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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · WI
The read
$1.2B of CMBS across 80 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($300M, 25% of the book). Multifamily is the largest book ($445M, 0.0% distressed). 29 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (815 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Milwaukee's book stays clean, but the ground tells a different story
Milwaukee-Waukesha carries $1.2 billion of CMBS across 80 loans, and on the securitized side the metro looks quiet. The heaviest maturity load sits well out at 2029, when $300 million — a quarter of the book — comes due. Multifamily is the largest exposure at $445 million and runs at 0.0% distress, against a national multifamily rate of 7.9%. Retail, the next book at $300 million, is likewise clean at 0.0% versus a 2.6% national mark. Across the bank side, all 17 lenders are free of distress, though four carry early-warning flags.
The contrast is on the ground. The metro logged 30 distress events over the past year — 17 store closures and 13 layoff notices — touching 900 jobs. That filed record of local stress has yet to surface in the loan data, where every sector and every maturity year reads 0.0% distressed.
The labor backdrop is soft at the margins. Unemployment stands at 3.8% as of August 2026, up 0.2 point year over year, and office-using employment of 160,338 is down 2.0% over the same stretch. For now the securitized book is untested; the earliest meaningful maturity wall is still years out, led by the 2029 vintage.
Written 2026-10-21
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$265M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
17
Layoff Notices (1y)
12 / 815 jobs
0.11% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
80 / $1.2B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
+0.2pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
160,338
-2.0% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI right now?
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI is showing early but uneven distress. Store closures sit at 17 closures (2.3 per 100k jobs) — elevated and ranked 28th of 392 by count, though a more moderate 136th by rate. WARN layoff notices are also elevated at 18 notices (0.14%), ranked 39th of 386 by count. The bank CRE leg is quiet at $137.0mm noncurrent (0.74%), and the CMBS tape shows just 2 special-servicing rows (5.57% of balance). Of six paired comparisons, four legs disagree — readings like "tenants are leaving and no lender balance sheet shows it yet" and "employment is going before any lender books it" — while one pair agrees hot (closures/WARN) and one agrees quiet (bank/CMBS). The key dynamic: real-economy stress is visible now, but it hasn't yet flowed through to lender balance sheets.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
17 closures | 2.3 per 100k jobs | 28 of 392 | 136 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
18 notices | 0.14% | 39 of 386 | 146 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$137.0mm | 0.74% | 142 of 393 | 302 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 5.57% | 66 of 335 | 68 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 738,368 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 780,687 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $18,582.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,149.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
+0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%4.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 738,368 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$265M — 22% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $811M of the metro's $1.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$265M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 28 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.0B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.13× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.0B
After Committed Draws
$1.2B / −41%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.13×
Banks In Footprint
28 / 8 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.2B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $807M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.2B,
with 13 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $365M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 28
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 28 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Town Bank, National Association WI | 74.2% | 150% total 184%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Five Nine WI | 100.0% | 166% total 598%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Great Midwest Bank, S.s.b. WI | 90.1% | 141% total 141%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Johnson Bank WI | 21.2% | 218% total 286%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Waukesha State Bank WI | 100.0% | 221% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| North Shore Bank WI | 66.9% | 250% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| National Exchange Bank And Trust WI | 11.1% | 133% total 157%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| First Federal Bank Of Wisconsin WI | 100.0% | 174% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Port Washington State Bank WI | 100.0% | 264% total 381%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Citizens Bank WI | 89.9% | 277% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Ixonia Bank WI | 21.5% | 164% total 254%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Horicon Bank WI | 22.9% | 235% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Waterstone Bank, Ssb WI | 100.0% | 294% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Byline Bank IL | 0.7% | 129% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.89% |
| Pyramax Bank, Fsb WI | 100.0% | 280% total 346%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank First, N.a. WI | 3.6% | 240% total 383%
|
🔒 | 0.87% |
| Peoples State Bank WI | 9.8% | 233% total 401%
|
🔒 | 1.71% |
| Collins State Bank WI | 26.1% | 238% total 444%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Alerus Financial, National Association ND | 1.8% | 260% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| State Bank Of Chilton WI | 10.8% | 248% total 447%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Forte Bank WI | 100.0% | 357% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Westbury Bank WI | 100.0% | 340% total 448%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Equitable Bank, S.s.b. WI | 86.2% | 418% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tri City National Bank WI | 83.3% | 348% total 415%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 26.2% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Marathon Bank WI | 17.7% | 361% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Business Bank WI | 13.6% | 340% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Bank Cmg WI | 1.6% | 333% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Northwestern Mutual Wealth Management WI · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Huntington National Bank OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Five Nine | $1.6B | 166% total 598%
|
2.20% | 🔒 |
| Waukesha State Bank | $598M | 221% total 320%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
| Forte Bank | $217M | 357% total 462%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Town Bank, National Association | $860M | 150% total 184%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Spring Bank | $248M | 286% total 482%
|
1.74% | 🔒 |
| Great Midwest Bank, S.s.b. | $245M | 141% total 141%
|
0.81% | 🔒 |
| Tri City National Bank | $930M | 348% total 415%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Bank | $551M | 277% total 342%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
29 local distress events in the past year (815 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Milwaukee
2026-10-04
LAYOFF
77 jobs · Milwaukee
2026-09-24
LAYOFF
41 jobs · Germantown
2026-09-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-09-09
CLOSURE
Milwaukee
2026-08-29
CLOSURE
West Bend
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
59 jobs · West Bend
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Milwaukee
2026-07-02
CLOSURE
Milwaukee
2026-07-01
LAYOFF
26 jobs · Milwaukee
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
West Allis
2026-06-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Wauwatosa
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Oak Creek
2026-04-29
LAYOFF
91 jobs · Menomonee Falls
What has actually happened on the ground in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI has seen 12 WARN notices, 17 store closures, and 2 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings, with 815 jobs affected — a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. Note the bankruptcy figure is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, so it should be read with that grain in mind.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 17
- WARN layoff notices
- 12
- Jobs on those notices
- 815
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
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