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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Jacksonville, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$941M of CMBS across 48 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 6.8% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($238M, 25% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($281M, 0.0% distressed). 32 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,065 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Jacksonville's Record Is Turning, and the Pressure Sits Beyond Retail
Jacksonville carries $941M of CMBS across 48 loans, and the filed distress rate has been rising — 6.8% as of July 2026. That is a modest book by national standards, but the direction in the servicer record is what commands attention here, even as the metro's median DSCR holds at 1.96.
The largest sector is retail at $281M, and it is clean: 0.0% distressed against a national retail rate of 2.6%. The pressure, such as it is, sits elsewhere in the book — office carries an 11.1% national rate and hospitality 6.2%, benchmarks against which Jacksonville's smaller exposures trade. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $238M comes due, a quarter of the entire book.
On the ground, the metro logged 32 distress events over the past year — 19 store closures and 13 layoff notices, touching 1,065 jobs — against a local unemployment rate of 4.8%, up 0.4 point year over year. For a book this size, that is a real-economy signal worth tracking alongside the servicer data.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$66M / 7.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$265M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
19
Layoff Notices (1y)
13 / 1,065 jobs
0.16% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
48 / $941M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.8%
+0.4pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Jacksonville, FL, and which cannot be read?
In Jacksonville, FL, the elevated distress signals are concentrated in the real-economy and bank-lending channels. Bank-distressed CRE is reading at 8.3% (the 90th percentile) for bank_cre_at_risk_p90, with "distressed_lender_cre" at $553.6mm and "bank_alloc_exact_share" at 2.9% of $15.59bn in total bank CRE. Additionally, closures and WARN notices are elevated, with 17 store closures and 19 WARN notices over the past year. However, the CMBS special servicing reading is unavailable for a percentile context, though the raw "cmbs_special_servicing_upb" is $20.0mm (a 2.1% share of metro UPB) with only 2 loans in special servicing, and "distressed_bank_assets_bn" is 0. The convergence score is 3, and the phase is "early", with the materiality of distressed CRE dollars deemed "immaterial" — meaning the ground is wobbling via closures/layoffs, but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet. Specific percentile readings for CMBS special servicing or bank asset distress are not provided beyond the figures stated.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $20.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $15.59bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $553.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 17
- WARN notices (past year)
- 19
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27260 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.8%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.2%5.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 675,877 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 7.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.6% — $13M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+1.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
+1.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+2.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 10 loans, $193M, where the same type runs 11.0% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$265M — 28% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 6.8% now (2026-07), +4.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $840M of the metro's $941M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$265M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 16 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$5.2B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.05× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$5.2B
After Committed Draws
$4.3B / −17%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.05×
Banks In Footprint
16 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $982M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $890M
comes out of the room above, leaving $4.3B,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $91M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 16
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
9 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 16 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everbank, National Association FL | 78.7% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 10.8% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 1.7% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 72.6% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 11.1% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| First Port City Bank GA | 39.0% | 190% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Primesouth Bank GA | 12.3% | 196% total 333%
|
🔒 | 1.74% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 2.3% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Southeastern Bank GA | 14.6% | 157% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 1.0% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| The Claxton Bank GA | 39.0% | 230% total 366%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Pineland Bank GA | 8.6% | 214% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Barwick Banking Company GA | 38.1% | 292% total 575%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Colony Bank GA | 2.8% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Cypress Bank & Trust FL | 2.7% | 252% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 14.5% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
Not counted — 20 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Td Bank, National Association DE · First Federal Bank FL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · First Horizon Bank TN · Bank Ozk AR · United Community Bank SC · Renasant Bank MS · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everbank, National Association | $8.0B | 169% total 175%
|
1.03% | 🔒 |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association | $244M | 228% total 318%
|
0.24% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Jacksonville, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Jacksonville's banks look well able to absorb the visible maturity load: the wall of maturing CMBS stands at $264.8mm across 15 maturing_loans, against $4.27bn of room_after_committed among the 16 banks_qualifying — a wall_to_room of 0.06, or 0.05 on a room_before_committed basis of $5.16bn — placing the metro at 224 of 275, counting from the most strained, and well below the 0.24 median ratio. Two caveats temper the read: the figure is an upper bound built on CMBS only (the platform cannot see the metro's whole maturity load), and the room proxy rests on deposit footprint, so the strained reading is unavailable if the metro's lending is concentrated in the 8 banks_excluded_here (explained_by_exclusion is false, so the exclusion does not appear to be driving the result here).
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $264.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 15
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $5.16bn
- Committed construction draws
- $981.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $4.27bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.06
- Rank, most strained
- 224
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.05
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 16
- … excluded from the calculation
- 8
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 7.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $941.0mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.06 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
224 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27260 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-3.2%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.7%
Occupancy
94.7%
Rent Growth
-0.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -3.2% | -1.7% | 94.7% | -0.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
32 local distress events in the past year (1,065 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
Jacksonville
2026-09-17
LAYOFF
Jacksonville
2026-09-08
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Jacksonville
What has actually happened on the ground in Jacksonville, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, Jacksonville, FL has seen 19 store closures and 13 warn notices, with 1,065 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the credit side, the reading is not metro-native: 53 is a state proxy counting CRE-likely bankruptcies across the states this metro's collateral sits in, not a Jacksonville-specific count, and counts before and after 2026-09-16 are not comparable because coverage widened to both court feeds on that date.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 19
- WARN layoff notices
- 13
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,065
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 53
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27260 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.