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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN
The read
$1.7B of CMBS across 93 loans. Multifamily is both the largest book ($583M) and the most distressed (14.8% vs 7.9% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($529M, 32% of the book). Distress is easing in the filed record — 14.3% as of 2026-07. 41 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,714 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Indianapolis, the stress is in the apartments, not the offices
Indianapolis carries $1.7 billion of CMBS across 93 loans, and the pressure point here is not the usual suspect. Multifamily is both the metro's largest book, at $583 million, and its most distressed, with 14.8% in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent against a 7.9% national rate for the sector. That is a meaningful gap, and it sits in the part of the book with the most money on the line. The overall CMBS distress rate stands at 14.2%, with roughly $0.2 billion marked distressed.
The filed record, for its part, is easing: distress reads 14.3% as of July 2026, with the trend falling and a median DSCR of 1.64. The heaviest maturity load is still some way off — $529 million, or 32% of the book, comes due in 2031, and that vintage currently shows no distress. The nearer years are lighter, with about $0.3 billion maturing inside 24 months.
On the ground, the metro logged 41 distress events over the past year — 22 store closures and 19 layoff notices totaling 2,714 jobs. The labor backdrop remains firm, with unemployment at 3.3% as of August 2026, down 0.3 points year over year. For credit desks, the read is clear: watch the apartment book, where the distress is concentrated, and keep the 2031 wall in view even as the near-term record softens.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$236M / 14.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$336M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 13
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
22
Layoff Notices (1y)
19 / 2,714 jobs
0.28% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
93 / $1.7B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.3pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN right now?
In Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN, CRE distress is broadly elevated across all four measured feeds. Store closures are elevated (8 closures; 0.83 per 100,000 jobs) and WARN layoff notices total 18 (0.23% of the metro’s employment). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line stands at $6,280.6mm (25.56% of allocated metro CRE), and securitized loans in special servicing hit 7 rows (12.23% of the trust’s slice). All six paired readings agree on elevation, with no disagreements or quiet pairs. Notably, the store-closure leg is elevated by size rather than by rate — the metro ranks 49th of 392 by count but 280th by rate, meaning its stress signal is driven by market scale, not per-unit intensity.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 0.83 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 280 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
18 notices | 0.23% | 39 of 386 | 104 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$6.28bn | 25.56% | 9 of 393 | 13 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
7 loan records | 12.23% | 24 of 335 | 41 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 958,916 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,129,157 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $24,576.1 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,644.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN, and which cannot be read?
In Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE (with distressed lender CRE at $6.28bn and bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reading of 11.5%), CMBS special servicing (special servicing UPB of $201.0mm, representing 12.2% of metro UPB), and real-economy signals closures and warn (8 store closures and 18 WARN notices in the last year). The overall convergence score is 4, with distressed bank assets at 20.3 (billion) and bank CRE allocation share at 43.2%. The metric is deemed material, with total bank CRE at $24.58bn. Regarding readings that cannot be obtained: the specific dollar amount of total metro CMBS UPB is not provided, and the count of CMBS loans in special servicing is available (7) but is not a dollar-based distress signal. No other absence is noted; all key indicators cited above are directly readable from the data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $201.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 12.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $24.58bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 11.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $6.28bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $20.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 43.2%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 7
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 8
- WARN notices (past year)
- 18
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.4%3.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 958,916 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.6% — $126M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+7.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+7.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+7.9pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 15 loans, $381M, where the same type runs 10.9% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$336M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 14.3% now (2026-07), -2.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.0B of the metro's $1.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$336M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 31 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$3.5B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.10× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$3.5B
After Committed Draws
$1.4B / −60%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.10×
Banks In Footprint
31 / 6 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $3.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2.1B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.4B,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.6B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 31
