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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · AR
The read
$325M of CMBS across 21 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($86M, 26% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 6 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$96M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 11
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
5
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
21 / $325M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.6%
-0.5pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR right now?
The Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR reading is mixed but not broadly distressed on the tenant side: store closures sit at 5 closures with a rate of 1.72 per 100k jobs — not elevated — while WARN layoff notices sit at 0 notices, also not elevated. The bank CRE leg is the only one reading hot, with $533.7mm at lenders over the noncurrent line for a rate of 2.67%, but that elevation is driven by metro size rather than per-unit stress (it ranks 59th by count but 226th by rate). Securitized loans in special servicing read 0 rows, not elevated. Of the six pairs, 3 are both quiet, 3 disagree, and none are both elevated. The disagreements all stem from the bank leg being hot with no visible tenant or employment cause, which the structure suggests could point to construction or rate resets rather than vacancy.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 1.72 per 100k jobs | 83 of 392 | 200 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$533.7mm | 2.67% | 59 of 393 | 226 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 289,883 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 385,232 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $19,972.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $326.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 30780 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR, and which cannot be read?
In Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR, the one elevated distress signal is bank_distressed_cre, with distressed lender CRE at $533.7mm and distressed bank assets at 0.9 (billion). The bank CRE at-risk reading is 30.3% (90th percentile), and bank CRE allocation is 7.8%, with total bank CRE at $19.97bn. The CMBS stress reading is unavailable: special servicing UPB is $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB), and the convergence signal is 1, but phase is "watch" with materiality "immaterial"—so the reading is present but not credit-material. No other signals (e.g., store closures or WARN notices) are stated as available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $19.97bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 30.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $533.7mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.90bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 5
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 30780 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.6%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 289,883 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (21) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$96M — 30% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $325M of the metro's $325M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$96M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 28 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.06× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.6B
After Committed Draws
$900M / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.06×
Banks In Footprint
28 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $832M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $737M
comes out of the room above, leaving $900M,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $95M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
7 of 28
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 28 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Security Bank AR | 41.0% | 169% total 189%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Arvest Bank AR | 10.1% | 213% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| First Arkansas Bank And Trust AR | 78.1% | 168% total 271%
|
🔒 | 2.03% |
| Peoples Bank AR | 100.0% | 127% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Eagle Bank And Trust Company AR | 40.0% | 109% total 147%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 30.0% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
| Central Bank AR | 88.3% | 246% total 416%
|
🔒 | 7.52% |
| Southern Bancorp Bank AR | 8.3% | 174% total 246%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| The Malvern National Bank AR | 37.6% | 192% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| First State Bank AR | 57.8% | 166% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Stone Bank AR | 25.1% | 176% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Community Bank AR | 14.3% | 257% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Bank Of Little Rock AR | 100.0% | 217% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| First National Bank AR | 10.0% | 241% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Relyance Bank AR | 19.1% | 259% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| The Citizens Bank AR | 19.5% | 255% total 365%
|
🔒 | 0.45% |
| First Financial Bank AR | 2.4% | 132% total 201%
|
🔒 | 4.49% |
| Merchants And Farmers Bank AR | 31.1% | 234% total 324%
|
🔒 | 3.78% |
| The Farmers & Merchants Bank AR | 3.9% | 257% total 304%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Armor Bank AR | 16.5% | 263% total 441%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 0.9% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Gateway Bank AR | 41.6% | 277% total 410%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 0.2% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Partners Bank AR | 9.6% | 288% total 361%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern Bank MO | 0.5% | 288% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| First Service Bank AR | 50.2% | 379% total 517%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Chambers Bank AR | 2.8% | 302% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Farmers Bank & Trust Company AR | 1.7% | 365% total 462%
|
🔒 | 1.13% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Regions Bank AL · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of England AR · The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fsnb, National Association OK · Producers Bank & Trust AR
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Bank | $414M | 246% total 416%
|
7.52% | 🔒 |
| First Service Bank | $462M | 379% total 517%
|
0.18% | 🔒 |
| First Arkansas Bank And Trust | $339M | 168% total 271%
|
2.03% | 🔒 |
| Bank Ozk | $18.1B | 260% total 272%
|
1.27% | 🔒 |
| Centennial Bank | $9.9B | 257% total 315%
|
0.46% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Little Rock | $57M | 217% total 261%
|
0.16% | 🔒 |
| Eagle Bank And Trust Company | $120M | 109% total 147%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
| Encore Bank | $1.5B | 291% total 403%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR looks comfortably slack on bank capacity: the CMBS wall maturing within 24 months is just $96.4mm across 5 maturing loans, against $899.6mm of room after committed draws at the 28 banks qualifying here, a wall_to_room of 0.11 — below the median of 0.24 and well below the 0.06 reading before committed draws would be even lower. With distressed_share at 0.0%, the reading ranks 198 of 275 counting from the most strained, so local banks appear to have ample capacity to refinance the visible maturity load; note only that the wall is $325.3mm in total CMBS UPB and this is CMBS debt alone, not the metro's whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $96.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 5
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.64bn
- Committed construction draws
- $831.9mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $899.6mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.11
- Rank, most strained
- 198
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.06
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 28
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $325.3mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.11 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
198 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 30780 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
6 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-01
CLOSURE
Little Rock
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
Little Rock
2026-05-24
CLOSURE
Benton
2026-01-07
CLOSURE
Little Rock
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
No Little Rock
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Little Rock
2025-03-29
CLOSURE
Little Rock
What has actually happened on the ground in Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, the vetted reading for Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR shows 5 store closures, 1 warn notices, 0 jobs affected, and 0 cre bankruptcies; note that the jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0, and the cre bankruptcies count is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 30780 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.