Start free trial
No credit card required
Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Kansas City, MO-KS
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · KS, MO
The read
$1.3B of CMBS across 66 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($330M). Office is the largest book ($575M, 0.0% distressed). 39 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (942 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Kansas City's securitized book is clean on paper; the street-level ledger isn't
Kansas City carries $1.3 billion of CMBS spread across 66 loans, and on the servicer's own books there is nothing to flag — no sector in this metro is running any measured distress. Office, the largest exposure at $575 million, sits at 0.0% delinquent or in special servicing, a striking contrast to the 11.1% national office rate. Retail and multifamily, the next two books, are likewise clean. For a desk pricing risk off declared status, this is as benign a securitized profile as the market offers.
The maturity wall is deferred rather than looming. The heaviest refinancing load lands in 2029 at $330 million, with the balance staggered across 2027 through 2030 and none of it currently carrying distress. That pushes the metro's test well past the near-term window and gives the book runway that peers facing 2025-2026 clusters don't have.
The divergence shows up off the securitized page. The filed record counts 39 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — 28 store closures and 11 layoff notices totaling 942 jobs — the kind of local softening that doesn't register in a loan-status table but belongs in the read. Among 37 banks tracked here, one is flagged distressed and five sit on early warning. The CMBS numbers say quiet; the street-level ledger says watch.
Written 2026-10-25
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$376M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 37
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
28
Layoff Notices (1y)
11 / 942 jobs
0.10% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
66 / $1.3B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Kansas City, MO-KS right now?
Distress in Kansas City, MO-KS is showing up as a mixed picture across the six pairwise comparisons: 4 of 6 pairs disagree, while 1 pair is elevated on both sides and 1 is quiet on both sides. Store closures are elevated at 20 closures (rank 26th of 392 by count, 156th by rate at 2.13 closures per 100,000 jobs), and WARN layoff notices are also elevated at 13 notices (0.1% of employment). However, bank CRE over the noncurrent line is not elevated at $327.7 million (1.08% rate), and securitized loans in special servicing is also quiet at 2 rows (1.52%). The store-closures leg and WARN leg agree on hot, reflecting distress among smaller operators, but both disagree with the bank and CMBS legs – meaning tenants and employers are cutting back before any lender balance sheet reflects it. Only 1 pair (store closures vs. WARN) is elevated on both sides; 1 pair (bank vs. CMBS) is quiet on both; and the remaining 4 pairs are disagreements where the real-estate leg reads low while the operating legs read high. The overall signal points to stress at the tenant and employment level that has not yet transmitted to lender books, likely reflecting retail and small-business failures that the securitized tape and bank allocations have yet to capture.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
20 closures | 2.13 per 100k jobs | 26 of 392 | 156 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
13 notices | 0.1% | 48 of 386 | 168 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$327.7mm | 1.08% | 86 of 393 | 288 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 1.52% | 66 of 335 | 96 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 938,598 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,183,945 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $30,240.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,312.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.2%4.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 938,598 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$376M — 28% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $954M of the metro's $1.3B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$376M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 55 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.13× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.9B
After Committed Draws
$1.6B / −44%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.13×
Banks In Footprint
55 / 14 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.3B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.6B,
with 22 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $561M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
8 of 55
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
21 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 55 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North American Savings Bank, F.s.b. MO | 87.3% | 117% total 117%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Capitol Federal Savings Bank KS | 42.6% | 204% total 223%
|
🔒 | 2.03% |
| Nbkc Bank KS | 100.0% | 149% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 52.6% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Bank Of Odessa MO | 89.2% | 107% total 126%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Mutual Savings Association KS | 82.4% | 102% total 117%
|
🔒 | 2.65% |
| Bank Of Labor KS | 100.0% | 131% total 243%
|
🔒 | 4.98% |
| Arvest Bank AR | 3.7% | 213% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Landmark National Bank KS | 29.7% | 126% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| Intrust Bank, National Association KS | 8.3% | 189% total 251%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| First Option Bank KS | 85.7% | 215% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hnb National Bank MO | 25.3% | 176% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Equity Bank KS | 7.5% | 237% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| The First National Bank Of Louisburg KS | 100.0% | 123% total 143%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Community National Bank KS | 21.5% | 113% total 193%
|
🔒 | 1.43% |
| Union Bank And Trust Company NE | 4.2% | 235% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Fusion Bank KS | 52.1% | 143% total 150%
|
🔒 | 1.16% |
