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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Cleveland, OH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OH
The read
$2.1B of CMBS across 100 loans. Office is both the largest book ($589M) and the most distressed (31.3% vs 11.1% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($553M, 26% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 21.7% as of 2026-07. 38 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,648 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries Cleveland, and the filed record is holding its line
Cleveland's CMBS exposure runs to $2.1 billion across 100 loans, and office does the heavy lifting on both sides of the ledger. At $589 million it is the largest book in the metro, and at a 31.3% distress rate it is also the most troubled — nearly triple the 11.1% national office mark. That is the number that defines this market: when the biggest slice of the book is also the one special servicers and 60-day delinquencies have flagged most heavily, the concentration speaks for itself.
The maturity calendar pushes its heaviest load out to 2029, when $553 million comes due — 26% of the entire book. For now the pressure is contained in the filed record rather than building: the distress rate reads 21.7% as of July 2026, flat on the quarter. Median DSCR across the book sits at 1.67, and the trend line is neither tightening nor easing on the data in hand.
Beneath the loan tape, the on-the-ground signal is active. Cleveland logged 38 distress events over the past year — 15 store closures and 23 layoff notices — touching 1,648 jobs. It is a reminder that the servicer-declared figures and the street-level record are two different lenses on the same metro, and here both are worth watching.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$429M / 20.4%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$604M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
15
Layoff Notices (1y)
23 / 1,648 jobs
0.18% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
100 / $2.1B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
1.8%
-1.8pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
195,211
-2.2% yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Cleveland, OH, and which cannot be read?
Cleveland, OH shows elevated distress across several fronts, with the realized credit side and the real-economy side firing together. On the banking front, distressed lender CRE exposure stands at $1.12bn, while the bank CRE-at-risk rate at the 90th percentile is 0.5%—both materially elevated, even though distressed bank assets are reported as 0 (no bank failures). In CMBS, the special-servicing UPB is $469.0mm, representing 21.6% of metro UPB, a sharply high ratio. Ground-level signals are also active: there were 11 CMBS loans in special servicing, 16 store closures over the past year, and 11 WARN notices. The overall phase is peak, with a confirmed sequence, and convergence stands at 4. Notably, the reading on bank CRE allocation share is 0.9%, but that is an aggregate share, not a distress signal per se. The only figure that cannot be read from this dataset is the count of distressed banks—it is 0, so that signal is not elevated, though the bank distressed CRE exposure clearly is.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $469.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 21.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $19.23bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 0.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.12bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 11
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 16
- WARN notices (past year)
- 11
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17410 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
1.8%
-1.8pp yr
Last 24 months
1.8%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 899,334 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 20.4% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.6% — $289M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+13.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
+14.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+12.9pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Mixed-Use: 8 loans, $344M, where the same type runs 4.8% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$604M — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 21.7% now (2026-07), +0.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.3B of the metro's $2.1B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$604M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 12 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.5B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.42× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.5B
After Committed Draws
$1.0B / −30%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.42×
Banks In Footprint
12 / 0 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $483M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $435M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.0B,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $48M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 12 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dollar Bank, Federal Savings Bank PA | 24.7% | 168% total 187%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lakewood OH | 99.2% | 138% total 185%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 4.4% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 4.8% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| The Farmers National Bank Of Canfield OH | 15.6% | 198% total 285%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| Buckeye Community Bank OH | 100.0% | 145% total 353%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 3.4% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Civista Bank OH | 9.8% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 6.3% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 0.7% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Main Street Bank Corp. OH | 3.6% | 151% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 10.1% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
Not counted — 20 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Keybank National Association OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lorain OH · The Andover Bank OH · The Northern Trust Company IL · Monet Bank TX · Bny Mellon, National Association PA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Peoples Bank OH · Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woodforest National Bank TX · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in Cleveland, OH have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Cleveland's banks look adequately positioned to refinance the visible maturity load: against $604.3mm of maturing loans, 24 loans in all, qualifying institutions retain $1.46bn of room before committed draws and $1.02bn after committed draws of $483.2mm, leaving a wall_to_room of 0.59 and a wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.42. That 0.59 sits above the median, ranking Cleveland 79 of 275 from the most strained, though the usual cautions apply: the reading rests on 12 banks_qualifying with 6 banks_excluded_here, so the capacity is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement, the $2.10bn cmbs_upb captures only what this platform can see, and a distressed_share of 20.4% suggests the strain that does exist is concentrated rather than broad.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $604.3mm
- … across this many loans
- 24
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.46bn
- Committed construction draws
- $483.2mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.02bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.59
- Rank, most strained
- 79
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.42
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 12
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 20.4%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $2.10bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.59 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
79 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17410 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
38 local distress events in the past year (1,648 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Lorain
2026-09-25
CLOSURE
Cleveland
2026-09-11
CLOSURE
Parma
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Parma
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Parma/Cuyahoga
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Parma/Cuyahoga
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Parma/Cuyahoga
2026-06-29
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Valley City/Medina
2026-06-29
LAYOFF
43 jobs · Valley City/Medina
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Beachwood
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
110 jobs · Cleveland/Cuyahoga
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
110 jobs · Cleveland/Cuyahoga
2026-04-09
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Eastlake/Lake
2026-04-09
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Eastlake/Lake
2026-03-27
LAYOFF
11 jobs · Beachwood/Cuyahoga
What has actually happened on the ground in Cleveland, OH recently?
Over the trailing window_days of 365, the vetted record for Cleveland, OH shows 15 store closures and 23 WARN notices affecting 1,648 jobs; note that the jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies register as 0, though this is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count and is not comparable across the feed-coverage change on 2026-09-16. No additional ground-level readings are available in the figures provided.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 15
- WARN layoff notices
- 23
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,648
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17410 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.