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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$6.0B of CMBS across 267 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 5.5% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.7B, 28% of the book). Office is the largest book ($1.7B, 8.4% distressed). 99 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (7,469 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the weight as Dallas's filed distress record turns up
Dallas-Fort Worth's $6.0 billion CMBS book, spread across 267 loans, is showing distress at 5.5% in the filed record as of July 2026 — a reading that has been rising. Office is both the largest sector and the sorest spot: at $1.7 billion it anchors the book, and 8.4% of it sits in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. That rate runs below the 11.1% national office mark, a point of relative resilience, but it is still the metro's heaviest concentration of trouble by a wide margin. Retail, at $1.6 billion, and the $0.8 billion each in hospitality and multifamily round out the exposure.
The refinancing calendar is backloaded. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $1.7 billion — 28% of the book — comes due, and that vintage is already carrying a 4.9% distress rate. Nearer-term walls are lighter: $0.8 billion matures in 2027, and the 2030 and 2031 stacks each show no distress on the filed record so far. Median DSCR across the book stands at 1.79.
The on-the-ground signal adds texture the loan tapes don't capture. The metro logged 99 distress events over the past year — 50 store closures and 49 layoff notices — totaling 7,469 jobs. Unemployment sits at 4.4% as of August 2026, up 0.1 point year over year. Among the 51 banks tracked here, 6 read as distressed and another 12 carry early-warning flags.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$341M / 5.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.1B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
6 / 51
Bank Early-Warning
12 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
50
Layoff Notices (1y)
49 / 7,469 jobs
0.21% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
267 / $6.0B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.4%
+0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX right now?
Based on the vetted figures, Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX is showing clear, broad-based commercial real estate distress. All four of the metro's legs are elevated, and on the 6 pairs of comparisons, all 6 show both sides elevated (pairs_both_elevated: 6), with 0 pairs both quiet and 0 pairs disagreeing. This means every one of the six pairs is in agreement that distress is present, indicating the pressure isn't isolated to one asset class or mechanism—it's showing up in store closures, layoff notices, bank CRE noncurrents, and securitized loans in special servicing alike. Notably, the store closures leg is elevated by size, not by rate: with 54 closures it ranks 8th of 392 by count but only 211th by rate (1.52 per 100k jobs), so that particular signal is a statement about how big this metro is rather than stress per unit of itself. The other three legs—WARN notices (55 notices, 0.18% of employment), bank CRE noncurrents ($4,562.2mm, 5.97%), and CMBS special servicing (18 rows, 4.03%)—are all elevated without that size caveat, and the readings on the bank and CMBS legs are qualified as allocated and a floor, respectively. Taken together, the picture is one of coordinated distress across the lender, the employer, the tenant, and the securitized tape—a level of consensus across all four independent feeds that points to a genuine stress event in the metro.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
54 closures | 1.52 per 100k jobs | 8 of 392 | 211 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
55 notices | 0.18% | 15 of 386 | 126 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$4.56bn | 5.97% | 13 of 393 | 125 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
18 loan records | 4.03% | 10 of 335 | 77 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 3,542,282 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 4,359,978 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $76,480.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $6,029.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19100 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX, and which cannot be read?
In Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX, the elevated distress signals span both credit and real-economy measures: bank distressed CRE exposure (21.6% of bank CRE), CMBS special servicing (4.0% of metro UPB, or $243.0mm), store closures, and WARN notices. The bank CRE at risk is measured at the 90th percentile (18.8%), with distressed bank assets at 15.6 and distressed lender CRE at $4.56bn. The reading for the 90th-percentile measure is available. However, the overall “convergence” figure is 4, but no specific signal is unavailable—all elevated signals are readable, though the total count of distressed banks (7) and CMBS loans in special servicing (18) are provided without a separate metric.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $243.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $76.48bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 18.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $4.56bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $15.60bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 21.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 18
- Distressed banks
- 7
- Store closures (past year)
- 54
- WARN notices (past year)
- 55
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 55.6% of this metro's 18 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19100 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.4%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 3,542,282 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.3% — $37M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 39 loans, $797M, where the same type runs 7.7% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.1B — 19% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 5.5% now (2026-07), +1.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $2.7B of the metro's $6.0B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.1B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 104 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$11.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.10× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$11.7B
After Committed Draws
$7.5B / −36%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.10×
Banks In Footprint
104 / 31 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $6.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $4.2B
comes out of the room above, leaving $7.5B,
with 51 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $2.5B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
31 of 104
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
