Start free trial
No credit card required
Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN, KY
The read
$610M of CMBS across 26 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($212M, 35% of the book). 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (154 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A small book with a 2029 problem, and the pink slips are piling up
Louisville carries a modest CMBS footprint — $610 million spread across 26 loans — but the refinancing calendar is lopsided. The single heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $212 million comes due, 35% of the entire book in one year. Thinner tranches sit in 2028, 2031 and 2034, leaving the metro's near-term exposure concentrated in that one vintage rather than spread evenly across the horizon.
On the ground, the filed record has been active: 10 distress events over the past year, split between seven store closures and three layoff notices accounting for 154 jobs. That is the kind of local-economy signal that shows up on servicer watchlists before it shows up in the numbers. For now the bank side is quiet — of nine local institutions none are distressed, though one carries an early-warning flag — and unemployment sits at 4.1% as of August 2026, unchanged on the year.
The read here is a metro to watch rather than one in trouble: a compact loan book, a single crowded maturity year, and a drip of closures and layoffs worth tracking against that 2029 wall.
Written 2026-10-23
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$166M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 9
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 154 jobs
0.03% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
26 / $610M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.1%
0.0pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN right now?
For Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN, distress signals are mixed but lean toward a structural story rather than severe stress: 1 of 4 signals is elevated, and that one—store closures—is elevated by size, not by rate (rank 70th of 392 by count, but 269th by rate). The other three legs are quiet: WARN notices sit at 2 notices (rank 166th by count, 220th by rate), bank noncurrent CRE is 0.0 ($mm) with a 0.0% rate, and CMBS special servicing is 3 rows (a floor, given measured over 33.3% of special-servicing rows). Notably, 3 of 6 pairs disagree, all involving closures hot against a quiet counterpart—suggesting small-operator retail failures below WARN’s filing threshold, not yet showing on lender balance sheets or securitized tapes. The other 3 pairs agree quiet. With 0 pairs both elevated, this is not a distressed metro but one where retail-specific churn is present, and the size-driven closure reading should not be mistaken for per-unit stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 0.98 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 269 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.02% | 166 of 386 | 220 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$0 | 0% | 358 of 393 | 358 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
3 loan records | 4.67% | 52 of 335 | 73 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 613,245 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 671,854 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $11,834.5 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $600.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.1%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%5.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 613,245 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$166M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $399M of the metro's $610M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$166M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 27 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.06× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.7B
After Committed Draws
$1.7B / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.06×
Banks In Footprint
27 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.0B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.7B,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $112M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 of 27
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 27 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 73.3% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company KY | 61.2% | 248% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| First Harrison Bank IN | 100.0% | 174% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 6.3% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| German American Bank IN | 11.8% | 222% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 3.0% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| Wilson & Muir Bank & Trust Company KY | 63.7% | 197% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Independence Bank Of Kentucky KY | 11.6% | 160% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Town & Country Bank And Trust Company KY | 91.4% | 206% total 254%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| The New Washington State Bank IN | 78.5% | 226% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| The Peoples Bank KY | 100.0% | 186% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Meade County Bank KY | 100.0% | 258% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Cecilian Bank KY | 8.7% | 203% total 263%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Central Bank & Trust Co. KY | 6.3% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| United Citizens Bank & Trust Company KY | 90.9% | 242% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Forcht Bank, National Association KY | 10.4% | 249% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 0.5% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Traditional Bank, Inc. KY | 7.4% | 267% total 332%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| The Paducah Bank And Trust Company KY | 5.1% | 211% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| River City Bank, Inc. KY | 100.0% | 293% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| South Central Bank, Inc. KY | 6.1% | 284% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| First National Bank Of Kentucky KY | 6.6% | 186% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust Company KY | 2.6% | 261% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| The Monticello Banking Company KY | 0.5% | 258% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Eclipse Bank, Inc. KY | 90.7% | 326% total 405%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Peoples Bank KY | 32.8% | 320% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| West Point Bank KY | 3.9% | 313% total 393%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
Not counted — 17 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Truist Bank NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · The Lincoln National Bank Of Hodgenville KY · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Regions Bank AL · The Farmers Bank Of Milton KY · Guardian Savings Bank OH · Bedford Loan & Deposit Bank KY
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Peoples Bank OH · Pinnacle Bank TN · Old National Bank IN · Woodforest National Bank TX
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| River City Bank, Inc. | $249M | 293% total 401%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| United Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $63M | 242% total 287%
|
1.29% | 🔒 |
| First Harrison Bank | $329M | 174% total 227%
|
0.48% | 🔒 |
| The New Washington State Bank | $232M | 226% total 318%
|
0.31% | 🔒 |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company | $2.1B | 125% total 186%
|
0.25% | 🔒 |
| Eclipse Bank, Inc. | $189M | 326% total 405%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company | $4.1B | 248% total 359%
|
0.20% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (154 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-04
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 15 jobs · Jefferson
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Clarksville
2026-08-26
LAYOFF
28 jobs · Jefferson
2026-08-22
CLOSURE
Louisville
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
New Albany
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Louisville
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
111 jobs · Jeffersonville
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Simpsonville
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Clarksville
2025-12-17
CLOSURE
Louisville
2025-07-01
CLOSURE
Louisville
2025-01-15
LAYOFF
106 jobs · Jeffersonville
2024-10-21
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Louisville
What has actually happened on the ground in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the ground-level activity in Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN shows 7 store closures, 3 warn notices, and 2 cre bankruptcies, with 154 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. Any metro-native reading of CRE bankruptcies is unavailable, as that measure is a STATE PROXY covering the states this metro's collateral sits in rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 154
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31140 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.