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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TN
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 67 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($439M, 28% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 4.0% as of 2026-07. 37 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,013 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Nashville's filed record holds steady while the 2028 wall builds
Nashville carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 67 loans, and the single largest claim on that book sits four years out: $439 million comes due in 2028, 28% of the total. The nearer term is lighter but not empty, with roughly $0.7 billion maturing inside 24 months. Credit quality in the filed record is holding — the distress rate reads 4.0% as of July 2026, flat, against a median debt-service coverage ratio of 1.72. Hospitality is the largest sector exposure at $0.5 billion, where the national distress rate runs 6.2%; retail follows at $0.3 billion against a 2.6% national mark.
The on-the-ground ledger tells a busier story than the loan tape. The metro logged 37 distress events over the past year — 14 store closures and 23 layoff notices, the latter accounting for 3,013 jobs. That activity has not yet translated into the serviced book, where the distressed balance stands at $0.1 billion and the bank picture is quiet: of 21 institutions tracked, one is flagged distressed and one carries an early-warning signal.
The backdrop is firm. Unemployment sits at 3.1% as of August 2026, up 0.1 point year over year. The 2030 maturity bucket, at $0.3 billion, currently shows no distress. For now the gap to watch is between a stable filed record and a steady drumbeat of closures and layoffs that has yet to reach the paper.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$62M / 4.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$654M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 21
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
14
Layoff Notices (1y)
23 / 3,013 jobs
0.31% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
67 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.1%
+0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN right now?
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN shows 3 of the 4 monitored signals elevated, with 3 of 6 total pairings in disagreement. Store closures are elevated primarily by size (rank 38th of 392 by count but 246th by rate, at 1.24 closures per 100k jobs) rather than per-unit stress, while WARN layoff notices are elevated on a more modest 0.27% rate (rank 86th of 386 by rate). The CMBS leg is elevated but only as a floor reading: 3.96% of the securitized balance read is in special servicing, measured over just 50.0% of the special-servicing rows. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is notably quiet at 0.46% ($190.6MM), ranking 314th of 393 by rate. The three disagreements all follow the same pattern: the real-economy legs (closures, WARN) are hot while the lender legs (bank, CMBS) are quiet, suggesting tenant stress is showing up at the front door before any lender balance sheet or trust tape reflects it. No legs are blind here, so all readings are meaningful, but the size-driven closure elevation should not be read as per-capita distress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
12 closures | 1.24 per 100k jobs | 38 of 392 | 246 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
22 notices | 0.27% | 30 of 386 | 86 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$190.6mm | 0.46% | 118 of 393 | 314 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
6 loan records | 3.96% | 28 of 335 | 78 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 970,821 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,164,841 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $41,452.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,567.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 34980 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN, and which cannot be read?
The elevated distress signals in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN are the CMBS special-servicing rate, store closures, and WARN notices. The CMBS special-servicing reading shows $62.0mm in UPB, or 4.0% of metro UPB; the reading is elevated but only partial, as the dollar figure is a "FLOOR" because balances are measured over 50.0% of the metro’s 6 special-servicing rows, with the rest carrying no balance. Store closures (12 in one year) and WARN notices (22 in one year) are also elevated, though these reflect real-economy stress rather than confirmed CRE credit pain. The bank side shows elevated risk metrics: 62.8% of bank CRE is at risk at the 90th percentile, and 14.9% of banks’ total allocation is to CRE, with distressed bank assets at 0.2 billion and distressed lender CRE at $190.6mm. However, the overall credit phase is "obscured": the securitized side is "invisible here, which is not the same as quiet," so a definitive read on CRE credit distress cannot be obtained from the CMBS data. No other distress signals are unavailable—the bank-side figures are fully readable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $62.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $41.45bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 62.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $190.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.20bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 14.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 6
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 12
- WARN notices (past year)
- 22
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 6 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 6 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 34980 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.1%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.5%3.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 970,821 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.2% — $35M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.6pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-1.9pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 9 loans, $379M, where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$654M — 42% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 4.0% now (2026-07), -0.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $912M of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$654M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 37 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.38× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.7B
After Committed Draws
$750M / −56%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.38×
Banks In Footprint
37 / 6 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $954M
comes out of the room above, leaving $750M,
with 16 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $846M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
11 of 37
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
