Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$17.5B of CMBS across 647 loans. Office is the largest book ($7.0B) but runs below its national distress rate (5.4% vs 11.3%); the elevated risk is in Industrial (3.8%). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($4.4B, 25% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 3.8% as of 2026-07. 403 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (21,047 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office Carries the Book, but the Filed Record Won't Move
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim carries $17.5 billion of CMBS across 647 loans, and the headline read is calmer than the skyline suggests. Office is the largest book at $7.0 billion, yet it runs at a 5.4% distress rate — less than half the 11.3% national mark for the sector. The elevated pocket sits elsewhere: Industrial, at a 3.8% distress rate, is where the risk has surfaced. Across the wider book, distress is flat in the filed record, holding at 3.8% as of July 2026, with a median DSCR of 1.98.
The refinancing calendar is loaded, but not immediate. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 at $4.4 billion — a quarter of the book — and it comes in light on distress at 2.0%. The nearer 2027 vintage, $2.6 billion, carries the highest distress rate on the maturity ladder at 5.5%, a note for desks watching the front end.
The on-the-ground record is where the strain reads more plainly. The metro logged 403 distress events over the past year, spanning 135 store closures and 268 layoff notices touching 21,047 jobs. Unemployment stands at 5.0% as of July 2026, down 0.8 points year over year, with office-using employment off 0.8%. It is a market where the servicer-declared numbers stay quiet and the labor signal does the talking.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$684M / 3.9%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$4.6B
Local Banks (stressed)
6 / 51
Bank Early-Warning
15 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
135
Layoff Notices (1y)
268 / 21,047 jobs
0.39% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
647 / $17.5B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.0%
-0.8pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
1,338,423
-0.8% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA right now?
In Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, all four vetted distress signals are elevated right now, with 4 of 4 legs reading hot and all 6 possible pairwise comparisons agreeing there is distress — no pairs are quiet and none disagree.
Store closures are the standout: the metro ranks 1st of 392 metros by count with 133 closures, at a rate of 2.45 per 100,000 jobs, though that rate rank is 126th — the level is driven by the metro's enormous job base. WARN layoff notices are also 1st of 386 with 439 notices, a 0.33% share of employment. Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $14,276.8 million (11.12% of allocated CRE, 4th of 393 by count), and securitized loans in special servicing total 39 rows (3.71% of the tracked balance, 4th of 335). All four legs are elevated regardless of whether you rank by raw count or rate, with no blind legs and no size-driven readings to discount.
The unanimous agreement across all six pairs is structurally meaningful: closures and WARN both point to real distress at the tenant level, bank and CMBS stress both show up on the lender side, and even the bank-CMBS pair — two genuinely different books that often diverge — agrees here. No measurement caveat undermines the picture; the only nuance is that the bank leg is allocated by branch deposits rather than confirmed at the property, but the CMBS leg, which is property-located, corroborates it.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
133 closures | 2.45 per 100k jobs | 1 of 392 | 126 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
439 notices | 0.33% | 1 of 386 | 60 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$14.28bn | 11.12% | 4 of 393 | 56 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
39 loan records | 3.71% | 4 of 335 | 79 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 5436274, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 6220251, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 128374.3, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 17542.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31080 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, and which cannot be read?
In Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, distress signals are elevated across both credit and real-economy metrics: bank-distressed CRE exposure is material at $14.28bn, with 21.6% of bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) and distressed bank assets of 12.60; CMBS special servicing is also elevated at $650.0mm, representing 3.7% of metro UPB; and ground-level signals are firing with 133 store closures and 439 WARN notices over one year. The signal convergence reading is 4. The reading for bank CRE allocation share is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $650.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 3.7%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $128.37bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 21.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $14.28bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $12.60bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 8.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 39
- Distressed banks
- 6
- Store closures (past year)
- 133
- WARN notices (past year)
- 439
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31080 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.0%
-0.8pp yr
Last 24 months
4.7%6.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 5,436,274 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 3.9% distressed where its own property mix predicts 7.3% — $591M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 8 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.4pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 188 loans, $7.0B, running 5.4% where the same type runs 11.9% elsewhere — worth 2.6pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$4.6B — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 3.8% now (2026-07), +0.8pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $5.6B of the metro's $17.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$4.6B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 57 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.97× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$4.7B
After Committed Draws
$2.7B / −42%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.97×
Banks In Footprint
57 / 27 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $3.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.9B
comes out of the room above, leaving $2.7B,
with 30 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.8B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 57
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
3% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 57 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Smbc Manubank CA | 100.0% | 155% total 182%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Farmers And Merchants Bank Of Long Beach CA | 96.5% | 255% total 299%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ctbc Bank Corp. (Usa) CA | 60.3% | 214% total 252%
|
🔒 | 2.90% |
| First General Bank CA | 100.0% | 206% total 272%
|
🔒 | 1.99% |
| New Omni Bank, National Association CA | 100.0% | 130% total 147%
|
🔒 | 9.43% |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 54.5% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Bank MO | 28.2% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 69.8% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Banc Of California CA | 61.4% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Usa, National Association NY | 19.2% | 154% total 183%
|
🔒 | 11.70% |
| Evertrust Bank CA | 67.8% | 211% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Open Bank CA | 92.3% | 255% total 458%
|
🔒 | 3.02% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 1.6% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Commonwealth Business Bank CA | 72.5% | 259% total 453%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Mission Valley Bank CA | 100.0% | 225% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Calprivate Bank CA | 42.5% | 252% total 431%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Israel Discount Bank Of New York NY | 7.2% | 250% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| American Continental Bank CA | 83.4% | 196% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Community Commerce Bank CA | 100.0% | 225% total 284%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Whittier, National Association CA | 86.9% | 107% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American First National Bank TX | 17.1% | 258% total 487%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 22.8% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| State Bank Of India (California) CA | 50.3% | 276% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| Gbc International Bank CA | 62.2% | 269% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| First Pacific Bank CA | 74.1% | 243% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Banner Bank WA | 2.0% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Mission Bank CA | 19.6% | 263% total 424%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Beneficial State Bank CA | 13.0% | 285% total 395%
|
🔒 | 3.44% |
| Balboa Thrift And Loan Association CA | 14.4% | 235% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Beach Cities Commercial Bank CA | 81.4% | 273% total 633%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Pacific Bank CA | 100.0% | 375% total 461%
|
🔒 | 2.60% |
| Universal Bank CA | 100.0% | 347% total 368%
|
🔒 | 3.91% |
| Eastern International Bank CA | 100.0% | 365% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Malaga Bank F.s.b. CA | 100.0% | 473% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pacific Alliance Bank CA | 100.0% | 407% total 443%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mega Bank CA | 100.0% | 372% total 450%
|
🔒 | 1.93% |
| American Plus Bank, N.a. CA | 100.0% | 455% total 483%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Partners Bank Of California CA | 100.0% | 365% total 548%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Genesis Bank CA | 98.3% | 442% total 532%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Oneunited Bank MA | 92.1% | 609% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Pcb Bank CA | 88.5% | 304% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Us Metro Bank CA | 87.8% | 393% total 560%
|
🔒 | 1.97% |
| Preferred Bank CA | 85.0% | 357% total 380%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
