Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$6.5B of CMBS across 253 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $2.2B. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.5B). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.2% as of 2026-07. 71 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (8,333 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Miami's Book Is Clean — but the Street-Level Count Keeps Climbing
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach carries $6.5 billion of CMBS across 253 loans, and by the filed record nothing in the book is distressed today. The metro-wide distress rate sits at 0.2% as of July 2026 and has held flat, backed by a median DSCR of 2.05. Retail is the largest single exposure at $2.2 billion, yet it registers a 0.5% distress rate against a 2.7% national mark. Office — the sector doing the damage almost everywhere else — shows a $1.9 billion book at 0.0% here, next to an 11.3% national rate. Hospitality, mixed-use and multifamily all read zero as well.
The near-term calendar is manageable but front-loaded toward the end of the decade: $1.6 billion comes due within 24 months, and the heaviest single-year load lands in 2029 at $1.5 billion, carrying a 0.8% distress rate. Another $1.5 billion matures in 2028 clean, with $1.1 billion in 2030 and $1.0 billion in 2031 behind it.
The caveat lives off the loan tape. The metro logged 71 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — 23 store closures and 48 layoff notices totaling 8,333 jobs. Unemployment reads 3.7%, up 0.2 point year over year, and office-using employment of 624,050 is down 0.6% over the same stretch. The servicer-declared book is pristine; the street-level count is where the pressure is showing.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$12M / 0.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.6B
Local Banks (stressed)
2 / 27
Bank Early-Warning
6 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
23
Layoff Notices (1y)
48 / 8,333 jobs
0.34% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
253 / $6.5B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
+0.2pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
624,050
-0.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL right now?
All six cross-checks agree: distress is elevated across the board here. Store closures sit at 20 with a rate of 0.81 per 100,000 jobs — that count is elevated by size (rank 26 of 392) rather than rate (rank 283 of 392), so the reading speaks to how big Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach is, not how stressed it is per unit. Layoff notices come in at 73 with a rate of 0.28%, both count and rate elevated (rank 11 of 386 by count, rank 81 by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line reads 6005.3 with a rate of 8.8% (rank 10 of 393 by count), though only 9.8% of these dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation; the rest is split by branch deposits, which the call report cannot confirm. Securitized loans in special servicing run 13 rows with a rate of 0.18%, a floor because it's measured over just 7.7% of those rows (rank 12 of 335 by count). Since all six pairs agree hot and none are blind or disagreeing, the picture is uniformly stressed, with the proviso that the closures leg is a size story and the CMBS figure is a floor.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
20 closures | 0.81 per 100k jobs | 26 of 392 | 283 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
73 notices | 0.28% | 11 of 386 | 81 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$6.01bn | 8.8% | 10 of 393 | 83 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
13 loan records | 0.18% | 12 of 335 | 104 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2481254, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 3142336, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 68257.9, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 6524.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL, and which cannot be read?
Distress signals are clearly elevated in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL, with both credit and real-economy readings firing together. The bank-distressed-CRE figure stands at $6.01bn across $68.26bn of bank CRE, placing 9.8% of that book at risk at the 90th percentile (22.6% at risk at that threshold), and 8 distressed bank assets are flagged. CMBS special servicing shows $12.0mm in unpaid balances, representing 0.2% of metro UPB, with 13 loans in special servicing. Real-economy stress is also present, with 73 WARN notices and 20 store closures in the past year. However, the share of CMBS special-servicing UPB relative to the metro cannot be fully read — while the percentage is given as 0.2%, the underlying dollar figure is described as a floor, and the full extent of exposure is unavailable because many of the 13 special-servicing rows carry no balance.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $12.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $68.26bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 22.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $6.01bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $8.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 13
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 20
- WARN notices (past year)
- 73
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 7.7% of this metro's 13 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
+0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%3.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,481,254 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.1% — $384M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
-6.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 75 loans, $1.9B, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.6% elsewhere — worth 3.4pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.6B — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.2% now (2026-07), -0.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.1B of the metro's $6.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.6B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 39 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$8.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.19× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$8.6B
After Committed Draws
$5.4B / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.19×
Banks In Footprint
39 / 13 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $4.5B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $3.3B
comes out of the room above, leaving $5.4B,
with 16 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.3B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 39 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 69.0% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| City National Bank Of Florida FL | 96.9% | 258% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Amerant Bank, National Association FL | 98.8% | 218% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Banco Do Brasil Americas FL | 93.0% | 108% total 119%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 26.7% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Firstbank Puerto Rico PR | 11.1% | 107% total 143%
|
