Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Jacksonville, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$937M of CMBS across 47 loans. Retail is the largest book ($281M) but runs below its national distress rate (0.0% vs 2.7%); the elevated risk is in Office (21.4%, 1.9× national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 5.2% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($238M, 25% of the book). 29 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,065 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the risk in Jacksonville, and the filed record is turning up
Jacksonville's securitized book runs to $937M across 47 loans, and the pressure is concentrated by sector rather than spread across it. Retail is the largest book at $281M, yet it carries no filed distress at all — 0.0% against a 2.7% national retail rate. The elevated risk sits squarely in Office, where the distress rate is 21.4%, roughly 1.9 times the 11.3% national office figure. This is not a broad-based problem; it is an office problem inside an otherwise clean book.
The filed record is rising. Distress stands at 5.2% as of July 2026, an observation the trend line confirms is moving up rather than settling. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $238M — a quarter of the book — comes due, giving the metro a clear checkpoint on the calendar. Median DSCR of 1.92 across the book suggests cash flow coverage remains intact outside the distressed office slice.
On the ground, the past year brought 29 distress events — store closures and layoff notices totaling 1,065 jobs — with metro unemployment at 4.9% in July 2026, up 0.6 points year over year. The signal for CRE desks is narrow but real: watch the office exposure and the 2029 wall, not the retail or hospitality books, which so far show nothing filed.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$50M / 5.4%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$251M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
18
Layoff Notices (1y)
11 / 1,065 jobs
0.16% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
47 / $937M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
+0.6pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Jacksonville, FL, and which cannot be read?
In Jacksonville, FL, the elevated distress signals are concentrated in the real-economy and bank-lending channels. Bank-distressed CRE is reading at 8.3% (the 90th percentile) for bank_cre_at_risk_p90, with "distressed_lender_cre" at $553.6mm and "bank_alloc_exact_share" at 2.9% of $15.59bn in total bank CRE. Additionally, closures and WARN notices are elevated, with 17 store closures and 19 WARN notices over the past year. However, the CMBS special servicing reading is unavailable for a percentile context, though the raw "cmbs_special_servicing_upb" is $20.0mm (a 2.1% share of metro UPB) with only 2 loans in special servicing, and "distressed_bank_assets_bn" is 0. The convergence score is 3, and the phase is "early", with the materiality of distressed CRE dollars deemed "immaterial" — meaning the ground is wobbling via closures/layoffs, but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet. Specific percentile readings for CMBS special servicing or bank asset distress are not provided beyond the figures stated.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $20.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $15.59bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $553.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 17
- WARN notices (past year)
- 19
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27260 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
+0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.2%5.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 675,877 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.4% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.6% — $2M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
+0.2pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
+0.6pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Office: 10 loans, $193M, running 21.4% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 2.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$251M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 5.2% now (2026-07), +2.7pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $835M of the metro's $937M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$251M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 15 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$5.4B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.05× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$5.4B
After Committed Draws
$4.5B / −17%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.05×
Banks In Footprint
15 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.0B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $919M
comes out of the room above, leaving $4.5B,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $89M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 15
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
8 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 15 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everbank, National Association FL | 83.5% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 11.2% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 1.3% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 73.6% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 10.3% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| First Port City Bank GA | 36.1% | 190% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Primesouth Bank GA | 11.7% | 196% total 333%
|
🔒 | 1.74% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 2.5% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Southeastern Bank GA | 15.6% | 157% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 1.1% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Pineland Bank GA | 8.9% | 214% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| The Claxton Bank GA | 14.7% | 230% total 366%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Barwick Banking Company GA | 37.8% | 292% total 575%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Cypress Bank & Trust FL | 3.2% | 252% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 14.9% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
Not counted — 20 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Regions Bank AL · Td Bank, National Association DE · First Federal Bank FL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Bank Ozk AR · United Community Bank SC · Pinnacle Bank TN · Renasant Bank MS · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everbank, National Association | $8.0B | 169% total 175%
|
1.03% | 🔒 |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association | $244M | 228% total 318%
|
0.24% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-3.2%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.7%
Occupancy
94.7%
Rent Growth
-0.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -3.2% | -1.7% | 94.7% | -0.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
29 local distress events in the past year (1,065 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-07-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-06-26
CLOSURE
Neptune Beach
2026-06-26
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-06-26
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-06-24
LAYOFF
62 jobs · JACKSONVILLE
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
10 jobs · JACKSONVILLE
2026-06-11
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Jacksonville
2026-06-10
LAYOFF
68 jobs · JACKSONVILLE
2026-05-18
LAYOFF
100 jobs · JACKSONVILLE
What has actually happened on the ground in Jacksonville, FL recently?
In the past 365 days, Jacksonville, FL has recorded 4 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings (a state-proxy count, not metro-native), 17 store closures, and 11 WARN notices affecting 1,065 jobs (a floor, as notices without a stated headcount contribute 0). The reading for metro-level bankruptcies is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 17
- WARN layoff notices
- 11
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,065
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27260 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.