39 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 104 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texas Capital Bank TX | 53.2% | 105% total 130%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Frost Bank TX | 25.3% | 123% total 208%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 18.6% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| First Financial Bank TX | 23.3% | 107% total 167%
|
🔒 | 1.05% |
| The American National Bank Of Texas TX | 96.4% | 251% total 375%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 43.3% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Citizens National Bank Of Texas TX | 94.0% | 215% total 416%
|
🔒 | 2.19% |
| Pegasus Bank TX | 100.0% | 179% total 218%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Origin Bank LA | 21.7% | 227% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| T Bank, National Association TX | 88.4% | 142% total 394%
|
🔒 | 4.42% |
| Texasbank TX | 63.3% | 223% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Pointbank TX | 100.0% | 171% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Grandview Bank TX | 98.3% | 178% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Texas Bank, National Association TX | 100.0% | 235% total 235%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Susser Bank TX | 58.9% | 243% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Maplemark Bank OK | 89.6% | 222% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Lakeside Bank TX | 100.0% | 153% total 212%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 17.7% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 1.7% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Bank Of The West TX | 91.1% | 221% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Homebank Texas TX | 100.0% | 181% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| First State Bank TX | 23.2% | 170% total 298%
|
🔒 | 1.44% |
| B1bank LA | 9.5% | 241% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 16.1% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| Benchmark Bank TX | 81.1% | 254% total 308%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sanger Bank TX | 73.0% | 104% total 163%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Investar Bank, National Association LA | 12.1% | 204% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Texas Security Bank TX | 100.0% | 265% total 424%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Alliance Bank TX | 44.7% | 228% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Legend Bank, N.a. TX | 28.6% | 176% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Texas Bank And Trust Company TX | 26.1% | 270% total 348%
|
🔒 | 0.60% |
| Third Coast Bank TX | 9.2% | 236% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| First National Bank And Trust Company Of Weatherford TX | 49.7% | 215% total 326%
|
🔒 | 5.97% |
| City Bank TX | 10.6% | 239% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| American First National Bank TX | 21.6% | 258% total 487%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 0.6% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Commercial Bank Of Texas, National Association TX | 13.8% | 174% total 297%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| The Community Bank TX | 100.0% | 158% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Nbt Financial Bank TX | 100.0% | 258% total 327%
|
🔒 | 2.33% |
| Southside Bank TX | 22.1% | 289% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Great Plains National Bank OK | 19.6% | 243% total 333%
|
🔒 | 2.30% |
| Lamar National Bank TX | 53.3% | 200% total 291%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Security National Bank Of Omaha NE | 14.1% | 238% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 13.1% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| International Bank Of Commerce OK | 3.1% | 127% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Bank TX | 16.1% | 219% total 304%
|
🔒 | 1.20% |
| Cornerstone Capital Bank, Ssb TX | 2.0% | 147% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| American Nation Bank OK | 22.3% | 235% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Guaranty Bank LA | 5.4% | 235% total 325%
|
🔒 | 2.88% |
| Community National Bank TX | 2.2% | 164% total 224%
|
🔒 | 2.52% |
| Stellar Bank TX | 1.5% | 246% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Austin County State Bank TX | 12.5% | 152% total 263%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Bank 7 OK | 6.6% | 252% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Broadway National Bank TX | 1.1% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Commonwealth Business Bank CA | 7.1% | 259% total 453%
|
🔒 | 1.29% |
| Bank Of Whittier, National Association CA | 15.2% | 107% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Granbury TX | 5.0% | 172% total 196%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| Liberty National Bank OK | 5.8% | 214% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Worthington Bank TX | 100.0% | 292% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pilgrim Bank TX | 5.8% | 184% total 251%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank TX | 22.5% | 211% total 316%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Mid Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 1.5% | 271% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Texas Heritage National Bank TX | 10.3% | 276% total 363%
|
🔒 | 2.37% |
| Open Bank CA | 1.9% | 255% total 458%
|
🔒 | 3.02% |
| Texas Regional Bank TX | 13.1% | 295% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Herring Bank TX | 5.7% | 255% total 335%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| First State Bank TX | 0.9% | 116% total 183%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| R Bank TX | 2.5% | 256% total 418%
|
🔒 | 2.76% |
| Grand Bank OK | 10.5% | 289% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Liberty Bank OK | 6.4% | 288% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Security State Bank & Trust TX | 0.5% | 266% total 346%
|
🔒 | 3.45% |
| Texana Bank, National Association TX | 0.2% | 132% total 298%
|
🔒 | 2.70% |
| Trinity Capital Bank Of Texas TX | 100.0% | 379% total 515%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| North Dallas Bank & Trust Co. TX | 100.0% | 339% total 470%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Inwood National Bank TX | 100.0% | 325% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| American Bank, National Association TX | 100.0% | 347% total 357%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Spectra Bank TX | 100.0% | 429% total 627%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Texas Republic Bank, National Association TX | 95.0% | 310% total 444%
|
🔒 | 1.55% |
| Harmony Bank TX | 94.5% | 324% total 420%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Dominion Bank TX | 94.0% | 335% total 399%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pinnacle Bank TX | 82.9% | 352% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| State Bank Of Texas TX | 76.6% | 484% total 484%
|
🔒 | 2.18% |
| One World Bank TX | 76.4% | 380% total 566%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Liberty Capital Bank TX | 69.7% | 372% total 439%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ciera Bank TX | 65.6% | 356% total 448%
