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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · SC
The read
$426M of CMBS across 29 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($102M). Retail is the largest book ($113M, 0.0% distressed). 16 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,169 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Greenville's securitized book is quiet; the pink slips aren't
Greenville-Anderson-Greer carries $426M of CMBS across 29 loans, and on paper the credit picture is calm. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, with $102M coming due that year, leaving the nearest refinancing test well out on the calendar rather than crowding the next 24 months. Across the sector detail the page shows, nothing is flagged in special servicing or 60-plus days late.
Retail is the metro's largest book at $113M, and it is carrying 0.0% distress — a clean mark against a national retail rate of 2.6%. That is the headline contrast here: the dominant asset class in Greenville is clearing where much of the country's retail is not. The seven banks tracked in the metro show no distressed credits and nothing in early-warning status.
The tension sits off the securitized ledger. The filed record shows 16 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — four store closures and 12 layoff notices — totaling 3,169 jobs. That runs against a labor backdrop that otherwise reads firm, with unemployment at 3.9% as of August 2026, down half a point year over year, and office-using employment at 83,606, off just 0.3%. For now the stress is in the WARN filings, not the loan tape.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$119M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 7
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
12 / 3,169 jobs
0.86% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
29 / $426M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.5pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
83,606
-0.3% yr
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%5.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 370,039 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$119M — 28% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $296M of the metro's $426M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$119M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 16 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$608M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$608M
After Committed Draws
$334M / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.20×
Banks In Footprint
16 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $355M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $273M
comes out of the room above, leaving $334M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $81M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 16
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
11 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 16 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Travelers Rest SC | 100.0% | 139% total 288%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 43.0% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| The Peoples Bank SC | 80.2% | 178% total 252%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 2.7% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| First Bank NC | 6.2% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Arthur State Bank SC | 19.8% | 175% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 3.9% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| First Reliance Bank SC | 9.9% | 206% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Townebank VA | 0.8% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 0.8% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Coastal Carolina National Bank SC | 9.0% | 266% total 364%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 5.6% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 0.4% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Southern Bank SC | 19.8% | 339% total 508%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| First Community Bank SC | 11.8% | 316% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 0.2% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
Not counted — 24 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Cbl State Savings Bank SC · The Commercial Bank SC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Regions Bank AL · Countybank SC · Pickens Savings And Loan Association, Fa SC · Oconee Federal Savings And Loan Association SC · Blue Ridge Bank SC · The Huntington National Bank OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
United Community Bank SC · Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA · Encore Bank AR
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Community Bank | $10.0B | 216% total 357%
|
0.32% | 🔒 |
| Southern First Bank | $1.8B | 236% total 397%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Travelers Rest | $514M | 139% total 288%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
| The Peoples Bank | $156M | 178% total 252%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+2.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+0.8%
Occupancy
95.4%
Rent Growth
+1.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +2.5% | +0.8% | 95.4% | +1.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
16 local distress events in the past year (3,169 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-14
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 68 jobs · Greenville
2026-12-22
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 10 jobs · Anderson
2026-09-19
CLOSURE
Greenville
2026-09-19
LAYOFF
Greenville
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Greenville
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Greenville
2026-09-03
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Greer
2026-08-21
LAYOFF
14 jobs · Anderson
2026-08-07
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Anderson
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-18
LAYOFF
1255 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-18
LAYOFF
1245 jobs · Anderson
2026-07-17
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Anderson
2026-05-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-10
LAYOFF
74 jobs · Pickens
What has actually happened on the ground in Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Greenville-Anderson-Greer, SC metro recorded 12 WARN notices and 4 store closures, with 3,169 jobs affected across those notices — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute nothing to the jobs tally. On the credit side, the only available reading is a state-proxy count of 1 CRE-likely bankruptcy filing across the states where this metro's collateral sits; it is not a metro-native count, so it should not be read as activity located in Greenville proper.
Note: the CRE bankruptcy figure is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count, and the jobs figure is a lower bound — both caveats are worth flagging to anyone using these numbers.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 4
- WARN layoff notices
- 12
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,169
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 24860 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.