Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MN, WI
The read
$1.9B of CMBS across 66 loans. Office is both the largest book ($743M) and the most distressed (35.9% vs 11.3% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 14.0% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($531M, 28% of the book). 39 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,184 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the Twin Cities, and the filed record is turning
The Twin Cities carry $1.9 billion of CMBS across 66 loans, and the strain sits almost entirely in one sector. Office is the metro's largest book at $743 million and its most distressed by a wide margin — a 35.9% distress rate against 11.3% nationally, more than triple the national mark. Retail, a book of comparable size, sits at 0.0% distress, so the story here is not broad deterioration but a single concentrated fault line.
The filed record is moving the wrong way. Metro-wide distress stands at 14.0% as of July 2026 and has been rising, even as the median debt-service coverage ratio holds at 1.82. The near-term maturity wall is manageable, but the load builds toward the end of the decade: $531 million, 28% of the book, comes due in 2029, with $0.3 billion maturing in 2028 at a 16.3% distress rate.
The on-the-ground record echoes the pressure. The past year brought 39 distress events — 34 store closures and five layoff notices — touching 2,184 jobs, against a metro unemployment rate of 4.4%, up 0.6 point year over year. Among lenders, 6 of 54 banks show distress and another 14 sit on early-warning watch.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$267M / 14.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$428M
Local Banks (stressed)
6 / 54
Bank Early-Warning
14 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
34
Layoff Notices (1y)
5 / 2,184 jobs
0.13% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
66 / $1.9B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.4%
+0.6pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI right now?
For Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, 3 of 6 pairs register as elevated on both sides, 0 as both quiet, and 3 as disagreeing; 0 pairs are unadjudicated because a side is blind. Among the four legs: store closures are elevated (27 closures, 1.59 per 100k jobs — elevated by size, not rate), layoff notices are not (6 notices, 0.11%), bank CRE is elevated (4,435.1 $mm, 10.09%), and securitized loans in special servicing are elevated (22 rows, 14.41% — a floor). The 3 disagreeing pairs — closures vs. WARN, WARN vs. bank, and WARN vs. tape — all share the same theme: the employment side is quiet while property-level distress persists. Meanwhile, closures agree hot with both bank and CMBS stress, and bank agrees hot with CMBS. Net: the metro's distress is concentrated in the buildings and the lenders, not in the employers — with the closure signal driven by the metro's size rather than its per-capita stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
27 closures | 1.59 per 100k jobs | 18 of 392 | 208 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
6 notices | 0.11% | 84 of 386 | 162 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$4.44bn | 10.09% | 14 of 393 | 61 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
22 loan records | 14.41% | 7 of 335 | 33 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1694714, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1995129, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 43977.0, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1853.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33460 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, and which cannot be read?
In Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, the elevated distress signals are concentrated in bank distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, and store closures. On the bank side, the reading shows distressed lender CRE of $4.44bn, with 26.3% of bank CRE allocated to at-risk assets, and bank CRE at the 90th percentile (35.8%) facing potential stress, backed by 1.7 billion in distressed bank assets. For CMBS, special servicing shows $267.0mm in UPB, representing 14.4% of the metro’s UPB, with 22 loans in special servicing, though the materiality note underscores that the dollar figure is a floor given incomplete balances. Additionally, the metro logged 27 store closures over the past year, confirming ground-level distress. The phase is “peak” with convergence at 3, and the composite test is “loaded,” signaling that leading and realized credit signals are firing together. The reading on any additional distress signals beyond these—such as specific WARN notice details or further breakdowns—is unavailable from the provided figures.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $267.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.4%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $43.98bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 35.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $4.44bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.70bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 26.3%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 22
- Distressed banks
- 7
- Store closures (past year)
- 27
- WARN notices (past year)
- 6
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 13.6% of this metro's 22 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33460 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.4%
+0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
2.6%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,694,714 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.6% — $144M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+7.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