| Golden State Bank CA | 80.5% | 420% total 612%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| Sunwest Bank UT | 76.9% | 327% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Commercial Bank Of California CA | 75.1% | 470% total 592%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Liberty Bank, National Association CA | 54.8% | 480% total 519%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Habib American Bank NY | 35.4% | 526% total 599%
|
🔒 | 0.85% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 34.7% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| City First Bank, National Association DC | 29.3% | 378% total 438%
|
🔒 | 1.20% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 20.3% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| United Business Bank CA | 18.8% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 12.8% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 12.3% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 9.6% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 9.1% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| First Western Trust Bank CO | 0.0% | 312% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 42 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Citibank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · First American Trust, Fsb CA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · The Northern Trust Company IL · Capital Bank And Trust Company CA · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Irvine CA · Tib National Association TX · Icon Business Bank CA · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
City National Bank CA · East West Bank CA · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Cathay Bank CA · Midfirst Bank OK · Bank Of Hope CA · Royal Business Bank CA · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Woori America Bank NY · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Columbia Bank OR · Hanmi Bank CA · Wafd Bank WA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY · Valley National Bank NJ
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
American Business Bank CA · First Credit Bank CA · Commerce West Bank CA · Infinity Bank CA · California Business Bank CA · California International Bank, N.a. CA · Nano Banc CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nano Banc | $246M | 529% total 535%
|
34.74% | 🔒 |
| New Omni Bank, National Association | $211M | 130% total 147%
|
9.43% | 🔒 |
| First Credit Bank | $361M | 110% total 146%
|
3.21% | 🔒 |
| Banc Of California | $11.9B | 291% total 334%
|
4.24% | 🔒 |
| Universal Bank | $250M | 347% total 368%
|
3.91% | 🔒 |
| Open Bank | $1.4B | 255% total 458%
|
3.02% | 🔒 |
| Preferred Bank | $3.8B | 357% total 380%
|
2.33% | 🔒 |
| Us Metro Bank | $1.0B | 393% total 560%
|
1.97% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, the answer is borderline yes but only because the math hinges on committed draws. The market has a maturing CMBS balance of $4.59bn across 190 loans, and regional/community banks here show room_after_committed of $2.69bn (down from room_before_committed of $4.72bn, after subtracting $3.70bn in committed draws). That gives a wall_to_room of 1.71—above the median of 0.20 and ranking it 40 of 270 among the most strained metros—but the wall_to_room_before_committed_draws is 0.97, meaning local bank capacity nearly covers the wall if not for those prior commitments. The distressed_share is a modest 4.0%, though the CMBS UPB totals $17.18bn, and the 57 qualifying banks versus 23 excluded here aren't skewing the read. So, banks could absorb the maturing debt in theory, but with committed draws already eating into room, refinancing capacity is stretched—the wall exceeds remaining room by a wide margin.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $4.59bn
- … across this many loans
- 190
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $4.72bn
- Committed construction draws
- $3.70bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $2.69bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.71
- Rank, most strained
- 40
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.97
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 57
- … excluded from the calculation
- 23
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $17.18bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.71 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
40 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31080 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+1.1%
Same-Store Revenue
+1.9%
Occupancy
95.8%
Rent Growth
+1.6%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +1.5% | 96.0% | +1.6% | 2026-07-30 |
| CPT | +1.8% | +3.6% | 95.1% | +1.4% | 2026-04-30 |
| EQR | -1.0% | +0.7% | 95.7% | +0.7% | 2026-04-28 |
| ESS | — | +1.5% | 95.7% | — | 2026-07-30 |
| UDR | +2.5% | +2.0% | 96.3% | +2.7% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
403 local distress events in the past year (21,047 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
La Habra
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Azusa
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Azusa
2026-09-09
LAYOFF
21 jobs · Los Angeles
2026-09-09
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Marina Del Rey
2026-09-05
CLOSURE
Los Angeles
2026-09-03
CLOSURE
Los Angeles
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
117 jobs · Los Angeles
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
16 jobs · Los Angeles
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
52 jobs · Laguna Hills
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
153 jobs · Torrance
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
79 jobs · Orange
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
738 jobs · El Segundo
2026-08-27
LAYOFF
119 jobs · Los Angeles
2026-08-26
CLOSURE
Glendale
What has actually happened on the ground in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA recently?
In the past 365 days, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA has recorded 3 CRE bankruptcy filings, 20,759 jobs affected, 131 store closures, and 263 WARN notices. Note that the bankruptcy count is a state proxy, not a metro-native count, and the jobs figure is a floor since notices without a stated headcount contribute zero. Store closures and layoffs are matched by ZIP code, with only approved rows counted.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 131
- WARN layoff notices
- 263
- Jobs on those notices
- 20,759
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 31080 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.