Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · WI
The read
$1.1B of CMBS across 79 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 5.6% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($300M, 26% of the book). Multifamily is the largest book ($446M, 0.0% distressed). 32 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (889 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A rising distress line, but the biggest book is still clean
Milwaukee-Waukesha carries $1.1 billion of CMBS across 79 loans, and the filed record has been rising — distress reached 5.6% as of July 2026. That is a modest book by national standards, and the pressure showing up in the servicing data is real rather than forecast: this is debt the servicer has already declared in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent.
The metro's largest exposure is also its cleanest. Multifamily accounts for $446 million of the book at 0.0% distressed, against a 7.6% national rate for the sector — a notable contrast in a market where apartments are carrying the load elsewhere. Retail, the next-largest sector at roughly $300 million, likewise sits at 0.0% versus 2.7% nationally. The concentration to watch on the calendar is 2029, when $300 million comes due — 26% of the entire book — the heaviest single maturity year on the page.
On the ground, the metro logged 32 distress events over the past year — 19 store closures and 13 layoff notices — tied to 889 jobs. That real-economy record sits alongside a servicing rate that is climbing off a low base, the kind of divergence a credit desk watches rather than dismisses.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$64M / 5.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$265M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
19
Layoff Notices (1y)
13 / 889 jobs
0.12% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
79 / $1.1B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.8%
+0.1pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
160,338
-2.0% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI right now?
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI is showing early but uneven distress. Store closures sit at 17 closures (2.3 per 100k jobs) — elevated and ranked 28th of 392 by count, though a more moderate 136th by rate. WARN layoff notices are also elevated at 18 notices (0.14%), ranked 39th of 386 by count. The bank CRE leg is quiet at $137.0mm noncurrent (0.74%), and the CMBS tape shows just 2 special-servicing rows (5.57% of balance). Of six paired comparisons, four legs disagree — readings like "tenants are leaving and no lender balance sheet shows it yet" and "employment is going before any lender books it" — while one pair agrees hot (closures/WARN) and one agrees quiet (bank/CMBS). The key dynamic: real-economy stress is visible now, but it hasn't yet flowed through to lender balance sheets.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
17 closures | 2.3 per 100k jobs | 28 of 392 | 136 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
18 notices | 0.14% | 39 of 386 | 146 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$137.0mm | 0.74% | 142 of 393 | 302 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 5.57% | 66 of 335 | 68 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 738368, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 780687, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 18582.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1149.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI, and which cannot be read?
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI, shows elevated signals around real-economy stress: 17 store closures and 18 WARN notices over the past year, with distress still in an early phase where CRE credit has yet to be hit. The special servicing reading is elevated, with CMBS special servicing UPB at $64.0mm (a 5.6% share of metro UPB), while bank CRE at risk sits at 22.4% (90th percentile), but bank CRE allocation is 31.6%, and distressed lender CRE exposure is $137.0mm with $0 in distressed bank assets. The convergence score is 2, indicating modest materiality — tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure. Readings that are unavailable: the share of bank CRE at risk is shown only at the 90th percentile, not as a broader distribution, and no comparison to prior periods or national benchmarks is provided; additionally, specific CMBS loan-level details (beyond the 2 loans in special servicing) and any bank-level capital stress figures are not stated.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $64.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 5.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $18.58bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 22.4%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $137.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 31.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 17
- WARN notices (past year)
- 18
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.8%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%4.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 738,368 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.5% — $11M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
-0.1pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-3.4pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Office: 9 loans, $223M, running 28.7% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 3.4pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$265M — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 5.6% now (2026-07), +5.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $770M of the metro's $1.1B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$265M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 29 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$3.3B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.08× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$3.3B
After Committed Draws
$1.8B / −44%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.08×
Banks In Footprint
29 / 8 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.5B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.8B,
with 13 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $366M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 29
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
