Commercial Real Estate Credit —
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NJ, NY
The read
$57.6B of CMBS across 2,458 loans. Retail carries the highest distress rate (5.2%, above the 2.7% national, 2× national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($14.3B). Distress is flat in the filed record — 6.7% as of 2026-07. 333 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (24,494 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail Runs Hot in New York, and the Filed Record Won't Budge
New York-Newark-Jersey City carries $57.6B of CMBS across 2,458 loans, and the standout is retail. On a $7.9B book, the sector's distress rate runs 5.2% — twice the 2.7% national mark and the widest gap against the national line anywhere in this metro's ledger. Office remains the biggest number in dollar terms at 11.5% distress on a $17.1B book, essentially in line with the 11.3% national rate, while multifamily (4.5% on $12.1B) and hospitality (1.3% on $2.4B) both sit below their national peers. Mixed-use, at 6.0% on $11.4B, runs modestly ahead of the 5.0% national figure.
The maturity wall is real but back-loaded: the heaviest load lands in 2029 at $14.3B, carrying a 4.1% distress rate today. The nearer tranches tell a sharper story — the $7.6B maturing in 2027 already shows a 17.6% distress rate, against far lighter reads on the 2030 ($11.1B, 1.3%) and 2031 ($8.1B, 3.5%) books.
At the portfolio level, distress is flat in the filed record — 6.7% as of July 2026, against a median DSCR of 1.24. On the ground, the metro logged 333 distress events over the past year, spanning 127 store closures and 206 layoff notices totaling 24,494 jobs, even as metro unemployment sits at 4.3%, down 1.1 points year over year.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$3.7B / 6.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$13.2B
Local Banks (stressed)
14 / 87
Bank Early-Warning
13 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
127
Layoff Notices (1y)
206 / 24,494 jobs
0.30% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
2,458 / $57.6B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
-1.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ right now?
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ is showing across-the-board CRE distress, with all four independent signals elevated: 89 store closures (a rate of 1.08 per 100,000 jobs), 229 WARN layoff notices, $48,092.8mm of bank CRE over the noncurrent line, and 109 securitized loans in special servicing. All six pairs of signals agree—6 pairs both elevated, 0 quiet, 0 disagreeing. The closures reading is elevated by size, not by rate (rank 2 of 392 by count but 262nd by rate), reflecting the metro's scale rather than per-unit stress. Distress here is pervasive across all mechanisms measured, from retail closures to lender balance sheets to securitized paper.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
89 closures | 1.08 per 100k jobs | 2 of 392 | 262 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
229 notices | 0.24% | 3 of 386 | 100 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$48.09bn | 14.05% | 1 of 393 | 36 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
109 loan records | 6.45% | 1 of 335 | 63 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 8254312, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 9910344, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 342227.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 57226.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35620 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ, and which cannot be read?
In New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, store closures, and WARN notices. Specifically, the bank-distressed CRE reading is at $48.09bn, while the CMBS special-servicing UPB sits at $3.69bn, representing a 6.5% share of metro UPB; store closures (89) and WARN notices (229) also register as elevated. On the credit side, the bank CRE at-risk (90th percentile) is 31.9%, with distressed bank assets at 113.1 and a bank CRE allocation of 22.2%. The reading for the "convergence" indicator is 4, signaling confirmed peak phase. As for what cannot be read, the data do not provide a measure of the 90th percentile for the CMBS special-servicing UPB share or any other distressed-signal metric beyond those listed; for those, the reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $3.69bn
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 6.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $342.23bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 31.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $48.09bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $113.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 22.2%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 109
- Distressed banks
- 12
- Store closures (past year)
- 89
- WARN notices (past year)
- 229
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
$1B+ of CRE in special servicing or held at distressed local banks
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35620 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
-1.1pp yr
Last 24 months
4.1%5.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 8,254,312 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 6.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 7.6% — $628M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 3 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-1.1pp
… and loan size held fixed
-1.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too — though 10% of this book is priced against a national comparator smaller than the metro itself
… and vintage held fixed
-0.9pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too — though 7% of this book is priced against a national comparator smaller than the metro itself
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 589 loans, $12.1B, running 4.5% where the same type runs 9.2% elsewhere — worth 1.0pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$13.2B — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 6.7% now (2026-07), -0.9pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $27.7B of the metro's $57.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$13.2B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 78 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$13.5B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.98× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$13.5B
After Committed Draws
$11.2B / −15%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.98×
Banks In Footprint
78 / 38 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $7.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2.0B