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 31 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Merchants Bank Of Indiana IN | 94.7% | 252% total 283%
|
🔒 | 2.96% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 28.1% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| The National Bank Of Indianapolis IN | 93.6% | 195% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Star Financial Bank IN | 39.3% | 139% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Greenfield Banking Company IN | 100.0% | 159% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 5.4% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| Home Bank Sb IN | 100.0% | 115% total 155%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| The North Salem State Bank IN | 85.0% | 146% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.45% |
| Lake City Bank IN | 10.9% | 209% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Citizens Bank IN | 100.0% | 202% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Horizon Bank IN | 13.1% | 235% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. IN | 17.4% | 224% total 284%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mutual Savings Bank IN | 100.0% | 171% total 293%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens State Bank Of New Castle, Indiana IN | 23.7% | 108% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Hendricks County Bank And Trust Company IN | 100.0% | 151% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Centier Bank IN | 7.4% | 265% total 318%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company KY | 4.6% | 248% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 3.2% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| State Bank IN | 95.9% | 281% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| The Peoples State Bank IN | 23.2% | 207% total 268%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Union Savings And Loan Association IN | 15.8% | 110% total 165%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 13.7% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| Jackson County Bank IN | 10.9% | 275% total 410%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Security Federal Savings Bank IN | 1.9% | 174% total 252%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 0.0% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| The Farmers Bank, Frankfort, Indiana IN | 43.9% | 310% total 450%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Community First Bank Of Indiana IN | 18.9% | 333% total 489%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| United Fidelity Bank, Fsb IN | 7.5% | 430% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Bank Richmond IN | 4.3% | 304% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.72% |
| American Bank Of Freedom MO | 2.3% | 381% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 1.4% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
Not counted — 17 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Keybank National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · The Home National Bank Of Thorntown IN · First National Bank IN · First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Greensburg IN · 1st Source Bank IN · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tri-County Bank & Trust Company | $116M | 148% total 411%
|
3.81% | 🔒 |
| Merchants Bank Of Indiana | $6.8B | 252% total 283%
|
2.96% | 🔒 |
| State Bank | $431M | 281% total 408%
|
0.18% | 🔒 |
| Hendricks County Bank And Trust Company | $74M | 151% total 306%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Home Bank Sb | $88M | 115% total 155%
|
1.09% | 🔒 |
| First National Bank | $68M | 80% total 154%
|
0.59% | 🔒 |
| First Internet Bank Of Indiana | $1.5B | 292% total 318%
|
0.48% | 🔒 |
| The North Salem State Bank | $245M | 146% total 309%
|
0.45% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN sits comfortably on the capacity question: with 31 banks qualifying and only 4 banks excluded here, the metro's maturing CMBS balance of $338.3mm across 26 maturing loans is small against $1.38bn of room after committed draws, giving a wall-to-room ratio of 0.24 — low given a distressed share of 14.2% and a light relative burden. The wall is CMBS-only, so this is an upper bound on what local banks would need to absorb, and the ratio is level with the median of 0.24, ranking 133 of 275 from the most strained; refinancing capacity looks adequate barring a heavy concentration of the $1.66bn CMBS UPB maturing in the same window.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $338.3mm
- … across this many loans
- 26
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $3.48bn
- Committed construction draws
- $3.74bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.38bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.24
- Rank, most strained
- 133
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.10
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 31
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.66bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.24 is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.24, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro
133 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26900 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
41 local distress events in the past year (2,714 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Indianapolis
2026-10-26
CLOSURE
Brownsburg
2026-10-21
CLOSURE
Bargersville
2026-10-20
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-10-02
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-10-01
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Indianapolis
2026-08-26
LAYOFF
90 jobs · Indianapolis
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
Indianapolis
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
Indianapolis
What has actually happened on the ground in Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground reading for Indianapolis-Carmel-Greenwood, IN shows 21 store closures, 19 warn notices, and 2,714 jobs affected — the latter a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. The 17 cre bankruptcies figure is a state proxy, not a metro-native count: a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, and coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 21
- WARN layoff notices
- 19
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,714
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 17
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26900 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.