+7.2pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+5.6pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 19 loans, $743M, running 35.9% where the same type runs 11.0% elsewhere — worth 9.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$428M — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 14.0% now (2026-07), +4.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.0B of the metro's $1.9B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$428M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 78 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$3.2B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.13× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$3.2B
After Committed Draws
$2.1B / −36%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.13×
Banks In Footprint
78 / 12 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $2.0B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.2B
comes out of the room above, leaving $2.1B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $855M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 78
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 78 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Choice Financial Group ND | 61.8% | 174% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Associated Bank, National Association WI | 7.1% | 183% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Bell Bank ND | 37.0% | 270% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Frandsen Bank & Trust MN | 18.6% | 155% total 250%
|
🔒 | 1.47% |
| Lake Elmo Bank MN | 100.0% | 147% total 250%
|
🔒 | 1.82% |
| Alerus Financial, National Association ND | 41.9% | 260% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Hiawatha National Bank WI | 79.5% | 176% total 352%
|
🔒 | 4.57% |
| North American Banking Company MN | 100.0% | 242% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| The Bank Of Elk River MN | 100.0% | 183% total 305%
|
🔒 | 1.80% |
| Security Bank & Trust Company MN | 58.8% | 205% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| First Bank & Trust SD | 14.5% | 212% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Hometown Bank MN | 66.8% | 153% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Bankcherokee MN | 100.0% | 180% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Merchants Bank, National Association MN | 15.7% | 197% total 275%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| Citizens Independent Bank MN | 100.0% | 159% total 266%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens State Bank WI | 87.5% | 173% total 291%
|
🔒 | 0.86% |
| Platinum Bank MN | 100.0% | 224% total 413%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Dacotah Bank SD | 9.5% | 202% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Minnwest Bank MN | 29.6% | 255% total 332%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| First National Community Bank WI | 91.3% | 153% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Midcountry Bank MN | 62.8% | 251% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Deerwood Bank MN | 24.4% | 158% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| Bankwest MN | 100.0% | 116% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Security State Bank Of Marine MN | 100.0% | 140% total 197%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank And Trust MN | 100.0% | 208% total 313%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cortrust Bank National Association SD | 26.9% | 207% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Lake Central Bank MN | 60.9% | 114% total 163%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Village Bank MN | 100.0% | 205% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Pillar Bank WI | 80.0% | 112% total 195%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Nicolet National Bank WI | 2.6% | 208% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.64% |
| The First National Bank Of River Falls WI | 100.0% | 200% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Gateway Bank MN | 100.0% | 181% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northeast Bank MN | 100.0% | 263% total 450%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Highland Bank MN | 93.7% | 260% total 399%
|
🔒 | 3.50% |
| 21st Century Bank MN | 100.0% | 273% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Sherburne State Bank MN | 100.0% | 234% total 441%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Minnesota Lakes Bank MN | 100.0% | 135% total 317%
|
🔒 | 3.28% |
| Americana Community Bank MN | 58.9% | 109% total 353%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank SD | 12.5% | 120% total 145%
|
🔒 | 3.88% |
| Tradition Capital Bank MN | 89.0% | 291% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| New Market Bank MN | 100.0% | 193% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Kensington Bank MN | 28.3% | 149% total 176%
|
🔒 | 1.77% |
| Star Bank MN | 53.6% | 219% total 252%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Sunrise Banks, National Association SD | 33.0% | 279% total 388%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| Park State Bank MN | 7.5% | 143% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Bankvista MN | 29.4% | 215% total 415%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| First Farmers & Merchants Bank MN | 18.0% | 110% total 184%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Prinsbank MN | 31.2% | 157% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Falcon National Bank MN | 31.0% | 246% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens Alliance Bank MN | 9.1% | 211% total 286%
|
🔒 | 1.64% |
| First Farmers & Merchants National Bank MN | 44.0% | 132% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Minnesota MN | 34.7% | 228% total 299%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| Community Resource Bank MN | 19.3% | 212% total 357%
|
🔒 | 1.58% |
| Bravera Bank ND | 1.6% | 136% total 221%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Border Bank ND | 10.9% | 225% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Security Financial Bank WI | 5.4% | 160% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Coulee Bank WI | 27.4% | 252% total 433%
|
🔒 | 1.95% |
| Commerce Bank MN | 87.6% | 282% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Western Bank & Trust ND | 3.8% | 243% total 378%
|
🔒 | 2.64% |