|
🔒 | 1.42% |
| Cattlemens Bank OK | 38.5% | 310% total 457%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Interbank OK | 38.0% | 451% total 470%
|
🔒 | 2.57% |
| Texas Bank TX | 33.3% | 389% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| Community National Bank & Trust Of Texas TX | 29.4% | 350% total 487%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 29.4% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| American National Bank & Trust TX | 19.0% | 388% total 453%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| Valliance Bank OK | 18.8% | 380% total 534%
|
🔒 | 0.86% |
| Blue Sky Bank OK | 18.7% | 349% total 490%
|
🔒 | 3.42% |
| Vantage Bank Texas TX | 18.1% | 314% total 424%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| Cendera Bank TX | 16.7% | 310% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Legacy Bank & Trust Company MO | 13.2% | 483% total 521%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 12.2% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| Farmers Bank & Trust Company AR | 11.4% | 365% total 462%
|
🔒 | 1.13% |
| American Bank Of Commerce TX | 8.7% | 365% total 507%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Ubank TX | 5.1% | 489% total 597%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Pcb Bank CA | 3.6% | 304% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 3.4% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Chambers Bank AR | 2.2% | 302% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| The First National Bank Of Ballinger TX | 0.0% | 152% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 60 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Charles Schwab Bank, Ssb TX · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Charles Schwab Premier Bank, Ssb TX · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Huntington National Bank OH · Charles Schwab Trust Bank TX · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Monet Bank TX · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Truist Bank NC · Texas Exchange Bank TX · Tbk Bank, Ssb TX · Regions Bank AL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Tib National Association TX · Colonial Savings, F.a. TX · Capital One, National Association VA · First Command Bank TX · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Tolleson Private Bank TX · Bank Of Desoto, National Association TX · First National Bank Of Burleson TX · Method Bank OK · Amarillo National Bank TX · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Commercial State Bank TX · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Cypress Bank, Ssb TX · Citibank, National Association SD · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Bokf, National Association OK · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Bank Ozk AR · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · East West Bank CA · Umb Bank, National Association MO · First Horizon Bank TN · Nbh Bank CO · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Busey Bank IL · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Glacier Bank MT · Metro City Bank GA · Centennial Bank AR · Midfirst Bank OK · Woodforest National Bank TX · Cathay Bank CA · Encore Bank AR · Woori America Bank NY · Bank Of Hope CA · Simmons Bank AR · Wafd Bank WA · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Nexbank TX · Trinity Bank, N.a. TX · Dallas Capital Bank, National Association TX · The Cowboy Bank Of Texas TX · The Bankers Bank OK
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First National Bank And Trust Company Of Weatherford | $330M | 215% total 326%
|
5.97% | 🔒 |
| T Bank, National Association | $471M | 142% total 394%
|
4.42% | 🔒 |
| Monet Bank | $294M | 29% total 29%
|
37.36% | 🔒 |
| Tbk Bank, Ssb | $860M | 94% total 120%
|
4.94% | 🔒 |
| Tib National Association | $322M | 59% total 70%
|
3.20% | 🔒 |
| Nexbank | $1.5B | 116% total 117%
|
2.55% | 🔒 |
| Citizens National Bank Of Texas | $1.2B | 215% total 416%
|
2.19% | 🔒 |
| State Bank Of Texas | $2.1B | 484% total 484%
|
2.18% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX sits comfortably in slack territory: its $1.12bn CMBS maturing within 24 months is matched against $7.48bn of room after committed draws at the region's qualifying banks, a wall-to-room ratio of 0.15 — well under the metro median, with slack holding at 0.10 on a before-committed-draws basis. With 104 banks qualifying against 28 excluded, the capacity reading for DFW does not appear to be an exclusion artifact.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.12bn
- … across this many loans
- 72
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $11.72bn
- Committed construction draws
- $6.72bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $7.48bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.15
- Rank, most strained
- 172
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.10
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 104
- … excluded from the calculation
- 28
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $5.99bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.15 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
172 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19100 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-0.5%
Same-Store Revenue
0.0%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
-0.2%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | +1.2% | +0.2% | 95.1% | -0.3% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | +0.4% | -1.3% | 95.7% | -2.0% | 2026-04-28 |
| MAA | -2.1% | +0.8% | 95.0% | +0.9% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | -1.5% | +0.3% | 96.6% | +0.7% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
99 local distress events in the past year (7,469 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2027-01-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Plano
2027-01-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Plano
2026-10-25
CLOSURE
Dallas
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-15
CLOSURE
Dallas
2026-10-13
CLOSURE
Dallas
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Dallas
2026-09-25
CLOSURE
Dallas
What has actually happened on the ground in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX recently?
Over the past 365 days, the visible on-the-ground activity in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX is concentrated in store closures and layoff notices: the record shows 49 store closures and 49 warn notices, with 7,469 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. On the capital-markets side, CRE-likely bankruptcies register at 101, but this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, so it should not be read as Dallas-specific distress.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 49
- WARN layoff notices
- 49
- Jobs on those notices
- 7,469
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 101
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19100 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.