7 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 29 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Associated Bank, National Association WI | 23.7% | 183% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Town Bank, National Association WI | 72.6% | 150% total 184%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Five Nine WI | 100.0% | 166% total 598%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Great Midwest Bank, S.s.b. WI | 89.8% | 141% total 141%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Waukesha State Bank WI | 100.0% | 221% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Johnson Bank WI | 17.3% | 218% total 286%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| North Shore Bank WI | 67.3% | 250% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| National Exchange Bank And Trust WI | 10.8% | 133% total 157%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| First Federal Bank Of Wisconsin WI | 100.0% | 174% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ixonia Bank WI | 30.2% | 164% total 254%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Port Washington State Bank WI | 100.0% | 264% total 381%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Citizens Bank WI | 90.1% | 277% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Horicon Bank WI | 23.1% | 235% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Waterstone Bank, Ssb WI | 100.0% | 294% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Byline Bank IL | 0.8% | 129% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.89% |
| Bank First, N.a. WI | 4.3% | 240% total 383%
|
🔒 | 0.87% |
| Pyramax Bank, Fsb WI | 100.0% | 280% total 346%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples State Bank WI | 9.8% | 233% total 401%
|
🔒 | 1.71% |
| Collins State Bank WI | 25.7% | 238% total 444%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| State Bank Of Chilton WI | 10.5% | 248% total 447%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Alerus Financial, National Association ND | 0.3% | 260% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Forte Bank WI | 100.0% | 357% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Westbury Bank WI | 100.0% | 340% total 448%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Equitable Bank, S.s.b. WI | 86.6% | 418% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tri City National Bank WI | 83.2% | 348% total 415%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 23.1% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Marathon Bank WI | 15.0% | 361% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Business Bank WI | 14.1% | 340% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Bank Cmg WI | 1.9% | 333% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Northwestern Mutual Wealth Management WI · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Huntington National Bank OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Cibc Bank Usa IL · Old National Bank IN · Umb Bank, National Association MO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Spring Bank WI · State Bank Of Newburg WI
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Five Nine | $1.6B | 166% total 598%
|
2.20% | 🔒 |
| Waukesha State Bank | $598M | 221% total 320%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
| Forte Bank | $217M | 357% total 462%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Town Bank, National Association | $860M | 150% total 184%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Spring Bank | $248M | 286% total 482%
|
1.74% | 🔒 |
| Great Midwest Bank, S.s.b. | $245M | 141% total 141%
|
0.81% | 🔒 |
| Tri City National Bank | $930M | 348% total 415%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Bank | $551M | 277% total 342%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI looks to be in solid shape on refinancing capacity, ranking 164 of 270 most-strained metros, which is below the median ratio of 0.20. With 29 qualifying banks and 5 excluded, the room before committed draws sits at $3.30bn, and after committed draws of $1.84bn, the room narrows to $1.83bn. Against the $265.3mm maturing CMBS wall, the wall-to-room ratio comes in at 0.14 after committed draws and 0.08 before them—both comfortably slack. Roughly 5.6% of the maturing balance is distressed, and the 11 maturing loans totaling $265.3mm face no near-term absorption issues given ample bank capacity. Distressed share at 5.6% is modest, though the reading is an upper bound since the wall only captures CMBS maturities. Overall, banks here have the room to refinance the coming wall without strain.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $265.3mm
- … across this many loans
- 11
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $3.30bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.84bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.83bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.14
- Rank, most strained
- 164
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.08
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 29
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.15bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.14 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
164 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
32 local distress events in the past year (889 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Milwaukee
2026-08-29
CLOSURE
West Bend
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
59 jobs · West Bend
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Milwaukee
2026-07-02
CLOSURE
Milwaukee
2026-07-01
LAYOFF
26 jobs · Milwaukee
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
West Allis
2026-06-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Oak Creek
2026-04-29
LAYOFF
91 jobs · Menomonee Falls
2026-04-01
LAYOFF
70 jobs · Cudahy
2026-03-09
CLOSURE
Franklin
2026-03-08
CLOSURE
Franklin
2026-03-08
CLOSURE
Milwaukee
2026-02-25
LAYOFF
64 jobs · Menomonee Falls
What has actually happened on the ground in Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI recently?
In the last 365 days, Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI has logged 18 store closures, 14 WARN notices affecting 937 jobs, and 1 CRE-related bankruptcy filing.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 18
- WARN layoff notices
- 14
- Jobs on those notices
- 937
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33340 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.