Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN, KY
The read
$618M of CMBS across 27 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 5.7% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($212M, 34% of the book). 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (154 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Louisville's Distress Climbs, With the Real Test Set for 2029
Louisville carries $618M of CMBS across 27 loans, and the filed record is moving the wrong way: distress stands at 5.7% as of July 2026 and has been rising. That is a modest book by national standards, but the trend line is what commands attention here — a servicer-declared rate that is trending up, not a forecast. Median DSCR across the metro sits at 1.44, still cushioned, though the aggregate number masks where the pressure is concentrated.
The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $212M — 34% of the book — comes due. That vintage already carries a 13.0% distress rate, well above the metro-wide 5.7%, and it is the single tranche that will define how this market clears. The nearer wall is lighter: the 2028 maturities total roughly $0.1B at a 6.6% distress rate, with later years in 2031 and 2034 showing nothing distressed on the page today. The book's fate rests disproportionately on that 2029 slug.
On the ground, the past year brought 10 distress events — seven store closures and three layoff notices totaling 154 jobs — against a metro unemployment rate of 4.8%, flat year over year. The bank side is quiet: of nine institutions tracked, none are distressed, with a single lender flagged as early warning. The signal in Louisville is a rising filed rate and a lopsided maturity calendar, not broad-based deterioration.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$35M / 5.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$167M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 9
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 154 jobs
0.03% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
27 / $618M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.8%
0.0pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN right now?
For Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN, distress signals are mixed but lean toward a structural story rather than severe stress: 1 of 4 signals is elevated, and that one—store closures—is elevated by size, not by rate (rank 70th of 392 by count, but 269th by rate). The other three legs are quiet: WARN notices sit at 2 notices (rank 166th by count, 220th by rate), bank noncurrent CRE is 0.0 ($mm) with a 0.0% rate, and CMBS special servicing is 3 rows (a floor, given measured over 33.3% of special-servicing rows). Notably, 3 of 6 pairs disagree, all involving closures hot against a quiet counterpart—suggesting small-operator retail failures below WARN’s filing threshold, not yet showing on lender balance sheets or securitized tapes. The other 3 pairs agree quiet. With 0 pairs both elevated, this is not a distressed metro but one where retail-specific churn is present, and the size-driven closure reading should not be mistaken for per-unit stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 0.98 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 269 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.02% | 166 of 386 | 220 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$0 | 0% | 358 of 393 | 358 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
3 loan records | 4.67% | 52 of 335 | 73 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 613245, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 671854, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 11834.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 600.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN, and which cannot be read?
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN shows an elevated signal only for closures, with the costumed reading noting "the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event." Other distress signals cannot be read: the phase is obscured, meaning the credit side is unreadable because the securitized dollars are measured over 33.3% of its 3 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR. On the securitized side, there are $28.0mm in CMBS special-servicing UPB and 4.7% of metro UPB in special servicing, with 3 loans in special servicing; bank-side readings show 0 distressed banks and $0.0mm distressed lender CRE, with 11.5% bank CRE allocation and $11.83bn bank CRE. However, because the securitized side is invisible here (measured over 33.3% of rows), the reading for whether CRE credit has been hit cannot be read — it is not the same as quiet. The overall materiality is "modest," reflecting tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure, but the lack of full coverage makes the credit distress signal unreadable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $28.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.7%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $11.83bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 33.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 11.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 3
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 33.3% of its 3 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 33.3% of this metro's 3 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.8%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%5.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 613,245 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.8% — $6M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+0.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
+0.6pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
+0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Office: 4 loans, $71M, running 39.1% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 3.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$167M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 5.7% now (2026-07), +1.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $406M of the metro's $618M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$167M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 26 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.5B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.07× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.5B
After Committed Draws
$1.5B / −39%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.07×
Banks In Footprint
26 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $999M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.5B,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $113M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 of 26
