Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MI
The read
$5.7B of CMBS across 272 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.5B, 27% of the book). Office is the largest book ($1.4B, 3.3% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 2.4% as of 2026-07. 66 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (4,104 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office anchors Detroit's book, and the record is holding steady
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn carries $5.7 billion of CMBS across 272 loans, and office is the biggest slice of it at $1.4 billion. That book is running at a 3.3% distress rate — a fraction of the 11.3% office is posting nationally, a striking gap for a market whose downtown has long been shorthand for office pain. Across the metro, the filed record sits at 2.4% as of July 2026 and has gone flat, with a median DSCR of 1.82.
The maturity calendar is front-loaded on a single year: $1.5 billion, 27% of the book, comes due in 2029, and none of that paper is distressed today. The nearer 2028 wall of $1.1 billion carries a 3.5% distress rate, and multifamily is the softest sector on the page at 6.9% against a 7.6% national mark. Retail ($1.2 billion) and industrial ($0.9 billion) show no distress in the filed data at all.
The on-the-ground signal is more active than the loan tape. The past year brought 37 store closures and 24 layoff notices totaling 3,547 jobs, and among the metro's eight tracked banks one is distressed and one carries an early-warning flag. Unemployment stands at 6.0% as of July 2026, up 0.4 points year over year — a real-economy read worth watching against a servicer record that, for now, is not moving.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$142M / 2.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.5B
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 8
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
40
Layoff Notices (1y)
26 / 4,104 jobs
0.24% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
272 / $5.7B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
6.0%
+0.4pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI right now?
In Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI, all four tracked distress signals are elevated. Store closures sit at 39 (2.25 per 100k jobs), layoff notices at 24 (0.17% of employment), bank CRE over the noncurrent line at $9,953.2mm (33.59% of allocated CRE), and securitized loans in special servicing at 11 (2.19% of balance). All six pairwise comparisons agree on elevated readings—none disagree, none are blind—so the signal here is unanimous, not mixed. The strength is concentrated in the bank leg, which ranks 7th of 393 metros by both count and rate, while the store-closure rate rank (146th of 392) is far quieter than its count rank (11th), indicating size-driven volume rather than proportional stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
39 closures | 2.25 per 100k jobs | 11 of 392 | 146 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
24 notices | 0.17% | 27 of 386 | 130 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$9.95bn | 33.59% | 7 of 393 | 7 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
11 loan records | 2.19% | 16 of 335 | 91 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1730208, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2085666, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 29632.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 5661.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19820 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI, and which cannot be read?
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI, is in a confirmed peak distress phase, with principal signals elevated on both the realized credit side and the leading real-economy side. On the credit front, distressed lender CRE exposure is $9.95bn (a 90th-percentile reading, with bank CRE at risk at 5.8% and a bank allocation share of 5.6%), while CMBS special servicing UPB is $124.0mm, equal to a 2.2% share of metro UPB. Ground-level signals are also firing: 24 WARN notices and 39 store closures in the past year, supported by 1 distressed bank and 11 CMBS loans in special servicing. However, the overall materiality is "modest", given only 0.3 (billion) in distressed bank assets; a bank CRE dollar value is not provided, so that absolute reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $124.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 2.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $29.63bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 5.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $9.95bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 5.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 11
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 39
- WARN notices (past year)
- 24
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19820 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
6.0%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
4.0%6.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,730,208 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 2.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.8% — $187M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 51 loans, $1.4B, running 3.3% where the same type runs 11.4% elsewhere — worth 2.0pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.5B — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 2.4% now (2026-07), -0.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $2.7B of the metro's $5.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.5B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 17 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.1B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.36× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.1B
After Committed Draws
$659M / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.36×
Banks In Footprint
