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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Colorado Springs, CO
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CO
The read
$436M of CMBS across 32 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($233M, 53% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 7 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (15 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Filed Record, With the Load Stacked in 2029
Colorado Springs carries a modest $436 million of CMBS across 32 loans, and the servicer-declared record on that book is pristine: distress stands at 0.0% as of July 2026, flat through the filed history. Median debt-service coverage sits at a comfortable 1.64. There is no delinquency or special-servicing flag to underwrite around here — the question is concentration, not condition.
That concentration is real. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $233 million — 53% of the entire book — comes due. For now every maturity bucket, 2029 included, shows a 0.0% distress rate, so the refinancing test is a future one rather than a present problem. Among the metro's six banks, none are distressed, though two sit in early-warning territory.
The on-the-ground signal is light but not silent: seven distress events over the past year — six store closures and one layoff notice totaling 15 jobs. Against a metro where office-using employment counts 71,338 jobs, down 0.5% year over year, and unemployment at 4.7% has risen 0.8 point, the backdrop is softening at the edges while the filed credit record holds clean.
Written 2026-10-21
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$80M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 6
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
6
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 15 jobs
0.01% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
32 / $436M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.7%
+0.8pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
71,338
-0.5% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Colorado Springs, CO right now?
The distress picture for Colorado Springs is split but telling. Of the six pair readings, zero are both elevated, three are both quiet, and three disagree. The store-closures leg is the only one reading elevated — with 9 closures, a rank of 44 of 392 by count and 69 by rate at 3.46 closures per 100,000 jobs — while WARN notices sit at 0, bank CRE over the noncurrent line reads $180.6mm (5.29% of allocated dollars), and securitized special servicing is at 0 rows. Where they disagree, the mechanism is clear: small operators failing below the WARN filing floor, tenants leaving before lender balance sheets show it, and retail stress on buildings the tape doesn't hold. The three quiet pairs agree on absence at the bank and CMBS level, but the closures leg is the leading indicator here.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
9 closures | 3.46 per 100k jobs | 44 of 392 | 69 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$180.6mm | 5.29% | 123 of 393 | 143 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 260,105 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 369,714 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $3,412.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $446.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17820 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Colorado Springs, CO, and which cannot be read?
In Colorado Springs, CO, the only elevated distress signal is store closures, with 9 store closures over the past year. Distress in the CRE-credit channel is notably absent: there are 0 loans in special servicing, CMBS special-servicing UPB sits at $0.0mm (a 0.0% share of metro UPB), and 0 distressed banks with $0 in distressed bank assets. However, the reading for lender-level troubled CRE exposure is available at $180.6mm in distressed lender CRE. Meanwhile, the signal for WARN notices is unavailable, as the count is reported as 0.0 despite being listed, so that figure cannot be read as elevated. Overall, the phase is "early," indicating real-economy deterioration has yet to translate into meaningful CRE-credit distress.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.41bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 18.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $180.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 15.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 9
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17820 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.7%
+0.8pp yr
Last 24 months
3.6%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 260,105 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.2% — $22M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
-4.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-6.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 6 loans, $152M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.3% elsewhere — worth 2.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$80M — 18% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $418M of the metro's $436M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$80M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 19 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$329M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.24× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$329M
After Committed Draws
$207M / −37%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.24×
Banks In Footprint
19 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $158M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $122M
comes out of the room above, leaving $207M,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $36M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 19
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
7 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 19 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anb Bank CO | 13.6% | 166% total 242%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Integrity Bank & Trust CO | 100.0% | 190% total 371%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| First National Bank Colorado CO | 26.9% | 101% total 181%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers State Bank Of Calhan CO | 84.5% | 184% total 204%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| 5star Bank CO | 79.6% | 228% total 299%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 6.5% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Adams Bank & Trust NE | 10.7% | 185% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| Pikes Peak National Bank CO | 100.0% | 176% total 344%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Eastern Colorado Bank CO | 15.8% | 175% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Waypoint Bank NE | 18.6% | 198% total 303%
|
🔒 | 1.15% |
| Inbank NM | 5.2% | 224% total 355%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Alpine Bank CO | 0.5% | 190% total 259%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Herring Bank TX | 11.0% | 255% total 335%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Bank Of Colorado CO | 2.3% | 292% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Kirkpatrick Bank OK | 16.5% | 384% total 449%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pb&t Bank CO | 8.3% | 317% total 480%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| American Bank Of Commerce TX | 2.2% | 365% total 507%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| United Business Bank CA | 0.7% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Oakstar Bank MO | 0.6% | 315% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
Not counted — 22 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Stockmens Bank CO · Keybank National Association OH · Bank19 TX · Rocky Mountain Bank & Trust CO · Tbk Bank, Ssb TX
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Umb Bank, National Association MO · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Nbh Bank CO · Busey Bank IL · The Central Trust Bank MO · First Interstate Bank MT · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Glacier Bank MT · Columbia Bank OR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers State Bank Of Calhan | $82M | 184% total 204%
|
0.71% | 🔒 |
| Integrity Bank & Trust | $167M | 190% total 371%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| Stockmens Bank | $157M | 99% total 225%
|
0.10% | 🔒 |
| 5star Bank | $191M | 228% total 299%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Pikes Peak National Bank | $62M | 176% total 344%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Colorado Springs, CO have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
On the evidence in this reading, yes — Colorado Springs looks to have ample bank capacity against its visible maturity wall: $80.0mm of CMBS maturing within 24 months across 10 maturing_loans sits against $206.9mm of room_after_committed (or $328.7mm of room_before_committed), a wall_to_room of 0.39 and a wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.24, with distressed_share at 0.0% and 19 banks_qualifying versus 11 banks_excluded_here. Two cautions temper that conclusion: the room figure is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measured lending capacity, and the wall covers only CMBS, so the ratio is an upper bound on what local banks would need to absorb rather than the metro's full maturity load; the ranking of 99 out of 275 metros (counting from the most strained) also places it more strained than the median despite the comfortable headline ratio.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $80.0mm
- … across this many loans
- 10
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $328.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $157.6mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $206.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.39
- Rank, most strained
- 99
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.24
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 19
- … excluded from the calculation
- 11
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $436.2mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.39 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
99 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17820 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
7 local distress events in the past year (15 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Colorado Springs
2026-03-13
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2026-03-13
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2026-03-13
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2026-03-13
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-11-07
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-11-07
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Woodland Park
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-06-19
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-03-31
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2025-03-31
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2024-12-31
CLOSURE
Colorado Springs
2022-08-01
LAYOFF
36 jobs · El Paso
2020-12-03
LAYOFF
144 jobs · Colorado Springs
What has actually happened on the ground in Colorado Springs, CO recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground record for Colorado Springs, CO is thin: 6 store closures, 1 WARN notice, and 15 jobs affected, with the jobs figure a floor since notices stating no headcount contribute zero. CRE bankruptcies register at 0, though that is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 6
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 15
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17820 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.