Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NV
The read
$6.3B of CMBS across 181 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($2.0B, 31% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($2.2B, 0.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.7% as of 2026-07. 11 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Las Vegas, the filed record stays quiet as the maturity wall sits in 2029
Las Vegas carries $6.3B of CMBS across 181 loans, and by the servicer's ledger it is one of the calmer books in the country. Distress stands at 0.7% as of July 2026 and has gone nowhere — flat in the filed record — against a median DSCR of 2.24. The tourism-anchored sectors that define this market are showing no strain on the page: retail, the metro's largest book at $2.2B, is 0.0% distressed versus a 2.7% national rate, and hospitality, also $2.2B, reads 0.0% against a national 6.1%. Where the rest of the country has bled, Las Vegas has not.
The softer spots are the smaller books. Office, at $0.8B, runs 3.5% distressed — elevated for this metro but a fraction of the 11.3% national office rate — and multifamily, at $0.3B, sits at 5.5% against 7.6% nationally. Neither carries the weight to move the headline number. The 11 on-the-ground store closures logged over the past year are the clearest sign of retail attrition, but they have yet to surface in the retail book's clean 0.0% distress mark.
The timing that matters here is refinancing, not delinquency. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 at $2.0B — 31% of the book — with $1.4B due within 24 months. Every one of the near-term maturity years reads 0.0% distressed today, so the question for desks is a rollover question, not a workout one. For now, the on-the-ground and filed records tell the same story: a book that has held.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$45M / 0.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.4B
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 10
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
11
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
181 / $6.3B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.4%
-0.5pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
214,742
+2.7% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV right now?
Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV shows a distinctly mixed distress picture across its four measured feeds. Of the six pairwise comparisons, 4 disagree while 1 pair shows both elevated and 1 pair both quiet. The most notable stress signal comes from bank CRE, with $2,493.8mm sitting over the noncurrent line, a rate of 17.92%, ranking 23rd of 393 metros by count and 21st by rate — the only leg elevated on both measures without a size caveat. Store closures are also elevated at 7 closures with a rate of 0.69 per 100k jobs, but this is size-driven: the metro ranks 58th by count yet 290th of 392 by rate, meaning the reading reflects Las Vegas's size rather than per-unit stress. The other two legs are quiet: layoff notices (WARN) show 0 notices with a 0.0% rate, and securitized loans in special servicing show only 3 rows at 0.71% of balance, ranking 52nd and 100th respectively. The disagreement pattern suggests lender stress with no employment event behind it (bank hot versus WARN quiet) and retail failing on buildings this tape does not hold (closures hot versus CMBS quiet), pointing toward localized distress concentrated in the banking channel rather than a broad-based pullback.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
7 closures | 0.69 per 100k jobs | 58 of 392 | 290 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.49bn | 17.92% | 23 of 393 | 21 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
3 loan records | 0.71% | 52 of 335 | 100 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1008580, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1167632, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 13916.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 6332.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 29820 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV, and which cannot be read?
In Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV, the elevated distress signals are bank_distressed_cre and closures, indicating a confirmed phase of "peak" distress where leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together. On the bank side, 20.0% of bank CRE allocation is distressed, with 1.4 billion in distressed bank assets and $2.49bn in distressed lender CRE; 1.7% of total bank CRE is at risk at the 90th percentile. On the ground, there were 7 store closures in the past year. The CMBS special servicing reading is muted, at $45.0mm in UPB ( 0.7% of metro UPB), with 3 loans in special servicing and 0 WARN notices, so the CMBS side is not elevated. The convergence score is 2, meaning both credit and ground-level distress are confirmed, though materiality is "modest" given tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure. The reading for CMBS special servicing distress and WARN notices is available but not elevated; there is no unavailable figure here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $45.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.7%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $13.92bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 1.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.49bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 20.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 3
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 29820 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.4%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
5.1%6.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,008,580 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $294M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
-6.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.6pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 12 loans, $2.2B, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.5% elsewhere — worth 2.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.4B — 22% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.7% now (2026-07), -0.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $5.1B of the metro's $6.3B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.4B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 9 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$98M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
14.06× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$98M
After Committed Draws
$79M / −19%
Maturing ÷ Room
14.06×
Banks In Footprint
9 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $75M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $18M
comes out of the room above, leaving $79M,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $56M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 9 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Genubank NV | 100.0% | 129% total 232%
|
🔒 | 1.18% |
| American First National Bank TX | 8.9% | 258% total 487%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Valley Bank Of Nevada NV | 100.0% | 267% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Nevada Bank And Trust Company NV | 13.1% | 102% total 152%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Open Bank CA | 2.0% | 255% total 458%
|
🔒 | 3.02% |
| Town & Country Bank NV | 100.0% | 405% total 474%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Gbank NV | 100.0% | 487% total 534%
|
🔒 | 4.75% |
| United Business Bank CA | 0.8% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb DE | 0.0% | 225% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
Not counted — 30 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Beal Bank Usa NV · Wells Fargo National Bank West NV · Toyota Financial Savings Bank NV · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Credit One Bank, National Association NV · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · The Northern Trust Company IL · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · First American Trust, Fsb CA · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Western Alliance Bank AZ · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · City National Bank CA · East West Bank CA · First Savings Bank SD · Midfirst Bank OK · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Royal Business Bank CA · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Cathay Bank CA · Wafd Bank WA · Columbia Bank OR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Axos Bank CA · First Security Bank Of Nevada NV · Lexicon Bank NV
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gbank | $1.0B | 487% total 534%
|
4.75% | 🔒 |
| Beal Bank Usa | $1.7B | 64% total 65%
|
1.23% | 🔒 |
| Genubank | $85M | 129% total 232%
|
1.18% | 🔒 |
| Lexicon Bank | $166M | 161% total 353%
|
0.84% | 🔒 |
| First Security Bank Of Nevada | $182M | 178% total 233%
|
0.73% | 🔒 |
| Toyota Financial Savings Bank | $1.0B | 53% total 53%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Town & Country Bank | $153M | 405% total 474%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Valley Bank Of Nevada | $113M | 267% total 425%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV, the maturing CRE wall of $1.37bn across 56 loans likely outstrips local bank capacity, with a wall-to-room ratio of 17.33 that ranks it 9 of 270 most strained metros. However, only 9 banks qualify for lending here versus 15 excluded, and the reading is "tight" — an artifact of exclusion rather than scarcity, as lenders whose deposits don’t indicate local activity are invisible in this metric. Room after committed draws is $79.1mm, suggesting capacity to refinance the wall is unavailable without broader market participation.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.37bn
- … across this many loans
- 56
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $97.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $74.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $79.1mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 17.33
- Rank, most strained
- 9
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 14.06
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 9
- … excluded from the calculation
- 15
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $6.30bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
17.33 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
9 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
{'fork': 'exclusion, not scarcity', 'note': "More banks are excluded here (15) than qualify (9). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce."}
True
Written from the figures above · CBSA 29820 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
11 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-18
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-18
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2026-03-12
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2025-05-31
CLOSURE
Las Vegas
2023-05-12
LAYOFF
79 jobs · Las Vegas
2023-01-30
LAYOFF
Las Vegas
2023-01-20
LAYOFF
Las Vegas
What has actually happened on the ground in Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV recently?
In the Las Vegas-Henderson-North Las Vegas, NV metro over the past 365 days, on-the-ground commercial real estate activity shows 7 store closures, with 0 commercial real estate bankruptcies and 0 WARN notices filed, affecting 0 jobs (noting that headcount figures may be understated where notices omit them). While the closure count is notable, the absence of bankruptcies and layoff filings suggests these are isolated tenant exits rather than systemic distress — though the bankruptcy figure is a state-level proxy, not a metro-native count, so metro-specific filing data is unavailable in this reading.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 29820 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.