comes out of the room above, leaving $11.2B,
with 44 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $5.7B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 78
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
2% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 78 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emigrant Bank FL | 100.0% | 100% total 100%
|
🔒 | 9.07% |
| Customers Bank PA | 54.1% | 179% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 69.6% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Maspeth Federal Savings And Loan Association NY | 100.0% | 141% total 141%
|
🔒 | 0.93% |
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 34.3% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 24.4% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Israel Discount Bank Of New York NY | 75.0% | 250% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Ridgewood Savings Bank NY | 100.0% | 246% total 246%
|
🔒 | 2.12% |
| Amalgamated Bank NY | 77.9% | 235% total 239%
|
🔒 | 4.15% |
| Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Usa, National Association NY | 59.8% | 154% total 183%
|
🔒 | 11.70% |
| Hana Bank Usa, National Association NJ | 100.0% | 145% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 7.0% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Bogota Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 132% total 150%
|
🔒 | 12.54% |
| Unity Bank NJ | 85.0% | 237% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| New Millennium Bank NJ | 90.2% | 168% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Crown Bank NJ | 97.3% | 197% total 307%
|
🔒 | 6.05% |
| Newbank NY | 100.0% | 164% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.26% |
| Somerset Regal Bank NJ | 100.0% | 225% total 257%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Interaudi Bank NY | 65.0% | 241% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Cross County Savings Bank NY | 100.0% | 151% total 151%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Putnam County National Bank Of Carmel NY | 100.0% | 113% total 157%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Grasshopper Bank, N.a. NY | 73.1% | 216% total 302%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Ctbc Bank Corp. (Usa) CA | 12.1% | 214% total 252%
|
🔒 | 2.90% |
| Industrial Bank DC | 25.7% | 131% total 212%
|
🔒 | 8.38% |
| Ion Bank CT | 22.3% | 243% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| First Central Savings Bank NY | 100.0% | 261% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Magyar Bank NJ | 100.0% | 269% total 458%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Schuyler Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 106% total 118%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 29.7% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| First Hope Bank, A National Banking Association NJ | 30.9% | 229% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 0.8% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Blue Foundry Bank NJ | 100.0% | 298% total 335%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.1% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Commonwealth Business Bank CA | 3.5% | 259% total 453%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Fieldpoint Private Bank & Trust CT | 14.2% | 257% total 330%
|
🔒 | 1.66% |
| Gsl Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 274% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 1.6% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Patriot Bank, National Association CT | 4.4% | 289% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.34% |
| Global Bank NY | 100.0% | 299% total 411%
|
🔒 | 7.09% |
| Promiseone Bank GA | 2.3% | 284% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
| Amboy Bank NJ | 100.0% | 396% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Dime Commercial Bank NY | 100.0% | 355% total 453%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Peapack Private Bank & Trust NJ | 100.0% | 406% total 444%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Apple Bank NY | 100.0% | 436% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Orient Bank NY | 100.0% | 425% total 477%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Ascendia Bank NJ | 100.0% | 304% total 340%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Kearny Bank NJ | 100.0% | 514% total 527%
|
🔒 | 1.06% |
| Haven Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 398% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Carver Federal Savings Bank NY | 100.0% | 442% total 617%
|
🔒 | 3.95% |
| Manasquan Bank NJ | 100.0% | 339% total 458%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Ponce Bank, National Association NY | 100.0% | 414% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Metropolitan Commercial Bank NY | 100.0% | 304% total 600%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| American Community Bank NY | 100.0% | 367% total 447%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bcb Community Bank NJ | 100.0% | 454% total 572%
|
🔒 | 3.49% |
| Empire State Bank NY | 100.0% | 313% total 402%
|
🔒 | 1.27% |
| Alma Bank NY | 100.0% | 406% total 587%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Hanover Community Bank NY | 100.0% | 346% total 460%
|
🔒 | 1.57% |
| Freedom Bank NJ | 100.0% | 575% total 663%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Spencer Savings Bank, Sla NJ | 97.6% | 476% total 552%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Connectone Bank NJ | 95.4% | 439% total 545%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Provident Bank NJ | 95.2% | 422% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Northfield Bank NY | 92.7% | 381% total 435%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Commerce Bank NJ | 91.1% | 459% total 634%
|
🔒 | 0.41% |
| Columbia Bank NJ | 87.4% | 350% total 405%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Northeast Community Bank NY | 69.5% | 501% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Amerasia Bank NY | 69.3% | 354% total 406%
|
🔒 | 1.90% |
| Popular Bank NY | 68.2% | 311% total 427%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Habib American Bank NY | 64.6% | 526% total 599%
|
🔒 | 0.85% |
| Oceanfirst Bank, National Association NJ | 59.3% | 384% total 456%
|
🔒 | 0.95% |
| Orange Bank & Trust Company NY | 52.9% | 353% total 405%
|
🔒 | 1.35% |
| First Bank NJ | 32.3% | 339% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| The Bank Of Princeton NJ | 21.3% | 382% total 509%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| Tompkins Community Bank NY | 16.3% | 323% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| The First Bank Of Greenwich CT | 15.7% | 367% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Preferred Bank CA | 9.3% | 357% total 380%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
