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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$378M of CMBS across 27 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($225M, 59% of the book). Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $119M. Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 5 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Book, With the Weight Stacked in 2030
Deltona-Daytona Beach carries $378M of CMBS across 27 loans, and as of the July 2026 filed record not a dollar of it is distressed. The distress rate sits at 0.0% and has held flat. Retail is the largest exposure at $119M, and it too reads clean — against a national retail distress rate of 2.6%, this metro's retail book shows 0.0%. Median DSCR across the book stands at 1.97, leaving a comfortable cushion on debt service.
The story in this market is timing, not trouble. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030, when $225M — 59% of the book — comes due, with smaller tranches scattered into 2031, 2028 and 2035. For now every maturity year prints a 0.0% distress rate, so the question for the desk is concentration rather than current performance: more than half the metro's CMBS converges on a single refinancing window.
Beneath the filed record, the on-the-ground signal is quieter but not silent — 5 store closures over the past year, with no layoff notices logged. The labor backdrop is soft, unemployment at 5.3% as of August 2026, up 0.4 points year over year, while office-using employment of 30,070 jobs was essentially unchanged at 0.1%. Across the three banks tracked here, none are flagged distressed or on early warning. A clean book today, with the real test circled on the calendar.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$26M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
5
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
27 / $378M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.3%
+0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
30,070
+0.1% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL right now?
In Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL, distress is visible but narrowly concentrated: store closures come in as elevated (rank 70 of 392 by count, 82 by rate, at 3.13 closures per 100,000 jobs), while every other leg reads quiet — WARN notices sit at 6 notices (0.09% of employment), bank CRE noncurrents hold at $236.8mm (8.88% of the allocated base), and securitized special servicing stands at 0 rows. Of the six metro pairs, zero show both sides elevated, three agree quiet, and three disagree — all three centered on closures being hot against a quiet counterpart. That split points to a mom-and-pop retail failure story below the WARN filing floor, not a broad-based credit event: lenders and the CMBS tape show no stress yet, while the leasing front door is already turning over.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 3.13 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 82 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
6 notices | 0.09% | 84 of 386 | 174 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$236.8mm | 8.88% | 106 of 393 | 80 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 191,600 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 306,618 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $2,668.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $421.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19660 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL, and which cannot be read?
In Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL, the elevated distress signal is closures, with 6 store closures and 6 WARN notices recorded over the past year — a "real-economy signal" that the ground is wobbling but not yet a CRE-credit event. On the CRE-credit side, readings are largely muted or unavailable: bank CRE at risk in the 90th percentile is 27.6%, but distressed bank assets sit at $0.0bn and distressed lender CRE is $236.8mm (with a bank CRE allocation of 13.1% and total bank CRE of $2.67bn). The CMBS special-servicing UPB reads $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB), and the convergence score is 1, indicating no material distress yet — the phase is "early," ahead of the record. The 90th-percentile measure is available, but specific CMBS loan count in special servicing is unavailable (0 loans), and no additional figures beyond these are provided.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $2.67bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 27.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $236.8mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 13.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 6
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19660 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.3%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.7%5.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 191,600 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.2% — $16M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 5 loans, $132M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.3% elsewhere — worth 2.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$26M — 7% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $278M of the metro's $378M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$26M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 8 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$83M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.31× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$83M
After Committed Draws
$30M / −64%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.31×
Banks In Footprint
8 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $167M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $53M
comes out of the room above, leaving $30M,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $114M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 8 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 2.0% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 1.5% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Axiom Bank, National Association FL | 16.4% | 171% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 2.3% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Mainstreet Community Bank Of Florida FL | 64.3% | 292% total 529%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| Barwick Banking Company GA | 28.6% | 292% total 575%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Intracoastal Bank FL | 100.0% | 301% total 550%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sunrise Bank FL | 9.6% | 387% total 582%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Trustco Bank NY
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Surety Bank FL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mainstreet Community Bank Of Florida | $479M | 292% total 529%
|
1.94% | 🔒 |
| Surety Bank | $80M | 121% total 267%
|
0.27% | 🔒 |
| Intracoastal Bank | $343M | 301% total 550%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
On the figures provided, the local-bank capacity picture in Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach is not tight: the maturity wall it must absorb is small, with maturing_loans of 2 and a maturing_bal of $25.5mm against room_after_committed of $29.9mm, giving a wall_to_room of 0.86 (and 0.31 on the wall_to_room_before_committed_draws basis, against room_before_committed of $83.3mm). That said, only banks_qualifying of 8 banks are counted here while banks_excluded_here of 3 are excluded, so the room is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement, and the wall itself is the cmbs_upb maturing within 24 months — $378.1mm in total, of which the maturing balance is the visible slice — not the metro's whole maturity load. The reading is therefore one of capacity slack on the visible CMBS maturities, with distressed_share at 0.0%; any broader conclusion about all maturing CRE would require data not available here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $25.5mm
- … across this many loans
- 2
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $83.3mm
- Committed construction draws
- $167.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $29.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.86
- Rank, most strained
- 61
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.31
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 8
- … excluded from the calculation
- 3
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $378.1mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.86 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
61 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19660 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
5 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-02
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-03-24
CLOSURE
Ormond Beach
2026-03-24
CLOSURE
Daytona Beach
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
Deltona
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
DeLand
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Daytona Beach
2025-09-17
LAYOFF
272 jobs · FLAGLER BEACH
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Port Orange
What has actually happened on the ground in Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL metro recorded 5 store closures, 0 warn notices, and 0 jobs affected, alongside 53 cre bankruptcies — though that last figure is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, since a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is. Note that jobs affected is a floor, as affected_employees is nullable and notices stating no headcount contribute 0 jobs.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 53
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19660 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.