17 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $530M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $407M
comes out of the room above, leaving $659M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $122M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
3% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 17 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Merchants Bank IN | 7.8% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Oxford Bank MI | 96.4% | 136% total 341%
|
🔒 | 2.79% |
| Bank Of Ann Arbor MI | 41.3% | 212% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Independent Bank MI | 19.3% | 174% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.65% |
| First State Bank MI | 100.0% | 205% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Choiceone Bank MI | 44.9% | 257% total 393%
|
🔒 | 0.80% |
| Tri-County Bank MI | 47.3% | 154% total 400%
|
🔒 | 1.82% |
| Superior National Bank MI | 14.9% | 130% total 195%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Grasshopper Bank, N.a. NY | 26.9% | 216% total 302%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Waterford Bank, N.a. OH | 17.7% | 248% total 398%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Mercantile Bank MI | 2.4% | 222% total 311%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Horizon Bank IN | 1.7% | 235% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| The Farmers & Merchants State Bank OH | 2.1% | 231% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens State Bank MI | 83.4% | 291% total 591%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northstar Bank MI | 43.1% | 298% total 548%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| First Community Bank MI | 3.3% | 268% total 520%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Huron Valley State Bank MI | 100.0% | 304% total 587%
|
🔒 | 2.10% |
Not counted — 19 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · The Huntington National Bank OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Dearborn Federal Savings Bank MI · First Independence Bank MI · The Northern Trust Company IL · Eastern Michigan Bank MI · Keybank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Cibc Bank Usa IL · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Old National Bank IN · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Community Unity Bank MI · Mi Bank MI
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Independence Bank | $122M | 87% total 130%
|
2.50% | 🔒 |
| Oxford Bank | $407M | 136% total 341%
|
2.79% | 🔒 |
| Huron Valley State Bank | $187M | 304% total 587%
|
2.10% | 🔒 |
| First State Bank | $474M | 205% total 352%
|
0.15% | 🔒 |
| Citizens State Bank | $290M | 291% total 591%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Mi Bank | $108M | 269% total 432%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Community Unity Bank | $52M | 230% total 247%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI shows a tight capacity reading: its maturing CMBS wall of $1.49bn against bank room after committed draws of $659.5mm yields a wall-to-room ratio of 2.26, placing it 28 of 270 among metros ranked from most strained — above the median of 0.20 and indicating more strain than typical. Before committed draws, the room of $1.10bn lowers the ratio to 1.36, but even then the wall exceeds local bank capacity. Room is a proxy based on deposit footprints, not a measurement; the wall is CMBS-only within 24 months, so the ratio is an upper bound on what local banks would absorb. The distressed share is 2.5%, with 82 maturing loans, and 17 banks qualify here versus 6 excluded — the high ratio is not explained by exclusion, so strain reflects genuine local capacity limits rather than invisible lending by nationals or card banks. Thus, banks in this metro lack the room to refinance the full maturing CMBS load, even before accounting for committed construction draws.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.49bn
- … across this many loans
- 82
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.10bn
- Committed construction draws
- $529.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $659.5mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.26
- Rank, most strained
- 28
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.36
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 17
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 2.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $5.64bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
2.26 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
28 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19820 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
66 local distress events in the past year (4,104 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-08
LAYOFF
Livonia
2026-09-08
LAYOFF
557 jobs · Livonia
2026-08-28
CLOSURE
Taylor
2026-08-20
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-08-19
CLOSURE
Royal Oak
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-07-28
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-07-24
CLOSURE
Farmington
2026-07-20
CLOSURE
Imlay City
2026-07-17
CLOSURE
Detroit
2026-05-30
LAYOFF
32 jobs · Livonia
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Novi
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Howell
What has actually happened on the ground in Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI recently?
In the Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI metro over the past 365 days, on-the-ground distress has been pronounced: 3 CRE-bankruptcy filings (state-proxy basis, not metro-native), 24 WARN notices affecting 3,547 jobs (a floor, as notices without headcounts count but add 0), and 40 approved store closures.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 40
- WARN layoff notices
- 24
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,547
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19820 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.