Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CT
The read
$638M of CMBS across 28 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 9.5% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($233M, 36% of the book). 19 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (920 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Hartford's Distress Ticks Up as a 2028 Maturity Wall Comes Into View
Hartford carries $638M of CMBS across 28 loans, and the filed record is turning the wrong way: distress stood at 9.5% as of July 2026 and has been rising. That is a modest book by national standards, but the concentration is what commands attention. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028, when $233M — some 36% of the metro's book — comes due. The years around it carry their own marks: the 2029 slice shows a 6.7% distress rate and the 2031 tranche 10.3%, though the 2028 wall itself sits clean on the page for now. Median DSCR across the metro is 1.44, leaving some cushion beneath the coming refinancings.
The pressure is corroborated on the ground. Hartford logged 19 distress events over the past year — 12 store closures and 7 layoff notices — accounting for 920 jobs. The labor backdrop is soft: unemployment reached 5.8% in July 2026, up 1.4 points year over year, and office-using employment, at 127,000 jobs, fell 4.7% over the same stretch. For desks watching the metro, the read is a slow climb in the servicer record set against a shrinking office-using base and a maturity book front-loaded into 2028.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$63M / 9.8%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$12M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
12
Layoff Notices (1y)
7 / 920 jobs
0.18% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
28 / $638M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.8%
+1.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
127,000
-4.7% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT right now?
For Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT, distress readings are broadly elevated across all four legs. The store closures leg clears a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of its own rate ranking, so any reading that leans on it is a statement about how big this metro is, not about stress per unit of itself. The layoff notices (WARN) leg reads 0.16% of the metro's employment on notices, while bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line sits at 4.84% of the CRE lent into this metro — a reading to treat with caution, as only 3.0% of these dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation, while the rest is split by branch deposits that the call report cannot confirm. Securitized loans in special servicing read 9.6% of the securitized balance read here. All six pairwise comparisons agree as elevated, with no disagreements and no blind legs, so the reading is a coherent one across property-level, employer-level, and lender-level feeds — worth noting that the tape, holding the building, and the WARN counts, holding the jobs, share no population at all, which is why their agreement is worth more than agreement between any other pair here.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
7 closures | 1.39 per 100k jobs | 58 of 392 | 224 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
8 notices | 0.16% | 67 of 386 | 137 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$450.0mm | 4.84% | 70 of 393 | 150 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
5 loan records | 9.6% | 34 of 335 | 50 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 505269, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 569323, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 9305.4, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 656.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 25540 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT, and which cannot be read?
In Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT, elevated distress signals include bank-distressed CRE, with distressed lender CRE at $450.0mm and bank CRE at risk (90th percentile) at 1.5%; CMBS special servicing, with special servicing UPB at $63.0mm and a 9.6% share of metro UPB; and real-economy signals from store closures (7 in the past year) and WARN notices (8 in the past year). The distressed bank assets reading is 0, so bank asset distress is unavailable as a meaningful signal, while the bank CRE allocation (3.0%) and total bank CRE ($9.31bn) are provided but do not indicate elevation on their own.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $63.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 9.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $9.31bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 1.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $450.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 3.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 5
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 8
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 25540 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.8%
+1.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%5.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 505,269 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 9.8% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $28M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+4.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
+4.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+4.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 4 loans, $112M, running 36.4% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 4.4pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$12M — 2% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 9.5% now (2026-07), +3.1pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $555M of the metro's $638M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$12M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 13 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$971M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.01× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$971M
After Committed Draws
$292M / −70%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.01×
Banks In Footprint
13 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $734M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $679M
comes out of the room above, leaving $292M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $55M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 13 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberty Bank CT | 66.3% | 256% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 8.5% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Essex Bank CT | 85.3% | 125% total 206%
|
🔒 | 1.41% |
| Windsor Federal Bank CT | 100.0% | 214% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.92% |
| Connecticut Community Bank, National Association CT | 30.6% | 127% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northwest Community Bank CT | 36.1% | 238% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Peoplesbank MA | 13.6% | 274% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Ion Bank CT | 6.2% | 243% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Thomaston Savings Bank CT | 10.9% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Dime Bank CT | 7.5% | 246% total 313%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Ascend Bank CT | 9.6% | 256% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Westfield Bank MA | 13.2% | 315% total 375%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Union Savings Bank CT | 1.9% | 336% total 381%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Stafford Savings Bank CT · Keybank National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Nbt Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Atlantic Community Bankers Bank PA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT ranks 234 of 270, counting from the most strained, with a distressed share of 9.5%. The maturing CMBS balance is $11.6mm, against which local banks have $292.1mm of room after committed draws, yielding a wall-to-room ratio of 0.04—well below the median ratio of 0.20 and signaling clear slack. With only 1 maturing loan and a wall-to-room before committed draws of 0.01, capacity is ample; the metro's environment is slack, as the band indicates, though the reading of 4 banks excluded here versus 13 qualifying suggests potential measurement artifacts are minimal (explained_by_exclusion is false).
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $11.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 1
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $970.9mm
- Committed construction draws
- $733.9mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $292.1mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.04
- Rank, most strained
- 234
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.01
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 13
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 9.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $660.8mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.04 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
234 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 25540 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
19 local distress events in the past year (920 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Clinton
2026-08-25
CLOSURE
Bloomfield
2026-08-19
CLOSURE
Bolton
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
Clinton
2026-06-19
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Windsor Locks
2026-05-21
LAYOFF
205 jobs · New Britain
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
South Windsor
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Westbrook
2026-03-03
LAYOFF
300 jobs · New Britain
2026-02-17
LAYOFF
101 jobs · Hartford
2026-01-12
LAYOFF
57 jobs · South Windsor
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Southington
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Clinton
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Enfield
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Manchester
What has actually happened on the ground in Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT recently?
In the Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT metro, tracked distress signals over the past 365 days show 0 CRE bankruptcy filings, 7 WARN notices affecting 920 jobs, and 9 store closures. Keep in mind the jobs figure is a floor, as notices without a stated headcount contribute 0 to the count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 9
- WARN layoff notices
- 7
- Jobs on those notices
- 920
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 25540 · geo_events · last changed 30 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.