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 26 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 71.2% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company KY | 69.6% | 248% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| First Harrison Bank IN | 100.0% | 174% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 3.6% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| German American Bank IN | 12.4% | 222% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Wilson & Muir Bank & Trust Company KY | 63.1% | 197% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Independence Bank Of Kentucky KY | 10.5% | 160% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| The New Washington State Bank IN | 92.0% | 226% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Town & Country Bank And Trust Company KY | 90.8% | 206% total 254%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| The Peoples Bank KY | 100.0% | 186% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Meade County Bank KY | 100.0% | 258% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Cecilian Bank KY | 9.0% | 203% total 263%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Central Bank & Trust Co. KY | 6.7% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| United Citizens Bank & Trust Company KY | 91.8% | 242% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Forcht Bank, National Association KY | 11.6% | 249% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Traditional Bank, Inc. KY | 7.3% | 267% total 332%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| The Paducah Bank And Trust Company KY | 4.9% | 211% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 0.4% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| River City Bank, Inc. KY | 100.0% | 293% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| South Central Bank, Inc. KY | 5.2% | 284% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| First National Bank Of Kentucky KY | 7.1% | 186% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust Company KY | 2.7% | 261% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| The Monticello Banking Company KY | 0.5% | 258% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Eclipse Bank, Inc. KY | 88.8% | 326% total 405%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Peoples Bank KY | 31.8% | 320% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| West Point Bank KY | 4.5% | 313% total 393%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
Not counted — 18 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Truist Bank NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH · The Lincoln National Bank Of Hodgenville KY · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Regions Bank AL · The Farmers Bank Of Milton KY · Guardian Savings Bank OH · Bedford Loan & Deposit Bank KY
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Pinnacle Bank TN · Peoples Bank OH · Old National Bank IN · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Woodforest National Bank TX
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Peoples Bank, Mt. Washington KY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| River City Bank, Inc. | $249M | 293% total 401%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| United Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $63M | 242% total 287%
|
1.29% | 🔒 |
| First Harrison Bank | $329M | 174% total 227%
|
0.48% | 🔒 |
| The New Washington State Bank | $232M | 226% total 318%
|
0.31% | 🔒 |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company | $2.1B | 125% total 186%
|
0.25% | 🔒 |
| Eclipse Bank, Inc. | $189M | 326% total 405%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company | $4.1B | 248% total 359%
|
0.20% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN shows slack lending capacity against its near-term CRE maturities. With a maturing balance of $166.6mm against a room_after_committed of $1.54bn, the wall_to_room reading is 0.11, which sits BELOW the median of 0.20 and places the metro at 188 of 270 — a lower strain ranking. Local banks here list 26 qualifying institutions, with a distressed_share of 5.9% on the $599.5mm CMBS balance, and the $1.11bn in committed draws still leaves ample room before hitting concentration limits.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $166.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 7
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.54bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.11bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.54bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.11
- Rank, most strained
- 188
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 26
- … excluded from the calculation
- 7
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.9%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $599.5mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.11 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
188 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (154 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Clarksville
2026-11-04
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Jefferson
2026-08-26
LAYOFF
28 jobs · Jefferson
2026-08-22
CLOSURE
Louisville
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
New Albany
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Louisville
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
111 jobs · Jeffersonville
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Clarksville
2025-12-17
CLOSURE
Louisville
2025-11-15
CLOSURE
Clarksville
2025-07-01
CLOSURE
Louisville
2025-01-15
LAYOFF
106 jobs · Jeffersonville
2024-10-21
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Louisville
What has actually happened on the ground in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN recently?
In the last 365 days, the Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN metro has recorded 2 CRE-related bankruptcies, affecting 139 jobs, alongside 6 store closures and 2 WARN notices. These figures reflect approved, ZIP-matched events only, with bankruptcies using a state-proxy count and job numbers representing a floor since notices without headcounts contribute zero employees. The data suggests a modest but real contraction in the local commercial real estate footprint, though a detailed breakdown of property types or specific sectors is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 6
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 139
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.