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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$6.5B of CMBS across 256 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.5B). 64 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (7,292 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Miami's securitized book stays quiet while the street-level record fills up
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach carries $6.5 billion of CMBS across 256 loans, a book weighted toward retail at $2.1 billion and office at $2.0 billion, with hospitality ($0.7 billion), mixed-use ($0.6 billion) and multifamily ($0.5 billion) rounding out the rest. The servicer-declared picture is strikingly clean: office, hospitality, mixed-use and multifamily all register a 0.0% distress rate here, against national marks of 11.1%, 6.2%, 5.4% and 7.9% respectively. Office carries 624,050 office-using jobs on the books even as that count runs 0.6% below a year ago, and metro unemployment sits at 3.7% as of August 2026, flat year over year.
The maturity wall is loaded toward the back end. The heaviest single year lands in 2029 at $1.5 billion, followed by $1.4 billion in 2028, with another $1.1 billion each in 2030 and 2031; $1.6 billion comes due inside the next 24 months. Where those maturing balances carry a reading, the filed distress rate is 0.0%. Among 27 banks with local exposure, two are flagged distressed and six sit in early-warning territory.
The tension in this metro is between the securitized record and the street. Sixty-four on-the-ground distress events landed in the past year — 25 store closures and 39 layoff notices — tied to 7,292 jobs. That filed record is where the pressure is showing up, even as the CMBS and bank books read quiet by national standards.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.6B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 27
Bank Early-Warning
6 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
25
Layoff Notices (1y)
39 / 7,292 jobs
0.29% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
256 / $6.5B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
0.0pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
624,050
-0.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL right now?
All six cross-checks agree: distress is elevated across the board here. Store closures sit at 20 with a rate of 0.81 per 100,000 jobs — that count is elevated by size (rank 26 of 392) rather than rate (rank 283 of 392), so the reading speaks to how big Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach is, not how stressed it is per unit. Layoff notices come in at 73 with a rate of 0.28%, both count and rate elevated (rank 11 of 386 by count, rank 81 by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line reads 6005.3 with a rate of 8.8% (rank 10 of 393 by count), though only 9.8% of these dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation; the rest is split by branch deposits, which the call report cannot confirm. Securitized loans in special servicing run 13 rows with a rate of 0.18%, a floor because it's measured over just 7.7% of those rows (rank 12 of 335 by count). Since all six pairs agree hot and none are blind or disagreeing, the picture is uniformly stressed, with the proviso that the closures leg is a size story and the CMBS figure is a floor.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
20 closures | 0.81 per 100k jobs | 26 of 392 | 283 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
73 notices | 0.28% | 11 of 386 | 81 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$6.01bn | 8.8% | 10 of 393 | 83 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
13 loan records | 0.18% | 12 of 335 | 104 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 2,481,254 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 3,142,336 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $68,257.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $6,524.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%3.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,481,254 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.6B — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.1B of the metro's $6.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.6B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 39 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$8.2B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$8.2B
After Committed Draws
$5.3B / −35%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.20×
Banks In Footprint
39 / 14 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $4.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2.9B
comes out of the room above, leaving $5.3B,
with 16 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.2B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 39 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 67.0% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| City National Bank Of Florida FL | 96.7% | 258% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Amerant Bank, National Association FL | 98.4% | 218% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Banco Do Brasil Americas FL | 93.5% | 108% total 119%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 25.3% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Firstbank Puerto Rico PR | 11.8% | 107% total 143%
|
🔒 | 0.78% |
| Banesco Usa FL | 82.7% | 216% total 269%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 20.9% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 4.3% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| First American Bank IL | 13.7% | 159% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Israel Discount Bank Of New York NY | 16.0% | 250% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Interaudi Bank NY | 36.6% | 241% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Grove Bank & Trust FL | 100.0% | 274% total 314%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cibc Bank Usa IL | 0.2% | 149% total 196%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Sunstate Bank FL | 100.0% | 257% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Evermore Bank FL | 100.0% | 256% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Of Coffee County GA | 48.0% | 227% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Interamerican Bank, A Fsb FL | 100.0% | 285% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Belmont Bank & Trust Company IL | 4.9% | 205% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| First Bank FL | 4.4% | 168% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cypress Bank & Trust FL | 36.0% | 252% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankflorida FL | 19.8% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Emigrant Bank FL | 0.0% | 100% total 100%
|
🔒 | 9.07% |
| Terrabank, National Association FL | 100.0% | 372% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Optimumbank FL | 100.0% | 504% total 714%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| U. S. Century Bank FL | 100.0% | 347% total 413%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ocean Bank FL | 99.7% | 528% total 621%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| Pacific National Bank FL | 98.5% | 355% total 400%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| International Finance Bank FL | 90.6% | 448% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Anchor Bank FL | 73.4% | 345% total 460%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Popular Bank NY | 33.1% | 311% total 427%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Amerasia Bank NY | 20.3% | 354% total 406%
|
🔒 | 1.90% |
| Oneunited Bank MA | 4.2% | 609% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Connectone Bank NJ | 2.7% | 439% total 545%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Old Dominion National Bank VA | 1.4% | 312% total 365%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| First Bank NJ | 1.1% | 339% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Metropolitan Commercial Bank NY | 0.8% | 304% total 600%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| First State Bank FL | 0.0% | 297% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb DE | 0.0% | 225% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
Not counted — 46 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citibank, National Association SD · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Truist Bank NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Regions Bank AL · Bradesco Bank FL · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · Beal Bank Usa NV · Helm Bank Usa FL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Natbank, National Association FL · Desjardins Bank, National Association FL · Paradise Bank FL · Bank Of Belle Glade FL · Commerce Bank MO · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Anthem Bank & Trust LA · Trustco Bank NY · Keybank National Association OH · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · Centennial Bank AR · United Community Bank SC · Bank Ozk AR · City National Bank CA · Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Nbh Bank CO · Valley National Bank NJ · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY · Capital Bank, National Association MD
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Newtek Bank, National Association FL · Pibank, National Association FL · Bankmiami FL · Locality Bank FL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emigrant Bank | $1.2B | 100% total 100%
|
9.07% | 🔒 |
| Newtek Bank, National Association | $1.0B | 219% total 484%
|
5.93% | 🔒 |
| Anchor Bank | $296M | 345% total 460%
|
0.02% | 🔒 |
| Paradise Bank | $129M | 92% total 313%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Optimumbank | $983M | 504% total 714%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Terrabank, National Association | $385M | 372% total 412%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Amerant Bank, National Association | $3.1B | 218% total 287%
|
1.61% | 🔒 |
| Locality Bank | $263M | 370% total 561%
|
0.73% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
—
Same-Store Revenue
+0.6%
Occupancy
97.1%
Rent Growth
+0.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +0.6% | 97.1% | +0.5% | 2026-07-30 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
64 local distress events in the past year (7,292 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
CLOSURE
Florida
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
CLOSURE
Miami Beach
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-09-25
CLOSURE
Coral Gables
2026-09-10
LAYOFF
30 jobs · Miami
2026-09-09
CLOSURE
Coral Springs
2026-08-14
CLOSURE
Florida
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
60 jobs · HIALEAH
What has actually happened on the ground in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL metro has logged 25 store closures and 39 WARN notices, with 7,292 jobs affected — a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. On the bankruptcy side, the reading is not metro-native: the 53 CRE-likely filings are a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it, and coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 25
- WARN layoff notices
- 39
- Jobs on those notices
- 7,292
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 53
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.