, and which cannot be read?
In North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL, the elevated distress signal is bank_distressed_cre, with distressed lender CRE at $434.0mm and bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reaching 22.9% — though bank assets are $5.95bn and the bank CRE allocation is 2.5%. However, the reading is unavailable for CMBS special servicing as a dollar figure ($11.0mm) and share (2.5%) are provided, but the materiality note indicates the dollar amount is a FLOOR because only 4 special-servicing rows carry balances, while the rest are zero — so the true CMBS exposure cannot be fully read. Additionally, signals like distressed bank assets (0) and the convergence metric (1) are not elevated; the phase is "watch" with an isolated signal, not a convergence.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $11.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $5.95bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 22.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $434.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 5
- WARN notices (past year)
- 7
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; measured over 25.0% of this metro's 4 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35840 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
+0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.4%5.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 305,301 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (20) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$28M — 7% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $390M of the metro's $427M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$28M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 14 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$430M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$430M
After Committed Draws
$266M / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
14 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $192M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $163M
comes out of the room above, leaving $266M,
with 2 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $29M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 14 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 1.9% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Stearns Bank National Association MN | 9.2% | 148% total 215%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 3.4% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Bayfirst National Bank FL | 19.4% | 115% total 229%
|
🔒 | 3.43% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 2.3% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 3.4% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| The Bank Of Tampa FL | 4.0% | 156% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Crews Bank & Trust FL | 14.3% | 242% total 322%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Gulfside Bank FL | 100.0% | 248% total 400%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Southern Bank GA | 24.5% | 128% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 0.4% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 1.0% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Ipava State Bank IL | 4.5% | 132% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sunwest Bank UT | 3.1% | 327% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
Not counted — 26 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · The Northern Trust Company IL · Liberty Savings Bank, F.s.b. OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Regions Bank AL · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Trustco Bank NY · 1st Source Bank IN · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Bank Ozk AR · Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Centennial Bank AR · Busey Bank IL · United Community Bank SC · Servisfirst Bank AL · Valley National Bank NJ
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gulfside Bank | $154M | 248% total 400%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL looks well able to absorb its visible maturity load: the CMBS wall maturing within 24 months is $28.1mm across 3 maturing loans, against room after committed draws of $266.3mm at 14 banks qualifying (with 9 banks excluded here), a wall_to_room of 0.11 — room before committed draws is $429.5mm and the ratio there is 0.07. On the platform's reading this metro ranks 200 of 275 counting from the most strained, so it sits well toward the slack end, with a distressed share of 0.0% and $426.8mm of CMBS UPB outstanding behind it; the usual caveat applies that the wall is CMBS only and room is a deposit-footprint proxy, so the ratio bounds rather than measures how much local banks would have to take up.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $28.1mm
- … across this many loans
- 3
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $429.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $192.0mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $266.3mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.11
- Rank, most strained
- 200
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 14
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $426.8mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.11 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
200 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35840 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
11 local distress events in the past year (443 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-20
CLOSURE
Sarasota
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-09-18
CLOSURE
Sarasota
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
North Port
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
168 jobs · sarasota
2026-07-20
LAYOFF
17 jobs · SARASOTA
2026-07-16
LAYOFF
193 jobs · PLANTATION
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Bradenton
What has actually happened on the ground in North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground record for North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL shows 7 store closures and 4 WARN notices affecting 443 jobs, with the caveat that affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor. On the investment side, the only reading available is 154 CRE-likely bankruptcies, and that figure is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count. No metro-native bankruptcy reading is available.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 4
- Jobs on those notices
- 443
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 154
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35840 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.