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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Columbia, SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · SC
The read
$290M of CMBS across 26 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($121M, 42% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 15 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,050 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Columbia, a Clean CMBS Book and a Street That Says Otherwise
Columbia's securitized book is small and, on paper, calm: $290M of CMBS spread across 26 loans, with zero recorded in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent as of July 2026. The distress rate sits at 0.0% and has been flat in the filed record — well below the national mark — and the median debt-service coverage of 1.97 on this book leaves little daylight between the figures and the servicer's silence. For desks pricing this metro, the story is less about repair than about how little stress has surfaced to date.
The weight in the book is a maturity question, not a performance one. The heaviest load lands in 2030, when $121M comes due — 42% of the entire metro book — dwarfing the thin slivers scattered across 2027, 2029 and 2031. None of that 2030 paper carries distress today. Among the three banks with local exposure, none are flagged distressed, though one sits on early-warning watch.
The counterweight is on the ground. The past year brought 15 distress events across the metro — nine store closures and six layoff notices totaling 1,050 jobs — a filed real-economy record running against an otherwise quiet credit page. Unemployment reads 4.2% as of August 2026, down 0.4 points year over year. The read here is a book that hasn't cracked, carried over a local economy throwing off more distress signals than the loan tape reflects.
Written 2026-10-20
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$71M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
9
Layoff Notices (1y)
6 / 1,050 jobs
0.33% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
26 / $290M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
-0.4pp yr
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%5.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 314,609 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.4% — $18M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-6.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.6pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-7.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 7 loans, $78M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 7.9% elsewhere — worth 2.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$71M — 24% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $224M of the metro's $290M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$71M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 11 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$165M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.43× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$165M
After Committed Draws
$67M / −59%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.43×
Banks In Footprint
11 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $194M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $98M
comes out of the room above, leaving $67M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $96M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
7 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 11 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security Federal Bank SC | 14.4% | 142% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.95% |
| First Reliance Bank SC | 26.8% | 206% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 2.0% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 8.7% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 52.9% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| The Citizens Bank SC | 3.6% | 102% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Arthur State Bank SC | 6.7% | 175% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Coastal Carolina National Bank SC | 9.5% | 266% total 364%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank NC | 0.2% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First Community Bank SC | 55.7% | 316% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 0.6% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
Not counted — 17 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Farmers And Merchants Bank Of South Carolina SC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · First Horizon Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Optus Bank SC
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optus Bank | $271M | 119% total 267%
|
1.30% | 🔒 |
| First Palmetto Bank | $453M | 266% total 409%
|
0.01% | 🔒 |
| First Community Bank | $1.1B | 316% total 473%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Columbia, SC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Columbia, SC carries a wall_to_room of 1.06 against a maturing_bal of $70.6mm across maturing_loans of 9, ranking rank_most_strained of 275 metros — more strained than the typical metro, and well above the median ratio. That headline reading is softened considerably by committed draws: wall_to_room_before_committed_draws is 0.43, leaving room_after_committed of $66.7mm out of room_before_committed of $164.7mm. Capacity here rests on banks_qualifying of 11 with banks_excluded_here of 7, and since explained_by_exclusion is false, the strain is not simply an artifact of excluded lenders; distressed_share sits at 0.0%, so this is a concentration-capacity question rather than a credit-event one, and the wall itself is CMBS-only at $290.0mm of UPB.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $70.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 9
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $164.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $194.2mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $66.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.06
- Rank, most strained
- 56
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.43
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 11
- … excluded from the calculation
- 7
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $290.0mm
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.06 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
56 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17900 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
15 local distress events in the past year (1,050 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · West Columbia
2026-10-18
LAYOFF
105 jobs · Richland
2026-10-16
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-09-17
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-09-15
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
254 jobs · Fairfield
2026-08-24
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Columbia
2026-08-08
CLOSURE
West Columbia
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Columbia
2026-06-07
LAYOFF
451 jobs · Lexington
2026-05-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-07
LAYOFF
62 jobs · Lexington
2026-01-30
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Lexington
What has actually happened on the ground in Columbia, SC recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window, the vetted reading for Columbia, SC shows 9 store closures and 6 WARN notices, with 1,050 jobs affected, a figure that is a floor since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. The count of 1 CRE bankruptcy is a state proxy rather than a metro-native figure, so it should not be read as activity within the metro itself.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 9
- WARN layoff notices
- 6
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,050
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17900 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.