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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$7.6B of CMBS across 345 loans. Multifamily is both the largest book ($2.3B) and the most distressed (18.3% vs 7.9% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($2.0B, 26% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 8.2% as of 2026-07. 55 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,162 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Houston, the Trouble Is in the Apartments, Not the Office Towers
Houston carries $7.6 billion of CMBS across 345 loans, and the distress here runs against the national grain. Multifamily is the largest book at $2.3 billion and also the most distressed, with 18.3% of it in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent — more than double the 7.9% national rate for the sector. Office, so often the epicenter elsewhere, is the inverse story: at a $2.0 billion book, its 6.5% distress rate sits well below the 11.1% national mark. Retail at $1.9 billion, mixed-use and industrial round out a book where the pressure is concentrated squarely in the apartment column.
The maturity wall is back-loaded. The heaviest single year is 2031, when $2.0 billion — 26% of the book — comes due, though that cohort carries a comparatively light 4.2% distress rate. The nearer vintages are tighter: $1.6 billion matures in 2029 at 10.1% distressed, $1.3 billion in 2030 at 11.7%, and $1.0 billion in 2028 at 11.8%. Just $1.4 billion comes due inside the next 24 months, giving the metro some runway.
In the filed record, distress has held flat at 8.2% as of July 2026, with a median DSCR of 1.66. The on-the-ground tally tells a quieter version of the same story: 55 distress events over the past year — 32 store closures and 23 layoff notices totaling 3,162 jobs. Among the 30 banks tracked here, two are flagged distressed and 11 sit on early-warning watch. Unemployment stands at 5.0% as of August 2026, up a tenth of a point on the year.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$564M / 7.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.4B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 30
Bank Early-Warning
11 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
32
Layoff Notices (1y)
23 / 3,162 jobs
0.11% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
345 / $7.6B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.0%
+0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX right now?
Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX is showing broad-based commercial real estate distress, with all four gauges elevated: store closures at 29 closures (16th of 392 metros by count, though this is elevated by size rather than rate at 1.03 per 100k jobs and ranked 265th by rate), WARN layoff notices at 36 notices (23rd of 386, at 0.11% of employment, ranked 162nd by rate), bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $3,349.9mm (19th of 393, at a 5.77% noncurrent share, ranked 132nd by rate), and securitized loans in special servicing at 24 rows (6th of 335, at an 8.23% special-servicing share, ranked 56th by rate). All six pairwise comparisons read as in agreement on elevated distress with no disagreements and no unreadable legs. The warning signal is partly size-driven—the metro's high counts reflect its large scale rather than per-unit stress—but the rate ranks still place it in the top half on all metrics, and the consistent agreement across the property-level tenant, employment, bank, and CMBS feeds points to genuine, multi-mechanism stress rather than a single isolated weakness.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
29 closures | 1.03 per 100k jobs | 16 of 392 | 265 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
36 notices | 0.11% | 23 of 386 | 162 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$3.35bn | 5.77% | 19 of 393 | 132 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
24 loan records | 8.23% | 6 of 335 | 56 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 2,818,612 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 3,716,242 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $58,068.4 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $7,699.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26420 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX, and which cannot be read?
Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX is showing elevated distress across both credit and real-economy signals. On the banking side, bank distressed CRE exposure is elevated at 10.3% (90th percentile) with 2 distressed banks holding 0.6 billion in distressed bank assets and $3.35bn in distressed lender CRE. CMBS special servicing is also elevated at $634.0mm in UPB, representing 8.2% of metro UPB, with 24 loans in special servicing. Ground-level distress is confirmed by 29 store closures and 36 WARN notices over the past year. Notably, the bank CRE allocation share is 7.3% and total bank CRE is $58.07bn. The reading for convergence is 4, indicating strong alignment across signals. There is no figure provided for a metric like a peak or phase-specific distress level beyond what is stated; that reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $634.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 8.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $58.07bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 10.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $3.35bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.60bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.3%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 24
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 29
- WARN notices (past year)
- 36
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26420 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.0%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
4.0%5.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,818,612 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 7.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.4% — $83M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+1.1pp
… and loan size held fixed
+1.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+2.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 107 loans, $2.3B, running 18.3% where the same type runs 7.2% elsewhere — worth 3.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.4B — 18% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 8.2% now (2026-07), +0.9pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $4.6B of the metro's $7.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.4B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 58 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$6.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$6.9B
After Committed Draws
$3.7B / −46%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.20×
Banks In Footprint
58 / 12 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $4.4B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $3.1B
comes out of the room above, leaving $3.7B,
with 26 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.3B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
16 of 58
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
23 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 58 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frost Bank TX | 19.0% | 123% total 208%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 18.4% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Texas Capital Bank TX | 11.1% | 105% total 130%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Stellar Bank TX | 65.8% | 246% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Third Coast Bank TX | 70.5% | 236% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| First Financial Bank TX | 7.8% | 107% total 167%
|
🔒 | 1.05% |
| Cornerstone Capital Bank, Ssb TX | 40.8% | 147% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| International Bank Of Commerce TX | 12.7% | 215% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.90% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 3.3% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Origin Bank LA | 19.4% | 227% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Liberty Bank TX | 98.9% | 171% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Central Bank TX | 100.0% | 221% total 306%
|
🔒 | 1.22% |
| Texas First Bank TX | 91.3% | 247% total 385%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Plains State Bank TX | 77.2% | 207% total 351%
