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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Lubbock, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$274M of CMBS across 26 loans. Hospitality is both the largest book ($118M) and the most distressed (42.2% vs 6.2% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($50M). 2 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (351 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Lubbock, the hotel book carries the stress
Lubbock runs a small, concentrated CMBS book: $274M across 26 loans, with an overall distress rate of 24.1%. The weight sits in hospitality, which is at once the metro's largest sector at $118M and its most distressed, running a 42.2% distress rate against a 6.2% national mark for hotel loans. That is a wide gap, and in a book this size it is the single fact that defines the metro. Retail, the other sector on the page, shows no distress at all — 0.0% versus 2.6% nationally — so the trouble here is sector-specific rather than broad.
The refinancing calendar is front-loaded into 2027, which carries the heaviest maturity load at $50M. That is the year desks watching this metro should mark. Away from the loan tape, the on-the-ground record is light but not clean: two layoff notices over the past year accounting for 351 jobs, with no store closures logged. Unemployment stands at 3.9% as of August 2026, flat year over year.
Among the five banks with local exposure, none are flagged distressed, though one sits on an early-warning footing. The picture, then, is a narrow one — a hotel concentration doing the work, a 2027 maturity wall to clear, and an otherwise steady labor backdrop.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$66M / 24.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$71M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 5
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
0
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 351 jobs
0.27% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
26 / $274M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
0.0pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Lubbock, TX right now?
Based on the four independent feeds tracked for Lubbock, TX, the distress picture is split: two signals are elevated and two are quiet. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at 431.4 $mm (8.97% of the lent-in balance, ranking 72nd of 393 metros by count), and securitized loans in special servicing are elevated with 5 rows (21.09% of the securitized balance read here, 34th of 335 by count). Store closures, meanwhile, are not elevated, with a rate of 0.78 per 100k jobs and a rank of 258th of 392 by count; layoff notices (WARN) are also not elevated, at 0.2% of employment and ranked 166th of 386 by count. The four disagreeing pairs flag lender stress without a visible tenant or employment cause, with the structural reads suggesting the elevated CMBS side may be an office story rather than retail, while bank stress could trace to construction or a rate reset. Overall, 1 of 6 pairs agree hot and 1 agree quiet, leaving 4 pairs disagreeing — a picture of building-level financial distress without a matching operational failure on the ground.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
1 closures | 0.78 per 100k jobs | 258 of 392 | 284 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.2% | 166 of 386 | 114 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$431.4mm | 8.97% | 72 of 393 | 78 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
5 loan records | 21.09% | 34 of 335 | 18 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 128,583 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 179,251 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $4,810.4 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $275.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31180 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Lubbock, TX, and which cannot be read?
In Lubbock, TX, two distress signals are elevated: bank distressed CRE exposure, with distressed lender CRE at $431.4mm and a 90th-percentile bank CRE at risk of 6.4%, and CMBS special servicing, where the special servicing UPB is $58.0mm, representing 21.1% of metro UPB. However, broader readings cannot be drawn: bank capital allocation to CRE is 0.0%, the count of distressed banks is 0 with distressed bank assets of 0, and the convergence score is 2, indicating an isolated signal rather than a systemic pattern; the phase is "watch" with a "no reading" phase sequence, and materiality is "modest" (tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure). Specific counts show 5 CMBS loans in special servicing, 1 store closure, and 2 WARN notices over one year, but no bank-level distress is present. The phase reason clarifies "an isolated signal, not a convergence," and the costume test is "thin," with the costume_reason noting "signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy."
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $58.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 21.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $4.81bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 6.4%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $431.4mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 5
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 1
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
an isolated signal, not a convergence
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31180 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%4.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 128,583 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 24.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.6% — $53M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+19.5pp
… and loan size held fixed
+20.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+18.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 11 loans, $118M, running 42.2% where the same type runs 6.1% elsewhere — worth 15.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$71M — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $274M of the metro's $274M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$71M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 20 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.1B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.1B
After Committed Draws
$531M / −50%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
20 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $669M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $528M
comes out of the room above, leaving $531M,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $141M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 20
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 20 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prosperity Bank TX | 4.0% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| City Bank TX | 58.6% | 239% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Cornerstone Capital Bank, Ssb TX | 35.9% | 147% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 18.9% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| First United Bank TX | 21.0% | 190% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Capra Bank IA | 34.1% | 180% total 233%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sundown State Bank TX | 51.5% | 109% total 171%
|
🔒 | 1.60% |
| Community National Bank TX | 4.5% | 164% total 224%
|
🔒 | 2.52% |
| Victory Bank TX | 72.2% | 209% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Maverick Bank TX | 33.3% | 214% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Spur Security Bank TX | 42.3% | 110% total 166%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank TX | 67.3% | 211% total 316%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southwest Bank TX | 11.7% | 183% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Western Bank TX | 33.9% | 266% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 1.1% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| West Texas National Bank TX | 1.4% | 129% total 163%
|
🔒 | 3.22% |
| West Texas State Bank TX | 10.1% | 171% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Wellington State Bank TX | 8.0% | 223% total 271%
|
🔒 | 8.92% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 0.8% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| American Bank Of Commerce TX | 40.9% | 365% total 507%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
Not counted — 8 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Amarillo National Bank TX · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Bank | $323M | 266% total 372%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| City Bank | $2.0B | 239% total 324%
|
0.16% | 🔒 |
| American Bank Of Commerce | $918M | 365% total 507%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| Victory Bank | $84M | 209% total 261%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First State Bank | $76M | 211% total 316%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Lubbock, TX have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Lubbock's refinancing picture looks comfortable on the visible numbers: with 6 maturing loans totaling $71.4mm against $530.7mm of room after committed draws — a wall-to-room ratio of 0.13, below the median of 0.24 — the 20 qualifying banks appear well able to absorb the maturing CMBS balance, ranking 182 of 275 counting from the most strained. That reading comes with real caveats, though: the $71.4mm wall is CMBS only, so it is not the metro's whole maturity load, and room is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement of lending capacity, with 3 banks excluded here for lack of a lending footprint. The 24.1% distressed share is the offsetting signal worth watching.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $71.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 6
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.06bn
- Committed construction draws
- $669.1mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $530.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.13
- Rank, most strained
- 182
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 20
- … excluded from the calculation
- 3
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 24.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $274.4mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.13 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
182 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31180 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
2 local distress events in the past year (351 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2025-11-19
LAYOFF
126 jobs · Lubbock
2025-10-29
LAYOFF
225 jobs · Lubbock
2025-09-28
CLOSURE
Lubbock
2025-04-30
CLOSURE
Lubbock
2025-02-12
CLOSURE
Idalou
2024-09-10
LAYOFF
218 jobs · Post
2024-02-02
LAYOFF
176 jobs · Lubbock
What has actually happened on the ground in Lubbock, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Lubbock, TX metro shows no approved store closures (store_closures: 0) and 2 WARN notices, with jobs_affected: 351 — a figure best read as a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. On the bankruptcy side, the reading is 101, but this is a state-level proxy, not a metro-native count: court cases are counted in their filing district and SEC filings in the filer's state rather than where the property sits, and coverage changes make pre- and post-2026-09-16 counts non-comparable, so it should not be attributed to Lubbock itself.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 0
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 351
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 101
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31180 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.