| International Finance Bank FL | 8.7% | 448% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Pcb Bank CA | 7.9% | 304% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 4.0% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
Not counted — 55 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Goldman Sachs Bank Usa NY · Citibank, National Association SD · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Morgan Stanley Private Bank, National Association NY · Td Bank, National Association DE · Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas NY · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Capital One, National Association VA · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Cross River Bank NJ · Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank (U.s.a.) Limited NJ · Btg Pactual Bank, National Association NY · Bessemer Trust Company, National Association NY · Mizuho Bank (Usa) NY · Keybank National Association OH · Bessemer Trust Company NJ · The Northern Trust Company IL · Quontic Bank NY · The Berkshire Bank NY · Lusitania Savings Bank NJ · Abacus Federal Savings Bank NY · Trustco Bank NY · Truist Bank NC · State Street Bank And Trust Company MA · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · City National Bank CA · East West Bank CA · Woori America Bank NY · First Horizon Bank TN · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Royal Business Bank CA · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Metro City Bank GA · Valley National Bank NJ · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY · Hanmi Bank CA · Amg National Trust Bank CO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Esquire Bank, National Association NY · United Roosevelt Savings Bank NJ · Modern Bank, National Association NY · Eastbank, National Association NY · Alpine Capital Bank NY · Community Federal Savings Bank NY · Spring Bank NY · Piermont Bank NY · Atlantic Community Bankers Bank PA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Berkshire Bank | $120M | 89% total 91%
|
11.90% | 🔒 |
| Flagstar Bank, National Association | $35.3B | 328% total 353%
|
7.53% | 🔒 |
| Amalgamated Bank | $2.3B | 235% total 239%
|
4.15% | 🔒 |
| Bcb Community Bank | $1.9B | 454% total 572%
|
3.49% | 🔒 |
| Woori America Bank | $1.8B | 238% total 308%
|
3.26% | 🔒 |
| Bogota Savings Bank | $202M | 132% total 150%
|
12.54% | 🔒 |
| Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Usa, National Association | $950M | 154% total 183%
|
11.70% | 🔒 |
| Global Bank | $149M | 299% total 411%
|
7.09% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
The capacity read for New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ is a wall-to-room of 1.17 — that is, the CMBS wall of $13.15bn across 420 maturing loans stands above the $11.24bn in room those banks have after committed draws, with the ratio easing to 0.98 before committed draws. The metro ranks 50 of 270 counting from the most strained, with a distressed share of 6.7% — but this is far more an exclusion artifact than a credit event, since only 78 of the banks qualifying here are counted while 24 are excluded, and the high ratio is driven by a national footprint that reads strained simply because its credit is invisible. Room is a proxy at best; the $13.45bn before committed draws assumes the local deposit base tracks lending exactly, and with committed draws of $7.65bn already deducted, actual headroom shrinks to $11.24bn against the $57.03bn CMBS balance overall. Given the ratio sits above the median of 0.20, the local banks show limited capacity to absorb this wall unaided, though the reading is unavailable for how much of the strain traces back to exclusion-driven measurement rather than true exposure.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $13.15bn
- … across this many loans
- 420
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $13.45bn
- Committed construction draws
- $7.65bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $11.24bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.17
- Rank, most strained
- 50
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.98
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 78
- … excluded from the calculation
- 24
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 6.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $57.03bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.17 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
50 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35620 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+6.7%
Same-Store Revenue
+3.5%
Occupancy
97.3%
Rent Growth
+3.4%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +2.0% | 96.4% | +1.7% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | +6.4% | +4.6% | 97.9% | +4.3% | 2026-04-28 |
| UDR | +6.9% | +4.0% | 97.6% | +4.3% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
333 local distress events in the past year (24,494 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Brooklyn
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Hazlet
2026-12-11
LAYOFF
54 jobs · Rahway
2026-12-07
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Basking Ridge
2026-11-25
LAYOFF
41 jobs · Weehawken
2026-11-19
LAYOFF
68 jobs · Bridgewater
2026-11-04
LAYOFF
58 jobs · Weehawken
2026-11-01
LAYOFF
62 jobs · Florham Park
2026-10-31
LAYOFF
59 jobs · Hudson County
2026-10-16
LAYOFF
307 jobs · Newark
2026-10-16
LAYOFF
282 jobs · Basking Ridge
2026-10-02
LAYOFF
322 jobs · East Hanover
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
179 jobs · Ridgefield Park
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
79 jobs · Piscataway
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Basking Ridge
What has actually happened on the ground in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ recently?
Over the past 365 days, commercial real estate activity in the New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ metro shows 0 CRE-related bankruptcies (state-proxy based, not a metro-native count), with 203 WARN notices affecting 24,313 jobs (a floor, as some notices don't state headcounts) and 91 store closures. Specific recent events driving these numbers aren't broken out here, but the aggregate suggests ongoing retailer and employer distress rather than a sudden shock—though the number of bankruptcies is unavailable, not zero on the ground, given the data's limitations.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 91
- WARN layoff notices
- 203
- Jobs on those notices
- 24,313
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35620 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.