| Wood & Huston Bank MO | 7.8% | 105% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Nodaway Valley Bank MO | 10.3% | 190% total 246%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hawthorn Bank MO | 25.7% | 260% total 340%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| State Bank Of Missouri MO | 100.0% | 148% total 167%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Verimore Bank MO | 62.6% | 260% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Citizens Bank MO | 67.6% | 154% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Concordia Bank Of Concordia, Missouri MO | 80.9% | 184% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| F & C Bank MO | 20.7% | 173% total 221%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Mid-America Bank KS | 19.7% | 205% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 4.4% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Patriots Bank KS | 30.2% | 205% total 514%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Outdoor Bank KS | 32.0% | 266% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.70% |
| Tbo Bank MO | 100.0% | 279% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern Bank MO | 6.6% | 288% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| First Heritage Bank KS | 9.6% | 136% total 205%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First Security Bank KS | 15.6% | 157% total 235%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pinnacle Bank NE | 2.2% | 282% total 346%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central National Bank KS | 0.9% | 154% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Corefirst Bank & Trust KS | 6.2% | 274% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers State Bank MO | 2.1% | 120% total 166%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Silver Lake Bank KS | 1.7% | 187% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Weston MO | 100.0% | 298% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Omb Bank MO | 2.9% | 298% total 404%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Security Bank Of Kansas City KS | 100.0% | 310% total 351%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Blue Ridge Bank And Trust Co. MO | 100.0% | 316% total 435%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Bison State Bank KS | 86.7% | 391% total 398%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank And Trust KS | 75.3% | 321% total 376%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Kendall Bank KS | 74.0% | 304% total 564%
|
🔒 | 1.69% |
| Tricentury Bank KS | 67.8% | 352% total 460%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Connections Bank MO | 52.5% | 320% total 431%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank 21 MO | 40.9% | 335% total 376%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Great American Bank KS | 37.3% | 308% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Oakstar Bank MO | 12.6% | 315% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Core Bank NE | 5.6% | 375% total 446%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| First Business Bank WI | 4.4% | 340% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Fidelity Bank, National Association KS | 1.7% | 323% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Emprise Bank KS | 0.8% | 380% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| First Bank MO | 0.0% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
Not counted — 49 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Commerce Bank MO · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · First Federal Bank Of Kansas City MO · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Citizens Federal Savings Bank KS · Community Bank Of Raymore MO · Farmers Bank & Trust KS · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Exchange Bank & Trust KS · The Bank Of Grain Valley MO · Adrian Bank MO · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Goppert Financial Bank MO · Community First Bank MO · First Federal Savings And Loan Bank KS · Community Bank Of Pleasant Hill MO · The Hamilton Bank MO · Bank Northwest MO · Labette Bank KS · The Union State Bank Of Everest KS · Preferred Bank MO · The Citizens National Bank KS · Independent Farmers Bank MO · Community Bank Of Marshall MO · First State Bank Of St. Charles, Missouri MO · Btc Bank MO · State Street Bank And Trust Company MA · Carroll County Trust Company Of Carrollton, Missouri MO · Midwest Heritage Bank, Fsb IA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Umb Bank, National Association MO · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Bokf, National Association OK · Nbh Bank CO · The Central Trust Bank MO · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Busey Bank IL · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Great Southern Bank MO · Simmons Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Lead Bank MO · Pony Express Bank MO · Central Bank Of Kansas City MO · Bank Of Prairie Village KS · Cornerstone Bank KS
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Labor | $225M | 131% total 243%
|
4.98% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Odessa | $121M | 107% total 126%
|
2.28% | 🔒 |
| Kendall Bank | $115M | 304% total 564%
|
1.69% | 🔒 |
| First State Bank And Trust | $185M | 321% total 376%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Weston | $100M | 298% total 425%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
| Mutual Savings Association | $116M | 102% total 117%
|
2.65% | 🔒 |
| Lead Bank | $318M | 136% total 150%
|
2.49% | 🔒 |
| Academy Bank, National Association | $1.5B | 228% total 294%
|
1.11% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
39 local distress events in the past year (942 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-09
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-09-14
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-25
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-21
LAYOFF
Kearney
2026-08-20
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Kearney
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-10
LAYOFF
Overland Park
2026-08-02
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Belton
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Belton
2026-07-26
CLOSURE
Overland Park
2026-07-10
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-07-07
LAYOFF
Kansas City
What has actually happened on the ground in Kansas City, MO-KS recently?
Over the trailing 365 window_days, the vetted record for Kansas City, MO-KS shows 28 store_closures and 11 warn_notices, with 942 jobs_affected — a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcy activity reads 1 cre_bankruptcies, but that figure is a STATE PROXY drawn from the states where the metro's collateral sits rather than a metro-native count, so it should not be read as local filings.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 28
- WARN layoff notices
- 11
- Jobs on those notices
- 942
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.