|
🔒 | 5.27% |
| American First National Bank TX | 48.1% | 258% total 487%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Texas Gulf Bank, National Association TX | 100.0% | 222% total 344%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 15.1% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Austin County State Bank TX | 87.5% | 152% total 263%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Austin Bank, Texas National Association TX | 7.8% | 135% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| The Moody National Bank TX | 93.0% | 278% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.18% |
| Trustmark Bank MS | 3.7% | 237% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| B1bank LA | 7.3% | 241% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Home Bank, National Association LA | 10.5% | 208% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| City Bank TX | 11.3% | 239% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 6.4% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Susser Bank TX | 20.4% | 243% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Southtrust Bank, N.a. TX | 26.1% | 145% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Verabank, National Association TX | 4.1% | 166% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| Capital Bank TX | 100.0% | 267% total 550%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hometown Bank, National Association TX | 100.0% | 281% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| T Bank, National Association TX | 11.6% | 142% total 394%
|
🔒 | 4.42% |
| Investar Bank, National Association LA | 4.5% | 204% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Peoples State Bank TX | 84.4% | 201% total 245%
|
🔒 | 2.46% |
| The First State Bank TX | 13.0% | 173% total 265%
|
🔒 | 5.25% |
| Southstar Bank, S.s.b. TX | 5.7% | 155% total 214%
|
🔒 | 1.19% |
| Citizens State Bank TX | 37.5% | 268% total 326%
|
🔒 | 4.98% |
| Southside Bank TX | 4.6% | 289% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Benchmark Bank TX | 4.2% | 254% total 308%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Yoakum Bank TX | 6.7% | 193% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Valuebank Texas TX | 7.8% | 231% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bom Bank LA | 1.4% | 222% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.93% |
| Grand Bank OK | 7.4% | 289% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Texas Regional Bank TX | 3.4% | 295% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| First Community Bank TX | 1.6% | 265% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Promiseone Bank GA | 3.2% | 284% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
| Newfirst National Bank TX | 45.8% | 300% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Lone Star Bank TX | 88.7% | 310% total 509%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 76.9% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 52.1% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 49.6% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Global One Bank TX | 33.5% | 302% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| One World Bank TX | 23.6% | 380% total 566%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank Of Texas TX | 20.2% | 309% total 493%
|
🔒 | 3.81% |
| Vantage Bank Texas TX | 9.3% | 314% total 424%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| State Bank Of Texas TX | 8.7% | 484% total 484%
|
🔒 | 2.18% |
| Citizens Bank TX | 4.8% | 485% total 660%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Bank Of The Orient CA | 3.6% | 378% total 580%
|
🔒 | 2.35% |
| Preferred Bank CA | 1.9% | 357% total 380%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
Not counted — 46 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank South Central, National Association TX · The Huntington National Bank OH · Capital One, National Association VA · Truist Bank NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Monet Bank TX · The Northern Trust Company IL · First State Bank TX · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Unity National Bank Of Houston TX · Anahuac National Bank TX · Texas Advantage Community Bank, National Association TX · Commerce Bank MO · First State Bank Of Livingston TX · U.s. Bank National Association OH · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Bokf, National Association OK · Woodforest National Bank TX · East West Bank CA · First Horizon Bank TN · Midfirst Bank OK · Bank Ozk AR · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Glacier Bank MT · Metro City Bank GA · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Simmons Bank AR · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Citizens State Bank TX · Gulf Capital Bank TX · Agility Bank, National Association TX · First National Bank Of Lake Jackson TX · Integrity Bank Ssb TX · The Mint National Bank TX · Texas Traditions Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plains State Bank | $490M | 207% total 351%
|
5.27% | 🔒 |
| Golden Bank, National Association | $1.7B | 327% total 505%
|
2.27% | 🔒 |
| The Mint National Bank | $265M | 267% total 373%
|
2.08% | 🔒 |
| Wallis Bank | $924M | 419% total 676%
|
1.67% | 🔒 |
| First State Bank | $148M | 72% total 302%
|
1.04% | 🔒 |
| Unity National Bank Of Houston | $64M | 71% total 214%
|
0.83% | 🔒 |
| Third Coast Bank | $2.5B | 236% total 309%
|
0.43% | 🔒 |
| American First National Bank | $2.1B | 258% total 487%
|
0.40% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX, the maturing CMBS balance of $1.35bn across 77 maturing loans compares against room of $6.87bn before committed draws and $3.73bn after, giving a wall-to-room ratio of 0.36 (or 0.20 before committed draws). That reads as slack, with a rank of 106 of 275 counting from the most strained, though the ratio is above the median metro; the figures rest on 58 qualifying banks, with 22 excluded here, so the reading reflects the proxy for local bank lending footprint rather than a measured whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.35bn
- … across this many loans
- 77
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $6.87bn
- Committed construction draws
- $4.44bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $3.73bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.36
- Rank, most strained
- 106
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.20
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 58
- … excluded from the calculation
- 22
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 7.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $7.56bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.36 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
106 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26420 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+1.4%
Same-Store Revenue
+0.7%
Occupancy
95.3%
Rent Growth
0.0%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | 0.0% | +0.5% | 95.1% | -0.5% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | +2.9% | +0.9% | 95.6% | +0.6% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
55 local distress events in the past year (3,162 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Houston
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-11
CLOSURE
Houston
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
Houston
2026-10-08
CLOSURE
Houston
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-02
CLOSURE
Houston
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Houston
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Houston
What has actually happened on the ground in Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands, TX metro recorded 32 store closures and 23 WARN notices, with 3,162 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount count toward the total but contribute zero jobs. The CRE bankruptcy reading of 101 is not a metro-native count: it is a state proxy covering CRE-likely filings in the states where this metro's collateral sits, counted once per case even where both court feeds carry it, and because coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 32
- WARN layoff notices
- 23
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,162
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 101
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 26420 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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