Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · SC
The read
$430M of CMBS across 30 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($107M). Retail is the largest book ($113M, 0.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 2.8% as of 2026-07. 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,901 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail carries the book clean as Greenville's distress record holds flat
Greenville-Anderson-Greer carries $430 million of CMBS across 30 loans, and the filed distress record is holding steady — 2.8% as of July 2026, flat with a median DSCR of 1.79 across the book. Retail is the largest sector here at $113 million, and it is carrying nothing distressed: 0.0%, against a national retail rate of 2.7%. That is the story on the page — a metro whose biggest exposure is clean and whose servicer-declared distress has not moved.
The maturity wall is manageable and back-loaded. The heaviest single year lands in 2029 at $107 million, with the rest spread across 2028, 2030 and 2032 — and none of those buckets shows distress today. For desks watching refinancing risk, the concentration is worth flagging qualitatively, but nothing in the filed record marks it as a problem yet.
The softer signal is on the ground rather than in the loan tape: 10 distress events over the past year — one store closure and nine layoff notices — touching 2,901 jobs. Local unemployment sits at 3.7%, down 0.7 point year over year, and office-using employment is essentially steady. It is a divergence worth holding in view: the servicer record is quiet, but the on-the-ground print is not silent.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$12M / 2.8%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$115M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 7
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
1
Layoff Notices (1y)
9 / 2,901 jobs
0.78% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
30 / $430M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.7pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
83,606
-0.3% yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC, and which cannot be read?
In Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC, the elevated distress signal is the WARN-notice count of 9 notices in the past year, pointing to real-economy deterioration (closures/layoffs) rather than CRE-credit stress yet. However, the CRE-credit side cannot be read: the securitized dollar figure is a "FLOOR" because it is measured over "50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows" (the rest carry no balance), and the phase is "obscured" — meaning the securitized side is invisible here, not quiet. Other readings: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 46.9% with 12.4% of bank assets allocated to CRE ($7.57bn), distressed lender CRE is $285.6mm, CMBS special-servicing UPB is $12.0mm (2.8% of metro UPB), and distressed bank assets are 0. The convergence signal is 1, and materiality is "immaterial".
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $12.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.8%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $7.57bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 46.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $285.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 12.4%
- Signals reading elevated
- WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 1
- WARN notices (past year)
- 9
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 2 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 24860 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%5.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 370,039 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 2.8% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $11M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.7pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-1.2pp
most of the gap goes away once vintage is held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Industrial: 3 loans, $51M, running 23.4% where the same type runs 2.6% elsewhere — worth 2.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$115M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 2.8% now (2026-07), -0.8pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $300M of the metro's $430M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$115M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 15 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$617M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.19× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$617M
After Committed Draws
$341M / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.19×
Banks In Footprint
15 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $351M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $275M
comes out of the room above, leaving $341M,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $76M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 15
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 15 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Travelers Rest SC | 100.0% | 139% total 288%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 48.6% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| The Peoples Bank SC | 78.6% | 178% total 252%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 3.3% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| First Bank NC | 5.9% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Arthur State Bank SC | 17.9% | 175% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 1.0% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 3.1% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| First Reliance Bank SC | 9.8% | 206% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Coastal Carolina National Bank SC | 9.9% | 266% total 364%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 0.3% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 4.3% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Southern Bank SC | 24.9% | 339% total 508%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| First Community Bank SC | 13.0% | 316% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 0.1% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
Not counted — 23 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Td Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Cbl State Savings Bank SC · The Commercial Bank SC · Regions Bank AL · Countybank SC · Pickens Savings And Loan Association, Fa SC · Oconee Federal Savings And Loan Association SC · Blue Ridge Bank SC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
United Community Bank SC · Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Encore Bank AR · United Bank VA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Community Bank | $10.0B | 216% total 357%
|
0.32% | 🔒 |
| Southern First Bank | $1.8B | 236% total 397%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Travelers Rest | $514M | 139% total 288%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
| The Peoples Bank | $156M | 178% total 252%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+2.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+0.8%
Occupancy
95.4%
Rent Growth
+1.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +2.5% | +0.8% | 95.4% | +1.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (2,901 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-22
LAYOFF
10 jobs · Anderson
2026-08-21
LAYOFF
14 jobs · Anderson
2026-08-07
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Anderson
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-18
LAYOFF
1255 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-18
LAYOFF
1245 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-17
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Anderson
2026-05-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-10
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Pickens
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Anderson
2025-10-30
LAYOFF
114 jobs · Greenville
2025-08-31
LAYOFF
108 jobs · Greenville
2025-06-15
LAYOFF
60 jobs · Greenville
2025-06-01
LAYOFF
113 jobs · Greenville
2024-10-31
CLOSURE
Laurens
What has actually happened on the ground in Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC recently?
Over the last 365 days, on-the-ground distress in the Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC metro has been modest but measurable: the reading shows 1 CRE bankruptcy, 1 store closure, and 9 WARN notices affecting 2,901 jobs, though the exact headcount is a floor since notices without a stated figure contribute zero jobs. Note the bankruptcy count is a state-proxy figure, not metro-native, so localized stress may be understated; a metro-specific closure or layoff breakdown beyond these approved, ZIP-matched rows is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 1
- WARN layoff notices
- 9
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,901
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 24860 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.