18 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 37 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lawrence Bank TN | 66.8% | 186% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Wilson Bank And Trust TN | 87.7% | 264% total 357%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Firstbank TN | 37.9% | 269% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| The Farmers Bank TN | 93.1% | 155% total 199%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| First Farmers And Merchants Bank TN | 73.9% | 216% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Citizens Bank TN | 61.4% | 151% total 201%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Macon Bank And Trust Company TN | 91.1% | 187% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Bank TN | 54.8% | 196% total 254%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Wellworth Bank TN | 37.4% | 211% total 298%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Tristar Bank TN | 81.2% | 188% total 280%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Lineage Bank TN | 84.0% | 140% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 1.9% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| First National Bank AR | 14.5% | 241% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Edmonton State Bank KY | 25.5% | 227% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Oakworth Capital Bank AL | 9.2% | 190% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Middle Tennessee TN | 38.5% | 240% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 1.5% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| First Financial Bank, National Association IN | 6.0% | 264% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Peoples Bank TN | 9.2% | 107% total 248%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Banktennessee TN | 24.6% | 236% total 286%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Southern Bank Of Tennessee TN | 82.0% | 274% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heritage Bank & Trust TN | 82.2% | 271% total 411%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| First Vision Bank Of Tennessee TN | 11.5% | 155% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Legends Bank TN | 23.9% | 275% total 433%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Traditions First Bank TN | 25.2% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Tower Community Bank TN | 8.2% | 159% total 248%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cb&s Bank, Inc. AL | 1.1% | 204% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Homeland Community Bank TN | 6.0% | 132% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| First Commerce Bank TN | 5.3% | 271% total 375%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Smartbank TN | 2.2% | 290% total 461%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| South Central Bank, Inc. KY | 1.1% | 284% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Insbank TN | 100.0% | 313% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Studio Bank TN | 100.0% | 312% total 415%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| First Freedom Bank TN | 65.5% | 337% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| C3bank, National Association CA | 8.8% | 361% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Tennessee TN | 4.9% | 375% total 484%
|
🔒 | 0.28% |
| Commercial Bank TN | 2.6% | 307% total 480%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 26 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Regions Bank AL · Truist Bank NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of Dickson TN · The Huntington National Bank OH · Apex Bank TN · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Fsnb, National Association OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · First Horizon Bank TN · City National Bank CA · United Community Bank SC · Old National Bank IN · Bank Ozk AR · Renasant Bank MS · Centennial Bank AR · Servisfirst Bank AL · Simmons Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Macon Bank And Trust Company | $220M | 187% total 265%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Wellworth Bank | $582M | 211% total 298%
|
2.20% | 🔒 |
| Firstbank | $7.1B | 269% total 386%
|
0.97% | 🔒 |
| Tristar Bank | $162M | 188% total 280%
|
0.84% | 🔒 |
| Studio Bank | $595M | 312% total 415%
|
0.74% | 🔒 |
| First Federal Bank | $293M | 196% total 254%
|
0.62% | 🔒 |
| Pinnacle Bank | $36.8B | 231% total 310%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Wilson Bank And Trust | $2.6B | 264% total 357%
|
0.39% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Yes, on these figures Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN looks to have capacity: its CMBS maturing within 24 months totals $654.4mm across 23 maturing loans, against $1.70bn of room before committed draws and $749.6mm of room after committed draws, a wall-to-room ratio of 0.87 (0.38 before committed draws) — placing it 59 of 275 counting from the most strained. That said, 0.87 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro, and the room figure is a proxy resting on 37 qualifying banks with 13 excluded here, with the caveat that room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line rather than a measured lending footprint.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $654.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 23
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.70bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.80bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $749.6mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.87
- Rank, most strained
- 59
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.38
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 37
- … excluded from the calculation
- 13
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.56bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.87 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
59 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 34980 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-5.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.9%
Occupancy
95.4%
Rent Growth
-1.3%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -12.0% | -1.2% | 95.8% | -3.3% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.9% | -1.3% | 95.3% | -1.1% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | -2.3% | -0.3% | 95.2% | +0.6% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
37 local distress events in the past year (3,013 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Lebanon
2026-10-20
LAYOFF
114 jobs · Davidson County
2026-10-20
LAYOFF
76 jobs · Davidson County
2026-10-12
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Nashville
2026-09-21
CLOSURE
Franklin
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Nashville
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
Nashville
2026-08-22
CLOSURE
Nashville
2026-08-20
CLOSURE
Nashville
2026-08-19
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Nashville
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
68 jobs · Williamson County
2026-08-05
LAYOFF
250 jobs · Davidson County
2026-08-01
CLOSURE
Spring Hill
2026-08-01
CLOSURE
Franklin
2026-07-29
CLOSURE
Nashville
What has actually happened on the ground in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN metro recorded 14 store closures, 23 WARN notices, and 3,013 jobs affected (a floor, since notices with no stated headcount contribute none); CRE-likely bankruptcies stand at 0, though that figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 14
- WARN layoff notices
- 23
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,013
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 34980 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.