Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OH
The read
$651M of CMBS across 31 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($312M, 48% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 5.7% as of 2026-07. 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (617 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Dayton, the Distress Sits Quiet While 2029 Fills Up
Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek carries $651M of CMBS across 31 loans, and the filed distress record is holding still: 5.7% as of July 2026, unchanged and comfortably below the strain seen in the largest metros. Median DSCR across the book sits at 1.65, and the local labor picture offers no immediate pressure — unemployment of 3.5% in July 2026, down 1.5 points on the year, with office-using employment flat at 60,934 jobs. This is a book that, by the servicer's own ledger, is not throwing off signals today.
The concentration to watch is in the calendar. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $312M — 48% of the entire book — comes due. That vintage already carries an 11.9% distress rate in the filed record, well above the metro-wide 5.7%, while the smaller tranches maturing in 2028, 2030 and 2034 read clean at zero. The exposure here is bunched, not spread, and it is bunched into a single year.
Beneath the securitized numbers, the on-the-ground record has more texture: 10 distress events over the past year — four store closures and six layoff notices — accounting for 617 jobs. That is the ground-level counterpoint to a distress rate that has otherwise stayed flat, and the record worth tracking as the 2029 wall moves closer.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$37M / 5.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$82M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
6 / 617 jobs
0.20% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
31 / $651M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
-1.5pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
60,934
0.0% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH right now?
In Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH, all four distress signals are quiet, with no elevated readings across store closures, WARN layoff notices, bank CRE noncurrent loans, or securitized loans in special servicing. All 6 of 6 two-leg pairings agree on quiet conditions, and none disagree. The closures leg shows 3 store closures over 311808 metro jobs, a rate of 0.96 per 100k jobs (ranked 128th of 392 by count, 270th by rate); WARN shows 6 notices over 384610 employed, a rate of 0.16% (ranked 84th of 386 by count, 137th by rate); bank CRE reads $0.0mm over $4134.1mm in allocated bank CRE, a 0.0% rate (ranked 358th of 393 both ways); and CMBS shows 4 rows in special servicing over $648.0mm balance, a 5.09% rate measured over 25.0% of rows, making it a floor reading (ranked 42nd of 335 by count, 70th by rate). The CMBS figure is unavailable as a full measure given it is a floor, but the overall picture is uniformly quiet distress across this metro.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
3 closures | 0.96 per 100k jobs | 128 of 392 | 270 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
6 notices | 0.16% | 84 of 386 | 137 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$0 | 0% | 358 of 393 | 358 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | 5.09% | 42 of 335 | 70 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
6 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 311808, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 384610, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 4134.1, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 648.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19430 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH, and which cannot be read?
In Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH, the elevated distress signal is isolated to CMBS special servicing, where the special-servicing UPB is $33.0mm, representing 5.1% of the metro's UPB. Bank-side signals appear contained: bank CRE allocations sit at 16.0% and the 90th-percentile at-risk share is 6.0%, with $0.0mm in distressed lender CRE and 0 in distressed bank assets. No convergence is recorded (0), and the phase is "watch" — an isolated, not credit-material signal. The following readings are unavailable: there is no stated figure for bank CRE at the dollar level (only the $4.13bn total), and the metro's overall distress convergence score is 0, meaning no aggregate signal can be read from that metric. Additionally, the count of CMBS loans in special servicing is 4, but the dollar figure is a floor since other rows carry no balance.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $33.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 5.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $4.13bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 6.0%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 16.0%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 6
an isolated signal, not a convergence
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 25.0% of this metro's 4 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19430 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
-1.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%5.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 311,808 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.1% — $4M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+0.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+1.7pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
+0.6pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 2 loans, $46M, running 69.9% where the same type runs 5.9% elsewhere — worth 4.6pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$82M — 13% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 5.7% now (2026-07), -0.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $481M of the metro's $651M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$82M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 11 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$400M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$400M
After Committed Draws
$247M / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.20×
Banks In Footprint
11 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $161M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $153M
comes out of the room above, leaving $247M,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $8M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 11 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Financial Bank OH | 4.7% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 15.2% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 5.0% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| The Old Fort Banking Company OH | 20.5% | 150% total 234%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank OH | 90.8% | 240% total 432%
|
🔒 | 1.56% |
| Minster Bank OH | 13.2% | 169% total 269%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Civista Bank OH | 3.5% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Greenville Federal OH | 17.4% | 131% total 189%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| 1st National Bank OH | 0.6% | 133% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Lcnb National Bank OH | 9.5% | 386% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| First Bank Richmond IN | 8.2% | 304% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.72% |
Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · Keybank National Association OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Monroe Federal Savings And Loan Association OH · Greenville National Bank OH · The Twin Valley Bank OH · Somerville Bank OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers & Merchants Bank | $189M | 240% total 432%
|
1.56% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH, the banks lending there have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE, with the reading in slack territory: a wall of $81.6mm across 9 maturing loans against room after committed draws of $247.2mm yields a wall-to-room ratio of 0.33, which is above the median of 0.20, ranking 104 of 270 metros from the most strained.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $81.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 9
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $400.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $160.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $247.2mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.33
- Rank, most strained
- 104
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.20
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 11
- … excluded from the calculation
- 2
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $651.3mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.33 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
104 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19430 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (617 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-22
CLOSURE
Kettering
2026-06-16
LAYOFF
190 jobs · Dayton/Montgomery
2026-06-01
LAYOFF
190 jobs · Dayton/Montgomery
2026-03-25
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Trotwood/Montgomery
2026-02-24
LAYOFF
66 jobs · Tipp City/Miami
2026-02-09
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Beavercreek/Greene
2026-01-12
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Dayton/Greene
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Dayton
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Fairborn
2025-12-13
CLOSURE
Piqua
2025-06-30
CLOSURE
Beavercreek
2025-05-31
CLOSURE
Dayton
2025-03-31
CLOSURE
Beavercreek
2025-02-02
CLOSURE
Moraine
2022-04-11
LAYOFF
597 jobs · Kettering/Montgomery
What has actually happened on the ground in Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH recently?
In the Dayton-Kettering-Beavercreek, OH metro over the past 365 days, ground-level distress signals are relatively limited. The reading shows 0 CRE-related bankruptcies (though note this figure uses a state proxy, not a metro-native count), while 6 WARN notices were filed, affecting 617 jobs. On the retail front, 3 store closures have been confirmed. These figures reflect only approved, ZIP-matched events, so the actual total could be slightly higher if pending or unclassified notices are included; the jobs-affected count is also a floor since some notices report no headcount.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 6
- Jobs on those notices
- 617
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19430 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.