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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Jackson, MS
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MS
The read
$278M of CMBS across 16 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($202M, 73% of the book). Distress is rising in the filed record — 25.1% as of 2026-07. 5 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (86 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
$70M / 25.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$42M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 8
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 86 jobs
0.04% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
16 / $278M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.0%
-0.7pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Jackson, MS, and which cannot be read?
In Jackson, MS, the elevated distress signal is the CMBS special-servicing rate, with a share of metro UPB at 25.1% (special-servicing UPB of $70.0mm). Bank-level stress appears modest: bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) is 16.4% of $10.44bn in bank CRE, with distressed bank assets at 0.5 and distressed lender CRE at $237.5mm. However, the convergence reading is 1, indicating an isolated signal rather than broad distress. A clear read on store closures (3 in the past year), WARN notices (0), and the exact bank allocation share (9.1%) is available, but the phase sequence is no reading, so broader directional trends cannot be inferred from the given data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $70.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 25.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $10.44bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 16.4%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $237.5mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.50bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 7
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.0%
-0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%4.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 219,252 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (16) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$42M — 15% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 25.1% now (2026-07), +14.2pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $278M of the metro's $278M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$42M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 20 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.4B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.03× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.4B
After Committed Draws
$296M / −78%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.03×
Banks In Footprint
20 / 0 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.4B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.1B
comes out of the room above, leaving $296M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $375M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
13 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 20 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trustmark Bank MS | 43.0% | 237% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Bankplus MS | 46.3% | 235% total 371%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Community Bank Of Mississippi MS | 27.7% | 202% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Bank Of Yazoo City MS | 100.0% | 110% total 138%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Copiah Bank MS | 100.0% | 118% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Origin Bank LA | 6.4% | 227% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Story Bank Dba Story Financial Partners MS | 78.9% | 244% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| The Bank Of Forest MS | 82.3% | 152% total 219%
|
🔒 | 0.60% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 0.4% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Bankfirst Financial Services MS | 6.2% | 219% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| The Citizens National Bank Of Meridian MS | 13.3% | 248% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Peoples Bank MS | 81.6% | 278% total 320%
|
🔒 | 3.01% |
| Riverhills Bank MS | 6.2% | 110% total 201%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Priorityone Bank MS | 73.0% | 296% total 378%
|
🔒 | 1.98% |
| Southern Bancorp Bank AR | 0.5% | 174% total 246%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| The Citizens Bank Of Philadelphia, Mississippi MS | 5.1% | 278% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| First Bank MS | 1.5% | 184% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Guaranty Bank And Trust Company MS | 1.5% | 272% total 368%
|
🔒 | 1.05% |
| First State Bank MS | 0.3% | 178% total 263%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 0.0% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Regions Bank AL · The Huntington National Bank OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Merchants And Planters Bank MS · Bank Of Commerce MS · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fsnb, National Association OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peoples Bank | $200M | 278% total 320%
|
3.01% | 🔒 |
| Priorityone Bank | $533M | 296% total 378%
|
1.98% | 🔒 |
| Story Bank Dba Story Financial Partners | $416M | 244% total 366%
|
0.79% | 🔒 |
| Copiah Bank | $96M | 118% total 249%
|
0.24% | 🔒 |
| Trustmark Bank | $6.3B | 237% total 298%
|
0.17% | 🔒 |
| Community Bank Of Mississippi | $1.4B | 202% total 310%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Yazoo City | $54M | 110% total 138%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Jackson, MS have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Jackson, MS screens as slack on bank refinancing capacity: its wall_to_room of 0.14 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro, with 20 banks_qualifying behind a maturing_bal of $42.2mm across 6 maturing_loans against room_after_committed of $296.3mm (room_before_committed of $1.35bn, reduced by committed_draws of $1.43bn). Two caveats temper that read: the wall is CMBS-only, the maturing debt this platform can see rather than the metro's whole maturity load, and room is a deposit-footprint proxy for lending capacity, not a measurement of it. Note also that 3 banks_excluded_here sit outside the room calculation; the data flag this metro as not explained_by_exclusion, but readers should still weigh how much local lending may simply be invisible here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $42.2mm
- … across this many loans
- 6
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.35bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.43bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $296.3mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.14
- Rank, most strained
- 175
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.03
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 20
- … excluded from the calculation
- 3
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 25.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $278.0mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.14 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
175 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27140 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
5 local distress events in the past year (86 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
86 jobs · Jackson
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Jackson
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
Clinton
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Jackson
2025-11-30
CLOSURE
Ridgeland/Jackson
2025-04-29
LAYOFF
41 jobs · Jackson
2025-02-18
LAYOFF
35 jobs · Canton
2025-02-12
LAYOFF
65 jobs · Canton
2025-01-31
CLOSURE
Jackson
2024-10-17
LAYOFF
267 jobs · Canton
2024-09-03
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Clinton
2024-07-18
LAYOFF
59 jobs · Ridgeland
2024-01-31
CLOSURE
Jackson
2023-08-03
LAYOFF
436 jobs · Richland
2023-04-10
LAYOFF
20 jobs · Madison
What has actually happened on the ground in Jackson, MS recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, the vetted reading for Jackson, MS shows 4 store closures and 1 WARN notice, with 86 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies register at 0, though that figure is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 4
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 86
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 27140 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.