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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
New Orleans-Metairie, LA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · LA
The read
$1.5B of CMBS across 56 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $476M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($563M, 37% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 12 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,127 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
New Orleans' CMBS book is clean on the tape, with the real test still three years out
New Orleans-Metairie carries $1.5 billion of CMBS across 56 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a 0.0% rate that has held flat in the filed record. Retail is the metro's largest exposure at $476 million, and it shows no distress against a 2.6% national mark; Hospitality sits clean versus 6.2% nationally, and Multifamily clean versus 7.9%. The median DSCR across the book stands at 1.61, and the metro's unemployment rate was 3.9% in August 2026, down 0.6 points year over year.
The weight of this book is a maturity story, not a delinquency one. The heaviest load lands in 2029 at $563 million — 37% of the metro — with roughly $0.4 billion coming due inside the next 24 months. That concentration is the thing to watch here: a clean tape today says nothing about how a third of the book refinances when it comes up.
Beneath the servicer record, the on-the-ground signal is more active than the 0.0% suggests. The past year brought 12 distress events — four store closures and eight layoff notices totaling 1,127 jobs — a layer of stress that is real even where no loan has yet been declared delinquent or sent to special servicing.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$395M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 13
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
8 / 1,127 jobs
0.29% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
56 / $1.5B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.6pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in New Orleans-Metairie, LA right now?
For New Orleans-Metairie, LA, the data currently shows no elevated distress signals across any of the measurable indicators. Store closures are at 5 closures (1.28 per 100,000 jobs, rank 83 of 392 by count); layoff notices stand at 6 notices (0.16% of employment, rank 84 of 386 by count); and bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at 16.3 $mm (0.23% of allocated CRE, rank 299 of 393 by count). The securitized loans in special servicing reading is currently unavailable because it is not measurable. All three readable signals are quiet, with no pairs disagreeing, though three of the six total pairings cannot be adjudicated because one side is blind.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 1.28 per 100k jobs | 83 of 392 | 236 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
6 notices | 0.16% | 84 of 386 | 137 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$16.3mm | 0.23% | 299 of 393 | 320 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
0 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 390,541 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 446,921 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $6,966.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,523.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35380 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in New Orleans-Metairie, LA, and which cannot be read?
In New Orleans-Metairie, LA, the elevated distress signals are primarily on the banking side: the 90th percentile measure of bank CRE at risk stands at 2.7%, with 2.1% of bank assets allocated to CRE and 0.3 billion in distressed bank assets, translating to $16.3mm in distressed lender CRE. However, the CMBS reading is unavailable: while 1 loan is in special servicing, its balance is $0.0mm (with a 0.0% share of metro UPB), which reflects a gap in the tape rather than an absence of distress. As a result, overall convergence is 0, placing the metro in a "watch" phase with signals present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $6.97bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 2.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $16.3mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.1%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 5
- WARN notices (past year)
- 6
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35380 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.9%5.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 390,541 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.2% — $80M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
-6.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-6.7pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 10 loans, $454M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.3% elsewhere — worth 1.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$395M — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.4B of the metro's $1.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$395M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 18 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.3B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.17× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.3B
After Committed Draws
$1.6B / −28%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.17×
Banks In Footprint
18 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $688M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $643M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.6B,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $46M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 18
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 18 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 23.0% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Gulf Coast Bank And Trust Company LA | 65.2% | 175% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| First American Bank And Trust LA | 69.8% | 105% total 159%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| First National Bank Usa LA | 100.0% | 137% total 183%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Home Bank, National Association LA | 12.8% | 208% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| Bankplus MS | 4.8% | 235% total 371%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Investar Bank, National Association LA | 5.5% | 204% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Hibernia Bank LA | 100.0% | 215% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Bank Of Louisiana LA | 49.9% | 105% total 173%
|
🔒 | 3.19% |
| Red River Bank LA | 2.8% | 155% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| B1bank LA | 2.3% | 241% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Merchants & Marine Bank MS | 9.3% | 228% total 311%
|
🔒 | 2.08% |
| Planters Bank & Trust Company MS | 2.7% | 236% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Bonvenu Bank, National Association LA | 6.3% | 274% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| American Bank LA | 15.3% | 282% total 484%
|
🔒 | 2.68% |
| United Community Bank LA | 1.9% | 290% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Metairie Bank & Trust Company LA | 86.8% | 312% total 404%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Resource Bank LA | 6.7% | 347% total 443%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Capital One, National Association VA · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Fidelity Bank LA · Crescent Bank LA · Fifth District Savings Bank LA · M C Bank & Trust Company LA · First American Trust, Fsb CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Renasant Bank MS · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $59M | 171% total 284%
|
5.66% | 🔒 |
| American Bank | $175M | 282% total 484%
|
2.68% | 🔒 |
| Hibernia Bank | $95M | 215% total 344%
|
1.11% | 🔒 |
| Liberty Bank And Trust Company | $288M | 153% total 216%
|
0.80% | 🔒 |
| First American Bank And Trust | $323M | 105% total 159%
|
1.10% | 🔒 |
| Gulf Coast Bank And Trust Company | $947M | 175% total 253%
|
0.67% | 🔒 |
| Resource Bank | $544M | 347% total 443%
|
0.05% | 🔒 |
| Metairie Bank & Trust Company | $312M | 312% total 404%
|
0.01% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in New Orleans-Metairie, LA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Yes — on the vetted reading, bank capacity in New Orleans-Metairie is not the binding constraint: 18 banks qualify against 4 excluded here, and the CMBS wall of $394.7mm (18 maturing loans, $1.54bn total CMBS UPB) compares with room before committed draws of $2.28bn and room after committed draws of $1.64bn, giving a wall-to-room of 0.24 and a wall-to-room before committed draws of 0.17; a distressed share of 0.0% reinforces the slack. That ratio is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.24, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro (rank 136 of 275, counting from the most strained), and the $688.2mm of committed draws is already netted in the 0.24. Two limits apply: the wall is CMBS maturing within 24 months only, so the ratio is an upper bound on what local banks would have to absorb, and room is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measured lending footprint — though with explained_by_exclusion false, the qualifying-versus-excluded count does not suggest the reading is an exclusion artifact.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $394.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 18
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.28bn
- Committed construction draws
- $688.2mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.64bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.24
- Rank, most strained
- 136
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.17
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 18
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.54bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.24 is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.24, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro
136 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35380 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
12 local distress events in the past year (1,127 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
New Orleans
2026-09-15
LAYOFF
216 jobs · Metairie
2026-08-26
LAYOFF
206 jobs
2026-07-30
LAYOFF
172 jobs · New Orleans
2026-07-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
New Orleans
2026-04-23
LAYOFF
242 jobs
2026-03-30
LAYOFF
81 jobs
2026-02-03
LAYOFF
64 jobs
2026-01-30
LAYOFF
45 jobs
2026-01-13
LAYOFF
101 jobs
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Gretna
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Metairie
2025-08-25
LAYOFF
166 jobs · St. Rose
2025-08-25
LAYOFF
166 jobs · 145 James Drive East, Suite 300 St. Rose
What has actually happened on the ground in New Orleans-Metairie, LA recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, the on-the-ground evidence for New Orleans-Metairie, LA is a modest trickle of distress rather than a wave: 4 approved store closures, 8 WARN notices affecting 1,127 jobs (a floor, since notices stating no headcount contribute zero), and 1 CRE-likely bankruptcy filing. That bankruptcy figure is a STATE PROXY and not a metro-native count, so it should be read as regional context rather than a New Orleans-specific event.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 4
- WARN layoff notices
- 8
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,127
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35380 · geo_events · last changed 18 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.