🔒 | 0.78% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 28.7% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Banesco Usa FL | 76.2% | 216% total 269%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 4.3% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 15.7% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Israel Discount Bank Of New York NY | 17.8% | 250% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| First American Bank IL | 13.0% | 159% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Pibank, National Association FL | 100.0% | 251% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Interaudi Bank NY | 35.0% | 241% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Grove Bank & Trust FL | 100.0% | 274% total 314%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sunstate Bank FL | 100.0% | 257% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Evermore Bank FL | 100.0% | 256% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Of Coffee County GA | 46.7% | 227% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank FL | 5.7% | 168% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Interamerican Bank, A Fsb FL | 100.0% | 285% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Belmont Bank & Trust Company IL | 3.2% | 205% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cypress Bank & Trust FL | 25.4% | 252% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankflorida FL | 13.6% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Emigrant Bank FL | 0.0% | 100% total 100%
|
🔒 | 9.07% |
| Pacific National Bank FL | 100.0% | 355% total 400%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Terrabank, National Association FL | 100.0% | 372% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Optimumbank FL | 100.0% | 504% total 714%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| U. S. Century Bank FL | 100.0% | 347% total 413%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Anchor Bank FL | 100.0% | 345% total 460%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Ocean Bank FL | 99.6% | 528% total 621%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| International Finance Bank FL | 91.3% | 448% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Popular Bank NY | 31.8% | 311% total 427%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Amerasia Bank NY | 20.1% | 354% total 406%
|
🔒 | 1.90% |
| Oneunited Bank MA | 4.5% | 609% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Connectone Bank NJ | 3.1% | 439% total 545%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Old Dominion National Bank VA | 1.8% | 312% total 365%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| First Bank NJ | 0.7% | 339% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First State Bank FL | 0.0% | 297% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb DE | 0.0% | 225% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
Not counted — 42 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citibank, National Association SD · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Truist Bank NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Regions Bank AL · Bradesco Bank FL · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Helm Bank Usa FL · Natbank, National Association FL · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Desjardins Bank, National Association FL · Beal Bank Usa NV · Paradise Bank FL · Bank Of Belle Glade FL · Anthem Bank & Trust LA · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Trustco Bank NY · Keybank National Association OH · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Bank Ozk AR · City National Bank CA · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Cibc Bank Usa IL · Valley National Bank NJ · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY · Capital Bank, National Association MD
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Newtek Bank, National Association FL · Bankmiami FL · Locality Bank FL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emigrant Bank | $1.2B | 100% total 100%
|
9.07% | 🔒 |
| Newtek Bank, National Association | $1.0B | 219% total 484%
|
5.93% | 🔒 |
| Anchor Bank | $296M | 345% total 460%
|
0.02% | 🔒 |
| Paradise Bank | $129M | 92% total 313%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Optimumbank | $983M | 504% total 714%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Terrabank, National Association | $385M | 372% total 412%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Amerant Bank, National Association | $3.1B | 218% total 287%
|
1.61% | 🔒 |
| Locality Bank | $263M | 370% total 561%
|
0.73% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Banks lending in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL appear to have slack capacity to absorb the metro’s maturing CMBS. The reading shows 39 qualifying banks (with 14 excluded here) and a wall-to-room ratio of 0.30 — above the median of 0.20, making this metro more strained than typical, ranking 113 of 270 from the most strained. The maturing balance stands at $1.63bn across 60 loans, against $8.64bn in room before committed draws, leaving $5.37bn after those draws are deducted; the ratio before committed draws is 0.19. Distressed share is 0.2%. Caveats apply: the wall covers only CMBS maturing within 24 months, room is a deposit-footprint proxy, and the elevated ratio is not an exclusion artifact (as 14 banks are excluded, this is not explained by exclusion).
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.63bn
- … across this many loans
- 60
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $8.64bn
- Committed construction draws
- $4.54bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $5.37bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.30
- Rank, most strained
- 113
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.19
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 39
- … excluded from the calculation
- 14
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $6.42bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.30 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
113 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
—
Same-Store Revenue
+0.6%
Occupancy
97.1%
Rent Growth
+0.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +0.6% | 97.1% | +0.5% | 2026-07-30 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
71 local distress events in the past year (8,333 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-14
CLOSURE
Florida
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
60 jobs · HIALEAH
2026-08-12
LAYOFF
181 jobs · WESTON
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Miami
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Miami
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
80 jobs · FORT LAUDERDALE
2026-07-30
CLOSURE
Miami
2026-07-16
LAYOFF
60 jobs · HIALEAH
2026-07-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-01
CLOSURE
Miami
2026-06-20
LAYOFF
117 jobs · MIAMI
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
337 jobs · MIAMI BEACH
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
73 jobs · DORAL
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
39 jobs · FORT LAUDERDALE
What has actually happened on the ground in Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL recently?
In the past year, Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL has seen 4 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings, 8,333 jobs affected, 21 store closures, and 48 WARN notices across the metro. These figures reflect approved closures and layoffs with a headcount or unspecified count, but note that bankruptcy filings are a state proxy, not metro-native, and job counts are a floor since some notices don’t list affected employees. A reading on additional ground-level activity is currently unavailable from the provided data.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 21
- WARN layoff notices
- 48
- Jobs on those notices
- 8,333
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 33100 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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