| Pine River State Bank MN | 17.6% | 144% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Center National Bank MN | 10.9% | 179% total 214%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Heritage National Bank MN | 10.5% | 255% total 355%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Granite Bank MN | 25.6% | 257% total 424%
|
🔒 | 2.52% |
| Gate City Bank ND | 0.2% | 102% total 137%
|
🔒 | 0.90% |
| First International Bank & Trust ND | 0.4% | 273% total 374%
|
🔒 | 1.81% |
| North Star Bank MN | 100.0% | 299% total 390%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| First Bank Elk River MN | 100.0% | 334% total 488%
|
🔒 | 0.52% |
| Premier Bank MN | 100.0% | 329% total 510%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Crown Bank MN | 100.0% | 358% total 431%
|
🔒 | 1.46% |
| Bridgewater Bank MN | 100.0% | 441% total 468%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| First Resource Bank MN | 88.5% | 325% total 414%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Prime Security Bank MN | 70.8% | 484% total 621%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Alliance Bank MN | 54.7% | 327% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Premier Bank Minnesota MN | 43.9% | 351% total 539%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sterling State Bank MN | 25.0% | 312% total 523%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| Unity Bank WI | 20.2% | 339% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| Ccfbank National Association WI | 6.3% | 321% total 439%
|
🔒 | 2.75% |
| National Bank Of Commerce WI | 5.9% | 318% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
Not counted — 41 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Ameriprise Bank, Fsb MN · The Huntington National Bank OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Vermillion State Bank MN · Scale Bank MN · Think Mutual Bank MN · Castle Rock Bank MN · Woodlands National Bank MN · Farmers State Bank Of Hamel MN · The Northern Trust Company IL · The First National Bank Of Milaca MN · The First National Bank Of Le Center MN · Farmers & Merchants Savings Bank IA · Cornerstone State Bank MN · Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America MN · The First National Bank Of Cokato MN · First State Bank Of Le Center MN · First Independence Bank MI · Liberty Bank Minnesota MN · Neighborhood National Bank MN · Citizens Bank Minnesota MN · The State Bank Of Faribault MN · Pine Country Bank MN · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Old National Bank IN · Umb Bank, National Association MO · Great Southern Bank MO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
United Bankers' Bank MN · Luminate Bank MN · Union Bank And Trust Company MN · Lakeview Bank MN · River Falls State Bank WI · Drake Bank MN · The First State Bank Of Rosemount MN · Entrebank MN · Key Community Bank MN · Visionbank MN
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hiawatha National Bank | $316M | 176% total 352%
|
4.57% | 🔒 |
| Highland Bank | $298M | 260% total 399%
|
3.50% | 🔒 |
| Union Bank And Trust Company | $99M | 148% total 418%
|
3.67% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Elk River | $219M | 183% total 305%
|
1.80% | 🔒 |
| Visionbank | $156M | 329% total 581%
|
1.45% | 🔒 |
| North Star Bank | $166M | 299% total 390%
|
1.11% | 🔒 |
| First Bank Elk River | $193M | 334% total 488%
|
0.52% | 🔒 |
| Lakeview Bank | $71M | 146% total 358%
|
0.42% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI shows slack capacity. The $428.4mm maturing balance on 18 loans is the cmbs_upb — $1.83bn — that local banks can see. They have $3.25bn in room before committed draws, and $2.09bn after, producing a wall-to-room of 0.21 pre-committed, and 0.13 after. This ranks 136 of 270 from the most strained, where the 14.6% distressed share, which is unavailable, is not a factor in this determination.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $428.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 18
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $3.25bn
- Committed construction draws
- $2.02bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $2.09bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.21
- Rank, most strained
- 136
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.13
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 78
- … excluded from the calculation
- 13
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.83bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.21 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
136 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33460 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
39 local distress events in the past year (2,184 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-22
CLOSURE
West St. Paul
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
St. Paul
2026-08-05
LAYOFF
102 jobs · Minneapolis
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
St. Paul
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Minneapolis
2026-07-31
LAYOFF
St. Paul
2026-07-30
LAYOFF
St. Paul
2026-07-01
LAYOFF
687 jobs · Bloomington
2026-06-28
CLOSURE
Burnsville
2026-06-20
CLOSURE
Minneapolis
2026-06-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-04
LAYOFF
1395 jobs · Bloomington
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Hopkins
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Bloomington
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Minnetonka
What has actually happened on the ground in Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI recently?
In the Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI metro over the last 365 days, the data shows 1 CRE-related bankruptcy filing, affecting 2,184 jobs. On the ground, there have been 26 store closures and 5 WARN notices. Note that the bankruptcy figure uses a state proxy (filings are attributed to the filer’s state, not the property’s metro), and the jobs total is a floor since notices without a stated headcount contribute 0.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 26
- WARN layoff notices
- 5
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,184
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33460 · geo_events · last changed 30 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.